9. Competition Act 1998: substantive provisions

Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter discusses the Competition Act 1998, which serves as a basis for UK competition law. Following an overview of the Competition Act, it considers decisional practice and case law under the so-called Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions in the Competition Act, which are modelled after Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It discusses the relationship between EU and domestic competition law, including the important ‘governing principles’ clause in section 60 of the Competition Act, which is intended to achieve consistency with EU law. The chapter contains a table of all the decisions under the Competition Act to have been published on the website of the Competition and Markets Authority (‘the CMA’) since the eighth edition of the book up until 8 December 2017. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the application of the Competition Act in practice and the possible implications of Brexit for UK competition law.

Author(s):  
Sandra Marco Colino

This chapter focuses on the current interaction between European Union and UK law. EU law is currently a source of UK law. However, the relationship between the two regimes is expected to change in the future as a consequence of the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 stipulates that the European Communities Act 1972 will be ‘repealed on exit day’, which would be 29 March 2019 provided that the two-year period since Article 50 TEU was triggered is not extended. Once the European Communities Act 1972 has been repealed, EU law will cease to be a source of UK law. No major immediate changes to the national competition legislation are to be expected, but future reforms could distance the UK system from the EU rules.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 189-198
Author(s):  
Constance Grewe

It is indeed a crucial moment now that Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have begun to join the EU. The Maastricht Treaty was itself, in several respects, a turning point in European construction; Member States then became aware of the increasing influence of EU law and started to defend their autonomy against the ‘attacks’ stemming from it. With the accession of the CEE states, the ‘Solange story: a story about national constitutional courts resisting a straightforward surrender of national legal sovereignties, and insisting on their own role as guardians of any further transfer of powers from the national to the European level’, can now enter into ‘its chapter 3’. National or constitutional identity is the main arm of resistance, and these national reactions require a rethinking of the relationship between national and European law.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 195-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodore Konstadinides

Abstract The pitfalls of the relationship between European and national judges constitute a well-travelled ground in literature, especially with regard to ‘sagas’ over the reconciliation of national sovereignty with EU law primacy. Hence, the contribution that this article is attempting to make is to explore the judicial understanding and potential of the concept of constitutional identity in the light of the newly-introduced Article 4(2) TEU by the Treaty of Lisbon, which makes it explicit that national identity encompasses constitutional specificity. A number of questions are raised and discussed. For instance: How has the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) been adjudicating on issues pertaining to the constitutional identity of the Member States pre- and post-Lisbon? How far can Member States stretch the concept to avoid the tidal effect of EU law upon their legal systems? For the sake of clarity, two notions of constitutional identity are identified and presented in this article: One related to the CJEU’s case law, where ‘constitutional identity’ has been invoked by defending Member States as a qualified derogation from their EU law obligations (a ‘shield’) and another, inherent in the German Constitutional Court’s (BVerfG) use of ‘constitutional identity’ as a break to an unprecedented transfer of competences to the EU and a tool of judicial review of national implementation measures of secondary legislation (a sword). The arguments advanced hereafter suggest that the implications of identity retention as a ‘shield’ may not be far-reaching since the CJEU has, through a pragmatic use of the loyalty and proportionality principles, succeeded in reducing its effect to the bare minimum. On the other hand, as a judicial review mechanism, the German paradigm demonstrates that, as a ‘sword’, constitutional identity retention comprises, largely, a theoretical possibility. These assumptions aside, it is concluded that constitutional identity retention may provide both national judiciaries and legislatures with new opportunities to participate in trans-national constitutional development through monitoring and assessing the compatibility of the exercise of EU competence with the requirements of national constitutions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-205
Author(s):  
Sven Simon

This article aims to provide insight into the relationship between constitutional identity and ultra vires review in Germany. First, a brief introduction is provided on the issue of the relationship between EU law and national law, then the diverging grounds for validity are presented concerning the interpretation of the CJEU and of the German Federal Constitutional Court. After the detailed analysis of the German case law, limits of a national reservation are scrutinised. In the end, a conclusion is drawn up.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sacha Prechal

This article looks briefly into the evolution of the principle of effective judicial protection in EU law and into the relationship between the different manifestations of that principle, which is by now given expression in Article 47 CFR, Article 19 TEU and various provisions of secondary law. Next, it focusses on recent developments in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, which concern two central aspects of the principle of effective judicial protection: the compliance with court judgments and the independence of the judiciary. As far as the first topic is concerned, two rather extreme cases addressed the issue what should be done, as a matter of EU law, in situations where a public authority refuses to comply with a final judicial decision. Then the article continues by discussing the independence of the judiciary as a key rationale for the principle of effective protection. In particular, it summarizes the increasingly detailed requirements to be satisfied in order to protect the independence of judges and indicates how an alleged lack of independence should be assessed in a concrete case.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 210-246
Author(s):  
Louise HALLESKOV STORGAARD

AbstractThis article offers a perspective on how the objective of a strong and coherent European protection standard pursued by the fundamental rights amendments of the Lisbon Treaty can be achieved, as it proposes a discursive pluralistic framework to understand and guide the relationship between the EU Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. It is argued that this framework – which is suggested as an alternative to the EU law approach to the Strasbourg system applied by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 and its Charter-based case law – has a firm doctrinal, case law and normative basis. The article ends by addressing three of the most pertinent challenges to European fundamental rights protection through the prism of the proposed framework.


Author(s):  
Emily HANCOX

Abstract Article 6 Treaty on European Union sets out two sources of fundamental rights in the EU—the Charter and the general principles of EU law—without specifying a hierarchy between them. Even though the Charter became binding over a decade ago, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) is yet to clarify unequivocally how these two sources interact. In this article I argue based upon the relevant legal framework that the Charter ought to replace the general principles it enshrines. This leaves a role for general principles in the incorporation of new and additional rights into the EU legal framework. Such an approach is necessary to ensure that the Charter achieves its aims in enhancing the visibility of the rights protected by EU law, while also providing the impetus for more coherent rights protection within the EU. What an extensive survey of CJEU case law in the field of non-discrimination shows, however, is that the CJEU has struggled to let its general principles case law go, potentially hampering the transformative potential of the Charter.


Author(s):  
Sandra Marco Colino

This chapter discusses the relationship between competition law and intellectual property rights. Competition law may limit the ability to exercise intellectual property rights. Article 101 TFEU and Chapter I Prohibition may apply to agreements to license intellectual property, as well as pay-for-delay settlements between a patent holder and potential competitors. Article 102 TFEU and Chapter II Prohibition may apply to the use of intellectual property rights by a dominant undertaking, particularly when the protected asset is essential to third parties. The existence of intellectual property rights does not automatically confer a dominant position — the product or service may still face competition.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-120
Author(s):  
Bjorn Lundqvist ◽  
Ylva Forsberg ◽  
Marc De Vries ◽  
Mariateresa Maggiolino

Public sector information (PSI) is a very valuable resource that, back in 2003, the EU parliament and council decided to appraise by incentivizing its re-use via a dedicated Directive. In 2013, the directive was revised to further promote the development of a single European market for information goods and services. On the bases of the European and national case law, this article investigates the main competitive issues that this EU law about PSI triggers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 174-182
Author(s):  
Kaie Rosin

Although the EU lacks explicit competence to harmonise national principles of criminal law, there are many ways in which EU law and national criminal law are interconnected on a level deeper than mere minimum standards adopted from directives. The article analyses these intersections between EU law and fundamental principles of Estonian substantive criminal law, explaining how the principles of criminal law recognised and interpreted in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU and covered by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union exhibit the capacity to affect fundamental principles of Estonian substantive criminal law. The article focuses on five principles specific to substantive criminal law, which are derived from the fundamental principles of the Estonian Constitution and have equivalents in human-rights law: the principle of legality of criminal law, the principle of retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law, proportionality, ultima ratio, and the principle of individual guilt. The analysis demonstrates that the relationship between EU law and the various principles of substantive criminal law is not uniform because the principles of substantive criminal law are not developed evenly at European Union level.


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