INFLUENCE OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY ON ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE THROUGH THE PERSPECTIVE OF H. L. A. HART

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (18) ◽  
pp. 315-330
Author(s):  
Luana Sion Li
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Theoretical Development ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Legal Philosopher ◽  
Linguistic Philosophy ◽  
The Way

This article discusses the influence of emerging linguistic philosophy theories in the 20th century on the development of analytical jurisprudence through an examination of the way those theories influenced the legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart. Although Hart is significantly influenced by linguistic philosophy, his legal theory could not have been developed solely with it. This is evidenced by Hart’s disownment of the essay Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, his attempt to employ ideas from ordinary language philosophy in the context of law. Hart’s theoretical development shows that he was above all not a linguistic, but a legal philosopher; and that analytical jurisprudence, albeit influenced by linguistic philosophy, depends on aspects beyond it.

Ordinary Language Philosophy in Aarhus

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-83
Author(s):  
Martin Ejsing Christensen ◽  
Thomas Bohl
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Important Influence ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
World War ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Work Done ◽  
The Way

Abstract This paper examines the way in which Ordinary Language Philosophy came to exert an important influence on the work done at Aarhus University’s department of philosophy in the latter half of the 20th century. The first section depicts the rise of Ordinary Language Philosophy as an international movement centered around Oxford in the wake of World War ii. The second section goes on to describe how it was brought to Aarhus by Professor Justus Hartnack, who had been deeply influenced by the movement during stays abroad in the UK and the US. The following three sections move on to describe some of the important ways in which Ordinary Language Philosophy has influenced the work of three of Hartnack’s most prominent students (Hans Fink, Uffe Juul Jensen and Jørgen Husted), who have influenced the life of the department in crucial ways from the 1970s until recently. Finally, the paper ends by briefly assessing the legacy and contemporary influence of Ordinary Language Philosophy in Aarhus.

scholarly journals Linguistic Philosophy in the Context of the Anthropological Turn of Culture

wisdom ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 45-53
Author(s):  
Viktoriia SLABOUZ ◽  
Yuliia BUTKO ◽  
Leonid MOZHOVYI ◽  
Nataliia NIKITINA ◽  
Nataliia MATORYNA
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Main Idea ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Modern Culture ◽  
European Culture ◽  
Self Worth ◽  
European Thought ◽  
Linguistic Philosophy

The article considers the role of the ideas of linguistic philosophy in the context of the anthropological turn of culture that happened in the middle of the 20th century. Culture has constantly been developing on the horizon of man, and all its initiations have always met at the point of “life of man”, which is impossible without language as an essential anthropological attribute of man. The purports of linguistic philosophy (ordinary language philosophy) are relevant as never before. The study presented is based on the phenomenology of Nietzsche’s ideas of returning a new European thought to the origins of modern culture –the idea of a sovereign individual, which is determined by power over himself and his destiny, the ideas of the representatives and founders of linguistic philosophy, the slogan by I. Kant “Sapere aude!” (“Dare to think for yourself!”), on the historical excursus concerning the origin of the term “anthropological turn”. The anthropological turn in the culture of the 20th century together with the purports of linguistic philosophy brought back and developed further the main idea of new European culture – the idea of the self-worth of life, individuality, and freedom. These events gave a new value meaning to this idea.

High Anxiety, Becalmed Language

2019 ◽  
pp. 247-270
Author(s):  
Ken Hirschkop
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
High Anxiety ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Naked Eye ◽  
Linguistic Philosophy

Chapter 8 looks at ‘linguistic philosophy’ in middle and late Wittgenstein and in J. L. Austin. In ordinary language philosophy, myth emerged not from charismatic demagogues but from the fervid minds of scientistic intellectuals. Wittgenstein and Austin share the conviction that ‘language as such’ is the antidote to the metaphysical entanglements that arise from this scientism. But this ordinary version of ‘language as such’ is not simply present to the naked eye and ear, but is only available as the end result of strategies of philosophical clarification, which make language a manifestation of life. The chapter therefore focuses on Wittgenstein’s idea of the perspicuous representation and Austin’s techniques of drawing out distinctions. It turns out that clarification is an ambiguous exercise: Wittgenstein’s belief that ‘language always works’ runs aground when he compares language to music, which, it turns out, doesn’t work, at least not in the twentieth century.

The Ordinary Language Case for Contextualism and the Relevance of Radical Doubt

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-94
Author(s):  
Michael P. Wolf ◽  
Jeremy Randel Koons
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Everyday Practice ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
The Face ◽  
High Standards

Many contextualist accounts in epistemology appeal to ordinary language and everyday practice as grounds for positing a low-standards knowledge (knowledgeL) that contrasts with high-standards prevalent in epistemology (knowledgeH). We compare these arguments to arguments from the height of “ordinary language” philosophy in the mid 20th century and find that all such arguments face great difficulties. We find a powerful argument for the legitimacy and necessity of knowledgeL (but not of knowledgeH). These appeals to practice leave us with reasons to accept knowledgeL in the face of radical doubts raised by skeptics. We conclude by arguing that by relegating knowledgeH to isolated contexts, the contextualist fails to deal with the skeptical challenge head-on. KnowledgeH and knowledgeL represent competing, incompatible intuitions about knowledge, and we must choose between them. A fallibilist conception of knowledge, formed with proper attention to radical doubts, can address the skeptical challenge without illicit appeal to everyday usage.

scholarly journals Ian Dearden. Do Philosophers Talk Nonsense?

1970 ◽  
Vol 18/2 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-278
Author(s):  
Carl Humphries
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Critical Inquiry ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Position ◽  
Philosophical Writings

In his newly reissued and revised book, the philosopher Ian Dearden at- tempts a critical inquiry into a philosophical position he calls “nonsensi- calism,” which he takes to correspond to the view “that it is possible to be mistaken in thinking one means anything by what one says” (9).1 He holds that an unexamined assumption to this effect is implicit in a large swathe of philosophical work dating from a period stretching throughout most of the 20th century (and to some degree extending to the present day), thanks to the widespread tendency of philosophers to accuse each other of talk- ing nonsense. This is, according to the author of the book, most visible in the earlier and later philosophical writings of Wittgenstein, in logical pos- itivism, and in representatives of the Oxford-based “ordinary language” philosophy movement, as well as in the writings of many of those subse- quently writing under the influence of these. Dearden coins a special term to refer to the sort of error that philosophers are accusing each other of having committed: he calls such cases of error “illusions of meaning.”

Filozoficzne podstawy Herberta L. A. Harta teorii prawa

2021 ◽  
pp. 43-63
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Doliwa
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Innovative Solutions ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
Linguistic Aspect

This article shows H. L. A. Hart as a leading representative of the analytic orientation in legal philosophy. Hart proved that the methods of analytic philosophy yield generous implications to law, where they may promote new ideas and innovative solutions. The text emphasizes the linguistic aspect of Hart’s works; his achievements in legal theory are discussed in the context of the principles of ordinary language philosophy.

Contemporary Metaphysics

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Hazlett
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Early 20Th Century ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Absolute Idealism ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

There is no general agreement or consensus about how to define metaphysics. The word itself derives from the title of one of Aristotle’s books, one that deals with decidedly metaphysical issues, but intuitively metaphysical issues are discussed by Aristotle as much in his other works as in the Metaphysics. Contemporary metaphysics ranges over a broad set of questions: questions about what reality is like, at its most fundamental; questions about the nature of human agency and perception; questions about the legitimacy of metaphysics itself. The only way to know what contemporary metaphysics is about is to understand the relevant texts, issues, and figures. Hence this article, which presents important and influential background readings in the various subareas of metaphysics. These “areas” of metaphysics (like the various “areas” of philosophy) are deeply interconnected, to say the least. Indeed the quotes used here indicate doubts about the very idea of distinct “areas.” On this score, the artificiality of the divisions employed here cannot be overemphasized. This article is concerned with contemporary metaphysics in the “analytic” tradition, and as such it ignores some important philosophers. Most importantly, this article does not cover the historical background to contemporary analytic metaphysics, which includes the Aristotelian tradition that still shapes contemporary metaphysical thinking; the Humean empiricism and Kantian idealism to which analytic metaphysicians owe so much; and finally, the “Absolute Idealism” of F. H. Bradley (the negative reaction to which helped spawn “analytic” philosophy as we know it). Nor does it cover early-20th-century analytic philosophy, including logical positivism, or ordinary language philosophy. The aim here is to provide background reading for those concerned with contemporary metaphysics. The texts selected are mostly from the last half of the 20th century, and, for the most part, they are those that have had the most impact on contemporary debates.

scholarly journals Philosophical and Linguistic Sources of Herbert L. A. Hart’s Theory of Law

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 231-254
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Doliwa
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Innovative Solutions ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Linguistic Aspect

Abstract The paper presents H. L. A. Hart as a leading exponent of the analytic orientation in legal philosophy. Hart showed that the principles and methods of analytic philosophy yield fruitful implications to law, where they may foster fresh ideas and innovative solutions. The text emphasizes the linguistic aspect of Hart’s works; his achievements in legal theory are discussed in the context of the principles of ordinary language philosophy.

Whose Dream Is It Anyway?

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 263-287
Author(s):  
Avner Baz
Keyword(s):  
Ordinary Language ◽  
External World ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Second Line ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
First Line ◽  
Standard Type ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Cartesian Skepticism

I start with two basic lines of response to Cartesian skepticism about the ‘external world’: in the first, which is characteristic of Analytic philosophers to this day, the focus is on the meaning of ‘know’—what it ‘refers’ to, its ‘semantics’ and its ‘pragmatics’; in the second, which characterizes Continental responses to Descartes, the focus is on the philosophizing or meditating subject, and its relation to its body and world. I argue that the first approach is hopeless: if the Cartesian worry that I could be dreaming right now so much as makes sense, the proposal that—under some theory of knowledge (or of ‘knowledge’)—my belief that I am sitting in front of the computer right now may still be (or truly count as) a piece of knowledge, would rightfully seem to the skeptic to be playing with words and missing the point. I then argue that the practice of Ordinary Language Philosophy, which has mostly been linked to the first line of response to Cartesian skepticism, may be seen as actually belonging with the second line of response; and I show how a form of what may be called “Existentialist Ordinary Language Philosophy” can be used to reveal the nonsensicality of the Cartesian skeptical worry. My argument takes its cue from Thompson Clarke’s insight—an insight that Clarke himself has not pursued far or accurately enough—that our concept of Dream is not a concept of the “standard type.”

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