13. Occupiers’ liability

2019 ◽  
pp. 154-166
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

This chapter discusses the law on occupiers’ liability, a form of negligence liability which was governed previously by the common law and now by statute law. The key statutes are the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 which governs duty to lawful visitors and the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984, regarding non-visitors, or trespassers. In determining to whom the duty is owed, it is necessary to identify the status of the entrant onto land. To determine who owes the duty as occupier, the main criterion is control of the land. Exclusion of liability and defences are included.

Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

This chapter discusses the law on occupiers’ liability, a form of negligence liability which was governed previously by the common law and now by statute law. The key statutes are the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 which governs duty to lawful visitors and the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984, regarding non-visitors, or trespassers. In determining to whom the duty is owed, it is necessary to identify the status of the entrant onto land. To determine who owes the duty as occupier, the main criterion is control of the land. Exclusion of liability and defences are included.


2021 ◽  
pp. 157-168
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

This chapter discusses the law on occupiers’ liability, a form of negligence liability which was governed previously by the common law and now by statute law. The key statutes are the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 which governs duty to lawful visitors and the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984, regarding non-visitors, or trespassers. In determining to whom the duty is owed, it is necessary to identify the status of the entrant onto land. To determine who owes the duty as occupier, the main criterion is control of the land. Exclusion of liability and defences are included.


Author(s):  
Thomas J. McSweeney

Priests of the Law tells the story of the first people in the history of the common law to think of themselves as legal professionals: the group of justices who wrote the celebrated treatise known as Bracton. It offers a new interpretation of Bracton and its authors. Bracton was not so much an attempt to explain or reform the early common law as it was an attempt to establish the status and authority of the king’s justices. The justices who wrote it were some of the first people to work full-time in England’s royal courts, at a time when they had no obvious model for the legal professional. They found one in an unexpected place: the Roman-law tradition that was sweeping across Europe in the thirteenth century. They modeled themselves on the jurists of Roman law who were teaching in Italy and France. In Bracton and other texts they produced, the justices of the royal courts worked hard to establish that the nascent common-law tradition was just one constituent part of the Roman-law tradition. Through their writing, this small group of people, working in the courts of an island realm, imagined themselves to be part of a broader European legal culture. They made the case that they were not merely servants of the king. They were priests of the law.


Author(s):  
Waugh John

This chapter explores the law of Australian colonization and its relationship with the laws of Australia's Indigenous peoples. A line of legal continuity links the Australian Constitution to the imposition of British law made during the colonization of Australia and to the decisions of colonial courts that treated the Australian colonies as colonies of settlement. Those decisions, after some initial doubts, displaced the diverse and intricate laws of Australia’s Indigenous peoples, who have occupied the continent for tens of thousands of years. Only in relation to native title to land have later courts made a major reassessment of the status of Indigenous laws. There, the High Court has challenged the factual assumptions of earlier decisions and found accommodation for Indigenous land ownership within the common law, but left the legal framework of colonization otherwise intact.


Author(s):  
Eva Steiner

This chapter examines the law of contract in France and discusses the milestone reform of French contract law. While this new legislation introduces a fresh equilibrium between the contracting parties and enhances accessibility and legal certainty in contract, it does not radically change the state of the law in this area. In addition, it does not strongly impact the traditional philosophical foundations of the law of contract. The reform, in short, looks more like a tidying up operation rather than a far-reaching transformation of the law. Therefore, the chapter argues that it is questionable whether the new law, which was also intended to increase France's attractiveness against the background of a world market dominated by the Common Law, will keep its promise.


Author(s):  
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling

This chapter studies intellectual property (IP). A hallmark of the New Private Law (NPL) is attentiveness to and appreciation of legal concepts and categories, including the traditional categories of the common law. These categories can sometimes usefully be deployed outside of the traditional common law, to characterize, conceptualize, and critique other bodies of law. For scholars interested in IP, for example, common law categories can be used to describe patent, copyright, trademark, and other fields of IP as more or less “property-like” or “tort-like.” Thischapter investigates both the property- and tort-like features of IP to understand the circumstances under which one set of features tends to dominate and why. It surveys several doctrines within the law of copyright that demonstrate how courts move along the property/tort continuum depending on the nature of the copyrighted work at issue—including, in particular, how well the work’s protected contours are defined. This conceptual navigation is familiar, echoing how common law courts have moved along the property/tort continuum to address disputes over distinctive types of tangible resources.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136571272110022
Author(s):  
Jennifer Porter

The common law test of voluntariness has come to be associated with important policy rationales including the privilege against self-incrimination. However, when the test originated more than a century ago, it was a test concerned specifically with the truthfulness of confession evidence; which evidence was at that time adduced in the form of indirect oral testimony, that is, as hearsay. Given that, a century later, confession evidence is now mostly adduced in the form of an audiovisual recording that can be observed directly by the trial judge, rather than as indirect oral testimony, there may be capacity for a different emphasis regarding the question of admissibility. This article considers the law currently operating in Western Australia, Queensland and South Australia to see whether or not, in the form of an audiovisual recording, the exercise of judicial discretion as to the question of the admissibility of confession evidence might be supported if the common law test of voluntariness was not a strict test of exclusion.


1993 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Braham Dabscheck

In October 1992 the federal coalition released Jobsback, a statement of its industrial relations policies. The article situates Jobsback in the context of the evolution of the coalition's industrial relations policies since the Fraser years, outlines its major features, and provides a critique. Jobsback erects a new regulatory schema under a banner of deregulation. Three key elements are contained in Jobsback. They are tribunal avoidance and the use of the common law, legislatively imposed employment rules to ‘aid’ the transition from an award to a non-award system, and enterprise confinement. The article draws attention to the coalition's views concerning industrial conflict, constitutional issues, transitional problems associated with establishing legislatively imposed workplace rules, minima in workplace agreements, the Office of the Employee Advocate, equality before the law and good faith bargaining.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (12) ◽  
pp. 1255-1275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Leible

National legislators approach European law very differently. The reason for these differences lies partly in the historical development of their individual legal cultures. If one pursues a broad interpretation of the term ‘legal culture’ one takes especially into account the style of law and the attitude toward it. Thus legal culture can be defined as the Continental civil law countries’ ideal of a “concise, but comprehensive codification by which the judge can derive solutions for all possible cases through teleological interpretation;” whereas the common law rather limits this concept to “special laws which are interpreted very narrowly by the courts and accordingly are designed by the legislator to the last detail”. Furthermore, one could include the status of a judge, the nature of legal discourse, or the training of legal professionals, as well as the respect accorded to the law by the population when defining the concept of ‘legal culture'.


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