5. Understanding Legal Reasoning

2019 ◽  
pp. 127-159
Author(s):  
James Holland ◽  
Julian Webb
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Specific Process ◽  
Theoretical Construction ◽  
Legal Arguments ◽  
Legal Contexts ◽  
The Way

This chapter focuses on legal reasoning more conceptually. It aims to develop a deeper understanding of what is involved in legal reasoning within the process of adjudication, focusing on how legal arguments seek to provide justification for specific decisions, and to help to predict the form of argument that judges may prefer. Legal reasoning is presented first as a theoretical construction, on which there is much debate, then as a specific process. The chapter explores the philosophical territory of legal theory or jurisprudence, examining the theories that underpin legal reasoning and the way that reasoning techniques are employed in legal contexts.

Argumenty i rozumowania prawnicze w konstytucyjnym państwie prawa: Komentarz

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Grabowski
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Interdisciplinary Research ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Legal Argumentation ◽  
Norms And Values ◽  
Legal Arguments ◽  
Latin American Countries

LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND REASONING IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GOVERNED STATE: THE COMMENTARY The interdisciplinary research on legal argumentation presented in this volume, entitled Legal Arguments and Reasoning in the Constitutional Law-governed State: The Commentary (edited by Monika Florczak-Wątor and Andrzej Grabowski), is primarily inspired by the theory of constitutional law-governed state developed in Italy, Spain, and Latin American countries, by scholars proposing doctrines of positivist or postpositivist constitutionalism and neoconstitutionalism. As explained by Andrzej Grabowski in the “Introduction” [pp. 23–29], the theory is focused first and foremost on legal reasoning as it is conducted in the process of judicial law application and with particular stress on how it is affected by constitutional norms and values. Legal theory on its own does not seem to possess sufficient means to examine legal reasoning in constitutional law-governed states adequately—such an endeavour might be done far better with the help of dogmatics of constitutional law. Hence, this commentary on 91 arguments, topoi, and legal reasoning schemata result from the research team’s joint efforts composed of 18 legal theorists and constitutionalists.

scholarly journals How Reflective and Critical Norm-Usage Paves the Way to the Public Power of Judgement

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-188
Author(s):  
Karolina M. Cern
Keyword(s):  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Public Power ◽  
The Public ◽  
Democratic Polity ◽  
Power Needs ◽  
The Way

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Neil MacCormick’s conception of norm-usage makes it necessary to address the concept of the public power of judgement as the key concept for understanding the democratic legitimization of current law. Therefore, firstly I analyse MacCormick’s conception of norm-usage, secondly I demonstrate that it leads to the idea of the institutionalisation of judgemental–interpretative practice, and thirdly, I show that the latter paves the way to the public power of judgement. Finally, I argue that this power needs to be elaborated in terms of competencies which are broader than legal skills and legal reasoning, and, further, that these competencies condition the use of both legal skills and reasoning. Importantly, MacCormick’s contribution to understanding the public power of judgement—when further developed—may indicate the profound role of comprehending the proper significance of law in a democratic polity and its relationship to the citizenry.

INFLUENCE OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY ON ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE THROUGH THE PERSPECTIVE OF H. L. A. HART

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (18) ◽  
pp. 315-330
Author(s):  
Luana Sion Li
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Theoretical Development ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Legal Philosopher ◽  
Linguistic Philosophy ◽  
The Way

This article discusses the influence of emerging linguistic philosophy theories in the 20th century on the development of analytical jurisprudence through an examination of the way those theories influenced the legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart. Although Hart is significantly influenced by linguistic philosophy, his legal theory could not have been developed solely with it. This is evidenced by Hart’s disownment of the essay Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, his attempt to employ ideas from ordinary language philosophy in the context of law. Hart’s theoretical development shows that he was above all not a linguistic, but a legal philosopher; and that analytical jurisprudence, albeit influenced by linguistic philosophy, depends on aspects beyond it.

scholarly journals AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN: REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND ISSUES (COMPARATIVE ASPECTS)

2020 ◽  
pp. 80-88
Author(s):  
Y. Stoilov
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Solid Core ◽  
Regulatory Requirements ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Way

The article compares conditions and procedures for the adoption of Constitution and amendments to thecurrent constitution between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Kazakhstan. The criteria used inthe legal theory for the classification of the constitutions according to the way of their change are used. Bothconstitutions refer to the category of the hard. Bulgaria has a solid core of the constitution, which can onlybe changed by a specially elected institution — a Great (Grand) National Assembly. In Kazakhstan there areeven texts that are not subject to change. The experience of several changes to the two basic laws has beenconsidered. Whit them some of the questions have been answered by juridical theory and practice, whileothers remain open. At the end, conclusions are drawn from the parallel between the changes to the bothconstitutions, some of which are of universal significance.

The Quantification of Law: Counting, Predicting, and Valuating

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Viana Ribeiro
Keyword(s):  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Public Institutions ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Legal Professionals ◽  
The Public ◽  
Past Behavior ◽  
Legal Arguments ◽  
Institutional Actors ◽  
Massive Databases

Legal reasoning is increasingly quantified. Developers in the market and public institutions in the legal system are making use of massive databases of court opinions and other legal communications to craft algorithms to assess the effectiveness of legal arguments or predict court judgments; tasks that were once seen as the exclusive province of seasoned lawyers’ obscure knowledge. New legal technologies promise to search heaps of documents for useful evidence, and to analyze dozens of factors to quantify a lawsuit’s odds of success. Legal quantification initiatives depend on the availability of reliable data about the past behavior of courts that institutional actors have attempted to control. The development of initiatives in legal quantification is visible as public bodies craft their own tools for internal use and access by the public, and private companies create new ways to valorize the “raw data” provided by courts and lawyers by generating information useful to the strategies of legal professionals, as well as to the investors that re-valorize legal activity by securitizing legal risk through litigation funding.

On subject`s specificity of the non-classic Philosophy of Law: continuing of the dialogue

2021 ◽  
pp. 48
Author(s):  
Aleksei V. Stovba
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
Philosophical Methods ◽  
Classical Philosophy ◽  
Positive Results

This article is a response to the criticism of Prof. O.V. Martyshin in the journal “State and Law” (2020. No. 12). The author has defended the thesis that there is no doubt as to whether the application of new terminology and philosophical methods of legal reasoning borrowed from contemporary philosophical trends and propagated by the representatives of the non-classical Philosophy of Law has brought positive results in Philosophy of Law and General legal theory.

Do Not Ignore the Elephant... Exploring the Role of Intuition and Experience in Judicial Decision-Making

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Tvrdíková
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Deliberative System ◽  
Experiential System ◽  
Analytical System

If we look at the literature about judicial decision-making and interpretation of law, we can find many texts which are dedicated to legal arguments, logic and legal reasoning – in those texts the rationality, analytical and logical thinking is glorified and an interpretation seems ‘just’ as a logical operation where judges subsume certain facts under general legal norm or norms, those norms are formulated linguistically, so it seems that the whole job of judges is to analyze texts. What we can see more rarely are discussions and texts exploring the role of intuitions, feelings and emotions and their role in judicial decision-making – at least in the Czech Republic. Those of our faculties are seen as the source of bias and distortion. Even if we look to the past, those themes are not so common among legal theorists and philosophers – especially in our tradition where we are still influenced by Hans Kelsen and František Weyr and their normative theory – but we can find exceptions and those are the American legal realists. In this paper, we will show that their observations and insights seem to be right. How can we know it? Because in last decades cognitive scientists have made big progress in the area of decision-making and it seems that we are not so rational as we thought us to be. They have explored that our thinking does not take place only through the deliberative system but, surprisingly, there is also another one system which influences our decisions. This system is automatic, fast, and intuitive – some call this system S1, Seymour Epstein an experiential system. This automatic system is more influential than our deliberative system because it is always heard – we can use Jonathan Haidt’s metaphor of an elephant and a rider. S1, the intuitive, experiential system, is an elephant and S2, the deliberative, analytical system is the rider – in legal theory, we have talked about the rider a lot but we do not explore the elephant sufficiently. This paper will try to uncover the nature of the elephant.

Fiduciary Law as Equity’s Child

Equity ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 113-151
Author(s):  
Irit Samet
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Contractual Obligation ◽  
The Law ◽  
Duty Of Loyalty ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Way

This chapter challenges the argument that one of Equity’s most distinctive doctrines, fiduciary law, must be fused with a common law doctrine—the law of contract. In particular, it highlights the disadvantages of transforming the equitable duty of loyalty into an ordinary contractual obligation. The chapter first considers the ‘contractarian’ interpretation of fiduciary law according to which fiduciary duties are no more than a species of contractual obligations before explaining why, in contrast with the contractarian argument, Equity was right in claiming that the fiduciary relationship was essentially different from contract. After making the case of why fiduciary law should be treated as a sui generis equitable doctrine, the chapter examines two features of equitable fiduciary law that will change dramatically if the fusion suggestion is adopted (the language in which it is set and the way into the relationship) and shows the adverse consequences of moving in that direction. It concludes with the contention that the concept of ‘conscience’ still has an active role to play in the legal reasoning about fiduciaries.

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