The extent of market concentration in South Africa’s product markets

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 352-364
Author(s):  
Thembalethu Buthelezi ◽  
Thando Mtani ◽  
Liberty Mncube

Abstract Competitive markets can benefit consumers, workers, entrepreneurs, small businesses, and the economy more generally but several indicators suggest the persistence of high levels of market concentration in many of South Africa’s economic sectors. The causes underlying the high levels of concentration and corresponding market power are not clear. This article uses recent data from notified mergers to show the extent of the static level of market concentration (measured using the Herfindahl–Hirschman index). This article argues that consumers and workers would benefit from additional actions to promote effective competition and inclusion in markets.

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-67
Author(s):  
Hottua Manalu

This article discusses about corporation action notification on the competition law perspective. Corporation action notification is a notification obligations by the business actor to the Business Competition Supervisory Commision about corporation action in the form of incorporation, fusion, or company share acquition that caused asset value or sales value is ecxceed specific value. This article concluded that notification is an important instrument to prevent monopolistic practices and unfair competition, because a corporation action has an influence towards business competition, that can increase market concentration and this can make a product price more higher and business actor’s market power become bigger so that can threatening small business actor. However, the notification nowadays applied in Indonesia is notification to the commission after the corporation action has been done, or as known as post-notification, actually is not effective to prevent monopolistic practices and unfair competition, because of the notification is delivered after the corporation action has been done, so that in case the Commission assess that the corporation action is causing monopolistic practices and unfair competition then the revocation is complicated. Therefore, this article is encouraging notification to be done before corporation action is started, as known as pra-notification, so monopolistic  practices and unfair competition possibility can be detected earlier and can be prevented. Abstrak Artikel ini membahas notifikasi aksi korporasi dalam perspektif hukum persaingan usaha. Notifikasi aksi korporasi adalah kewajiban pemberitahuan oleh pelaku usaha kepada Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha atas aksi korporasi baik dalam bentuk penggabungan, peleburan, maupun pengambilalihan saham perseroan yang berakibat nilai aset dan atau nilai penjualannya melebihi jumlah tertentu. Artikel ini menyimpulkan, notifikasi merupakan instrumen penting dalam mencegah praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat, dikarenakan aksi korporasi berpengaruh terhadap persaingan usaha, yaitu menyebabkan bertambahnya konsentrasi pasar yang dapat menyebabkan harga produk semakin tinggi dan kekuatan pasar pelaku usaha menjadi semakin besar sehingga dapat mengancam pebisnis kecil. Namun demikian, notifikasi yang saat ini berlaku di Indonesia, yaitu pemberitahuan kepada Komisi setelah aksi korporasi selesai dilakukan, atau yang dikenali dengan post-notifikasi, sesungguhnya tidak efektif mencegah praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat, dikarenakan notifikasi disampaikan setelah aksi korporasi selesai dilakukan, sehingga dalam hal Komisi menilai aksi korporasi menyebabkan praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat maka pembatalan jelas mengalami kerumitan. Oleh karenanya, artikel ini mendorong notifikasi dilakukan sebelum aksi korporasi dilakukan, yang disebut dengan pra-notifikasi, agar kemungkinan terjadinya praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat diketahui sejak dini dan dapat dicegah.


Author(s):  
Aleksandar Bogojević

Contemporary directions of the market liberalization should lead to a bigger number of market participants and to a bigger degree of competition among them. This again, leads to a more diversified offer and to bigger quality products along with higher level of services with cheaper rates. In order to control the mentioned processes, analysis of market concentration is needed, as well as studying and perfection of the methods that allow measurement of market concentration. The degree of market concentration which on a specific market one or more economic subjects have is defined as ‘’market power’’. Economic efficiency on a specific market largely depends on whether non competitive market structures which produce adverse effects on economic efficiency are existent on that market, which ultimately affects on the overall well – being. Conversance of the degree of concentration of a specific (relevant) market is important so that breaching of the market principles can be timely spotted and so that appropriate measures can be taken. Supervision over the market and the market processes, as well as appliance of specific measuring methods of market concentration have the goal of establishing and maintenance of free market competition in which all of the economic subjects participate under the same conditions.


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 593-602 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT S. TAYLOR

Historically, republicans were of different minds about markets: some, such as Rousseau, reviled them, while others, like Adam Smith, praised them. The recent republican resurgence has revived this issue. Classical liberals such as Gerald Gaus contend that neorepublicanism is inherently hostile to markets, while neorepublicans like Richard Dagger and Philip Pettit reject this characterization—though with less enthusiasm than one might expect. I argue here that the right republican attitude toward competitive markets is celebratory rather than acquiescent and that republicanism demands such markets for the same reason it requires the rule of law: because both are essential institutions for protecting individuals from arbitrary interference. I reveal how competition restrains—and in the limit, even eradicates—market power and thereby helps us realize “market freedom,” i.e., freedom as nondomination in the context of economic exchange. Finally, I show that such freedom necessitates “Anglo-Nordic” economic policies.


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Justus Haucap ◽  
Tobias Wenzel

AbstractThe Internet is characterized by competition between platforms which bring together potential partners of exchange. The degree of competition between these multi-sided platforms und market concentration are determined through (1) the strength of the direct and indirect network effects, (2) the extent of economies of scale, (3) the risk of congestition, (4) platform differentiation, and (5) the possibility of multi-homing. Depending on these factors different market concentrations and barriers to entry result. While there is no general tendency for concentration in the Internet and no general need for special market regulation of online content providers and intermediaries, single platforms may still have long lasting and significant market power which is unlikely to erode fastly, as the example of ebay illustrates.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ufuk Akcigit ◽  
Wenjie Chen ◽  
Federico Diez ◽  
Romain Duval ◽  
Philipp Engler ◽  
...  

Corporate market power has risen in recent decades, and new estimates in this note suggest that the likely wave of small and medium-sized enterprise bankruptcies from the ongoing pandemic will further strengthen market concentration. Whether and how policymakers should address this issue is hotly debated. This note provides new evidence on the policy relevance of rising market power and highlights possible implications for the design of competition policy frameworks and macroeconomic policies.


2020 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2096624
Author(s):  
Marleen Willekens ◽  
Simon Dekeyser ◽  
Liesbeth Bruynseels ◽  
Wieteke Numan

This study examines whether auditor market power is associated with audit quality. Regulators around the world have repeatedly expressed concerns about the high levels of supplier concentration, the limited number of audit suppliers in the audit market, and the potential adverse consequences of their (alleged) market power. Using U.S. data from 2009 to 2017, we examine the effect on audit quality of two competing measures of auditor market power: (a) a “traditional” market concentration measure (Herfindahl index) and (b) a competing measure derived from spatial competition theory (i.e., market share distance from the closest competitor). Following Aobdia, we infer audit quality from two measures of financial reporting quality: (a) the level of absolute abnormal accruals, and (b) the incidence of financial statement restatements. Our results indicate that industry market share distance is positively associated with audit quality, but we do not find an association between market concentration and audit quality. In addition, we find that the positive association between market share distance and audit quality only holds when the incumbent auditor is a market leader, although industry leadership itself is not significantly associated with audit quality. These findings suggest that audit quality is positively affected by a market leader’s industry market share dominance over its competitors rather than by industry specialization per se. JEL Classification: M4; L0


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