United Nations Weapons Control Treaties

Author(s):  
Barry Kellman

Weapons control was born of necessity to reduce the existential threats of weapons technologies following the last century’s world wars. In a dangerous and anarchic world, security can be enhanced by substituting multilateral agreements for unconstrained procurement, deployment, and transfer of weapons. This chapter focuses on four aspects of weapons control treaties: (1) nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, (2) eradication of chemical and biological weapons, (3) prohibition of unique inhumane weapons, and (4) restriction of the trade in conventional weapons. Cumulatively, these treaties serve to lower the risk of war, reduce war’s devastation should it begin, and curtail the enormous financial drain of procuring and stockpiling weapons. Methodologies have developed with established institutions and stipulated procedures that influence virtually every state’s military choices, significantly enhancing global security. These treaties have enabled humanity to stanch the inherent tendency of employing advancing technologies to make and use more powerful weapons. By significantly contributing to capping centuries of accelerating violence and by restraining how escalating fears of an adversary’s weapons can accelerate political friction into armed conflict, these treaties have contributed to building a more secure world order, thereby enabling diplomacy and other processes to help address more deep-rooted social conditions. It is perhaps the greatest achievement of these treaties to have fostered trust among the vast majority of states and their populations with regard to lethal weapons, enabling maturation of innumerable initiatives for promoting peace.

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 325-342
Author(s):  
Roderic Alley

Abstract Compared to nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons or advanced conventional weapons systems, such as missiles, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and the ammunition required to render them lethal, have received less attention from arms control analysts. Accordingly the focus of this commentary is upon two particular inadequacies identified within the existing SALW restraint repertoire. They include, first, a failure to have SALW ammunition designated as an objective deserving explicit restraint designation and, secondly, persisting and largely unresolved state differences over controlling supplies of this weaponry to armed non-state actors. Both concerns illustrate how a use of consensus procedures within relevant rule formulation has favoured the interests of major SALW suppliers. The two deficiencies identified are considered destabilising given their continued capacity to degrade restraints designed to restrict deployments of this long-lasting weaponry—particularly within locations exhibiting limited forms of state capacity. The scope for existing legal mechanisms to remedy these deficiencies is examined, as is their potential to induce enhanced compliance and implementation.


Author(s):  
Longobardo Marco ◽  
Fleck Dieter

This chapter provides an overview of treaty and customary international law rules applicable to means of combat. Belligerents do not need an authorization from international humanitarian law in relation to a specific means of combat. Rather, they are free to develop, produce, stockpile, transfer, or use any particular weapon, except for those cases in which a prohibitive rule of international humanitarian law dictates to the contrary. In order to guarantee effective implementation of the prohibition of certain means and methods of warfare, it is necessary to provide for an efficient procedure to ensure the legality of new weapons. This procedure is preventive in nature and aims at providing the belligerents with means of combat that do not violate international law prohibitions. The chapter discusses the prohibition of certain conventional weapons and then looks at weapons of mass destruction, which are simply defined as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. While the production, possession, and use of chemical weapons and biological weapons is prohibited under treaty law, the legal status of nuclear weapons is more complex.


Author(s):  
Ulrich Kühn

This chapter discusses the military- and defence-related capabilities and policies of Western Europe’s major powers (Germany, France, United Kingdom), of the NATO alliance, the Russian Federation, and Austria in the realm of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction (WMD)). It focuses on the differing roles, positions, and security policy outlooks of these actors, with a special emphasis on their respective policies towards nuclear weapons. Particularly in the realm of nuclear weapons, the situation on the European continent is extremely diverse and complex, with officially recognized nuclear-weapons states, non-nuclear-weapons states under NATO’s ‘nuclear umbrella’, and staunch supporters of a world free from nuclear weapons. Highlighting converging and diverging international policy trends, the chapter concludes that European security policies on WMD continue to have a significant impact on related global security and defence matters.


Author(s):  
Karen Hulme

SummaryOver the past century, the laws of armed conflict have limited or prohibited the use of a number of weapons, principally due to their cruel effects or indiscriminate nature. Among the examples are chemical and biological weapons, anti-personnel mines, and blinding laser weapons. In recent years, one of the most controversial armaments used by states has been the cluster bomb. Cluster weapons are inexpensively produced area weapons with a high propensity for failure. The source of constant condemnation since the Vietnam conflict, the legality of cluster weapons remains highly questionable. With such weapons, the question is not so much whether there is a need to create new instruments of limitation, or indeed prohibition, but whether the existing laws of armed conflict are already sufficient to address any human and environmental concerns.


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