US Supreme Court Agenda Setting and the Role of Litigant Status

2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 286-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. C. Black ◽  
C. L. Boyd
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Us Supreme Court

The Role of Emotional Language in Briefs before the US Supreme Court

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 377-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan C. Black ◽  
Matthew E. K. Hall ◽  
Ryan J. Owens ◽  
Eve M. Ringsmuth
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Emotional Language ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court

scholarly journals Values and Valuations in Judicial Discourse. A Corpus-Assisted Study of (Dis)Respect in US Supreme Court Decisions on Same-Sex Marriage

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanisław Goźdź-Roszkowski
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Argumentation ◽  
A Value ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Discourse ◽  
Evaluative Language

Abstract This paper investigates the role of (DIS)RESPECT a value premise in two landmark civil rights cases given by the United States Supreme Court. It adopts a corpus-assisted approach whereby a keyword analysis and the analysis of key semantic domains are used to identify potential values relied upon by judges in their justifications. The two categories of NO RESPECT and RESPECTED have been selected and examined as one domain of (DIS)RESPECT. (DIS)RESPECT turns out to be the only value marked by strong evaluative polarity and it is found in the majority, as well as in dissenting opinions. The analysis shows how the notion of (DIS)RESPECT has been integrated into the arguments of judges and it highlights the central importance of values and the related evaluative language for legal argumentation.

Should We Elect the US Supreme Court?

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 785-803 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariah Zeisberg
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Science Research ◽  
Judicial Selection ◽  
Judicial Elections ◽  
The People ◽  
Theoretical Inquiry ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Meaning

Extensive political science research reveals that the decisions of the US Supreme Court are deeply political. And both advocates and critics of judicial elections concede that partisan elections are a democratic method of judicial selection. Does the value of democratic representation mean that US Supreme Court Justices should be selected through partisan elections? I argue not. Partisan judicial elections are actually far poorer institutional mechanisms for capturing the judgment of the people on legal matters than has been recognized. The role of parties in structuring a campaign distorts the deliberative environment surrounding judicial elections, creating significant barriers to voters expressing a judgment on matters of legal meaning. The kind of distortion is best understood through reference to aprocessualcriterion of deliberative democracy, which provides a fitting normative template to ground theoretical inquiry into the reason-giving possibilities of existing democratic institutions and practices. Hence, answering why the US Supreme Court should not be elected on democratic grounds also reveals new insights about the role of parties in sustaining (or subverting) deliberative democratic ideals.

Terrorism, Emergency Powers, and the Role of the US Supreme Court: An Interview with Neal K. Katyal

Ratio Juris ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 443-455
Author(s):  
NEAL K. KATYAL ◽  
GIORGIO BONGIOVANNI ◽  
CHIARA VALENTINI
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Emergency Powers ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court

3. Political Power, Authority, and the State

Politics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Ferdinand ◽  
Robert Garner ◽  
Stephanie Lawson
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Max Weber ◽  
The State ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
Good Thing ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Methodological Problems ◽  
German Sociologist

This chapter examines power and authority, two central concepts in politics, in relation to the state. It first defines power in the context of authority, taking into account the distinction between them by citing the role of the US Supreme Court as an example. It then considers the classic threefold typology of authority proposed by German sociologist Max Weber, namely: traditional authority, charismatic authority, and legal–rational authority. It also addresses some conceptual questions about power; for example, whether power is the same as force, whether it must be exercised deliberately, whether it is a good thing, or whether we can eliminate it. The chapter goes on to explore the methodological problems inherent in the measurement of power, particularly in relation to the theories of the state such as Marxism, pluralism, elitism, and feminism. Finally, it describes Stephen Lukes' three dimensions of power.

Democratic Law and the Erosion of Common Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 65-89
Author(s):  
Seana Valentine Shiffrin
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Narrow Focus ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Democratic Character ◽  
The Common ◽  
Customary Practices

This chapter explores the democratic character of the common law by examining the implied contractual duty of good faith and its dismissive treatment by the US Supreme Court in Northwest v. Ginsberg, a 2014 preemption decision. The decision was mistaken because it failed to recognize law’s morally indispensable role of publicly articulating and interpreting our shared moral commitments, treating law instead as a mere means of resolving disputes. The chapter also celebrates the democratic character of common law, which, although articulated by judges, responds to reasons and problems emerging from the citizenry and attends to moral expectations embodied in customary practices. The chapter underscores the importance of common law (and the doctrine of good faith) in publicly articulating reasons and drawing on the underlying values that law serves, democratic functions that are lost when litigation is replaced by private arbitration and overlooked by a narrow focus on elections.

Justice-level heterogeneity in certiorari voting: US Supreme Court October terms 1939, 1968, and 1982

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Gregory A. Caldeira ◽  
Daniel Lempert
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Multivariate Analyses ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Standard Set

Abstract Although the literature on US Supreme Court agenda-setting is sizable, justice-vote-level multivariate analyses of certiorari are almost exclusively limited to samples of discussed cases from 1986 to 1993. Moreover, these studies have done very little to explore justice-level heterogeneity on certiorari. Here, we address these lacunae by analyzing the predictors of individual justices’ cert votes on all paid cases from the 1939, 1968, and 1982 terms. We find substantial justice-level heterogeneity in the weight that justices place on the standard set of forces shaping the cert vote. We also show that some of this heterogeneity is associated with justices’ experience and ideological extremism, largely in theoretically predicted ways. In closing, we sound a note of caution on drawing conclusions about effects of justice attributes, when the number of justices is relatively small.

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