scholarly journals Wettbewerb im Internet: Was ist online anders als offline?

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Justus Haucap ◽  
Tobias Wenzel
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
The Internet ◽  
General Tendency ◽  
Market Regulation ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Online Content ◽  
Indirect Network Effects

AbstractThe Internet is characterized by competition between platforms which bring together potential partners of exchange. The degree of competition between these multi-sided platforms und market concentration are determined through (1) the strength of the direct and indirect network effects, (2) the extent of economies of scale, (3) the risk of congestition, (4) platform differentiation, and (5) the possibility of multi-homing. Depending on these factors different market concentrations and barriers to entry result. While there is no general tendency for concentration in the Internet and no general need for special market regulation of online content providers and intermediaries, single platforms may still have long lasting and significant market power which is unlikely to erode fastly, as the example of ebay illustrates.

The potential of entry barriers in the context of digitalization

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-147
Author(s):  
Aleksey Zazdravnykh
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Digital Transformation ◽  
Entry Barriers ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Significant Growth ◽  
Digital Infrastructure ◽  
Market Operation

The article analyzes the practical aspects of the functioning of some barriers to entry in the era of digital transformation of industry markets. It is noted that under the influence of digitalization processes, both positive changes in the mechanism of market operation are recorded, as well as a number of negative circumstances that have become a serious challenge for antitrust agencies. Control of big data, initial investment in digital infrastructure, and broad technological capabilities of digital blocking of users, against the background of powerful network effects and pronounced economies of scale, carry the potential for significant growth in the market power of individual firms. The article substantiates that such trends theoretically pose a significant threat to competition, and can form new types of entry barriers. At the same time, practical arguments are presented that indicate the ambiguity of this position.

scholarly journals Research on market power and market structure

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 210-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baowen Sun ◽  
Wenjun Jing ◽  
Xuankai Zhao ◽  
Yi He
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Scale Economy ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Internet Industry ◽  
Empirical Industrial Organization ◽  
Welfare Change ◽  
Internet Platform ◽  
Traditional Industry

Purpose This paper aims to clear whether the monopoly structure of the internet industry has produced market power and discussed the welfare change of the internet industry monopoly. Design/methodology/approach By using new empirical industrial organization methods and taking the e-commerce market as an example, the authors measured market power and economies of scale of the internet platform companies. Findings Internet platform enterprises have formed scale economy, but it has not had market power, and the industry still maintains high levels of competition; also, the emergence of large enterprises may increase the welfare of consumers. Originality/value The conclusion of this paper clarified actual competition status of internet industry and provided a new foothold for regulation and ideas for the traditional industry to crack the Marshall Conflict.

A Giant Problem: The Influence of the Chicago School on Australian Competition Law, Economic Dynamism and Inequality

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 696-714 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Triggs ◽  
Andrew Leigh
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
The United States ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Competitive Process ◽  
Growing Body

Australia has a competition problem: there is not enough of it. Our industries are concentrated. Our markets show signs of weak competition. The way Australia’s courts, parliamentarians and regulators think about competition is partly to blame. Although it has been less influential in Australia than in the United States, the Chicago School’s views on competition have shaped our laws, policies and enforcement practices. The Chicago School views market concentration as a virtue more than a vice. The School contended that barriers to entry are negligible, market power is temporary, most mergers are good, vertical restraints and predatory pricing are either benign or efficient. The growing body of research and experience, however, shows that the Chicago School’s faith in the ability of markets to self-correct and deliver competitive outcomes was misplaced. There is a strong progressive case for repositioning how we think about competition. Focusing more on the competitive process, the structure of markets and the incentives those structures create for firms will play an important role in reducing inequality.

The Limits of Antitrust

2021 ◽  
pp. 117-121
Author(s):  
Eric A. Posner
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Labor Supply ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Significant Degree ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
Search Costs ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Barriers To Entry

While antitrust law is an important response to labor market monopsony, it cannot solve all the problems of labor monopsony. A significant degree of labor market power is “frictional,” that is, without artificial barriers to entry or excessive concentration of employment. The two major sources of such friction are search costs and job differentiation. Search costs refer to the costs a worker must incur in order to find a job. Job differentiation refers to the variations in amenities and other conditions that distinguish otherwise similar-seeming jobs. A simple mathematical exercise, drawing on estimates of concentration and aggregate and firm-specific labor supply elasticities, shows that even if labor market concentration were eliminated, workers would be paid less than 60% of the competitive wage.

scholarly journals Merger Control and Online Platforms: the Relevance of Network Effects

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-100
Author(s):  
Antonio Robles Martín-Laborda
Keyword(s):  
Network Effects ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Entry Barriers ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Online Platforms ◽  
Indirect Network Effects ◽  
Direct Network ◽  
The One ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Direct Networks

Digital platforms operate in multisided markets providing services through the internet to two or more distinct groups of users, between which there are indirect network effects. Direct networks effects are frequently present within each group. Therefore, online platforms usually present both direct network effects, between individual members of the same group, and indirect network effects, between members of distinct groups. Network effects may simultaneously reduce competition leading to a greater concentration and strengthening entry barriers, on the one hand, and put forward significant efficiencies on the other. This article examines some keys aspects related to the impact of network effects on the assessment of mergers in two-sided markets, taking account of the recent practice of the Commission.

scholarly journals Competition Between Chinese and United States Companies in the Internet Market

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-152
Author(s):  
Tomasz Bieliński
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Market Research ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Chinese Market ◽  
Fast Growing ◽  
Chinese Companies ◽  
Internet Market ◽  
Foreign Corporations

World’s Internet market is dominated by the companies based in United States, but fast growing Chinese companies try to challenge them, and already took the second position. Their success is based on economies of scale and network effects gained thanks to their operations in the Chinese market. This two strategic advantages enable Chinese companies to successfully compete in the global Internet market. Research presented in this paper positively verifies hypothesis that PRC authorities contribute to the success of its companies through discriminatory practices, that do not allow foreign corporations to expand their operations in the Chinese market.

scholarly journals Taking It With You: Platform Barriers to Entry and the Limits of Data Portability

2021 ◽  
pp. 263
Author(s):  
Gabriel Nicholas
Keyword(s):  
Network Effects ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Switching Costs ◽  
Data Access ◽  
The United States ◽  
Power Dynamics ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Data ◽  
Data Portability

Policymakers are faced with a vexing problem: how to increase competition in a tech sector dominated by a few giants. One answer proposed and adopted by regulators in the United States and abroad is to require large platforms to allow consumers to move their data from one platform to another, an approach known as data portability. Facebook, Google, Apple, and other major tech companies have enthusiastically supported data portability through their own technical and political initiatives. Today, data portability has taken hold as one of the go-to solutions to address the tech industry’s competition concerns. This Article argues that despite the regulatory and industry alliance around data portability, today’s public and private data portability efforts are unlikely to meaningfully improve competition. This is because current portability efforts focus solely on mitigating switching costs, ignoring other barriers to entry that may preclude new platforms from entering the market. The technical implementations of data portability encouraged by existing regulation—namely one-off exports and API interoperability—address switching costs but not the barriers of network effects, unique data access, and economies of scale. This Article proposes a new approach to better alleviate these other barriers called collective portability, which would allow groups of users to coordinate to transfer data they share to a new platform, all at once. Although not a panacea, collective portability would provide a meaningful alternative to existing approaches while avoiding both the privacy/competitive utility trade off of one-off exports and the hard-to regulate power dynamics of APIs.

Barriers to Entry and Implications for Competition Policy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Roberts
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Vertical Integration ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Productive Capacity ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Access To Finance ◽  
African Context ◽  
Regulatory Barriers ◽  
Consumer Switching

Competition requires rivals. While this rivalry may come from imports, the development of local capabilities and productive capacity for rivalry, including by black industrialists in the South African context, means understanding the barriers to entry that local producers must overcome. Barriers to entry are also critical for the correct balance between the risks of over- and under-enforcement and are one reason why it has been recommended that countries should adopt different standards for competition evaluation. This chapter draws on studies of barriers to entry in different markets in South Africa to consider the nature and extent of these barriers and the implications for competition policy. It highlights issues related to regulatory barriers, consumer switching costs and branding, routes to market, and vertical integration, as well as economies of scale and access to finance.

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