Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Kühn
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
European Security ◽  
European Continent ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
The Military

This chapter discusses the military- and defence-related capabilities and policies of Western Europe’s major powers (Germany, France, United Kingdom), of the NATO alliance, the Russian Federation, and Austria in the realm of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction (WMD)). It focuses on the differing roles, positions, and security policy outlooks of these actors, with a special emphasis on their respective policies towards nuclear weapons. Particularly in the realm of nuclear weapons, the situation on the European continent is extremely diverse and complex, with officially recognized nuclear-weapons states, non-nuclear-weapons states under NATO’s ‘nuclear umbrella’, and staunch supporters of a world free from nuclear weapons. Highlighting converging and diverging international policy trends, the chapter concludes that European security policies on WMD continue to have a significant impact on related global security and defence matters.

Efforts to Address Iraqi Compliance with UN Weapons Inspections

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 956-962 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean D. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Medical Supplies ◽  
Ballistic Missiles ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
On Site Inspection

At the conclusion of the 1991 UN enforcement action against Iraq, the Security Council adopted a resolution setting the terms for a cease-fire. The resolution required, among other things, that Iraq “unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision,” of all chemical and biological weapons, all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and associated materials and facilities. Further, the resolution provided for the creation of a UN special commission to carry out “on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities,” and ordered Iraq to yield such weapons to the commission for “destruction, removal or rendering harmless.” Similar requirements were imposed with respect to the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons. While maintaining the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Security Council allowed exports to Iraq of foodstuffs and medical supplies (on the condition that a UN sanctions committee had been notified) and also other commodities (if approved by the same committee). The Security Council decided that the sanctions regime would be lifted, however, once Iraq complied with its obligations on the destruction and monitoring of weapons of mass destruction.

Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response in Poland: Prevention, Surveillance, and Mitigation Planning

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Goniewicz ◽  
Beata Osiak ◽  
Witold Pawłowski ◽  
Robert Czerski ◽  
Frederick M. Burkle ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Emergency Response ◽  
Terrorist Attack ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
European Security ◽  
Observation Units ◽  
Main Emphasis ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Military ◽  
Flow Of Information

Abstract Objectives: Biological weapons are one of the oldest weapons of mass destruction used by man. Their use has not only determined the outcome of battles, but also influenced the fate of entire civilizations. Although the use of biological weapons agents in a terrorist attack is currently unlikely, all services responsible for the surveillance and removal of epidemiological threats must have clear guidelines and emergency response plans. Methods: In the face of the numerous threats appearing in the world, it has become necessary to put the main emphasis on modernizing, securing, and maintaining structures in the field of medicine which are prepared for unforeseen crises and situations related to the use of biological agents. Results: This article presents Poland’s current preparation to take action in the event of a bioterrorist threat. The study presents both the military aspect and procedures for dealing with contamination. Conclusions: In Poland, as in other European Union countries fighting terrorism, preparations should be made to defend against biological attacks, improve the flow of information on the European security system, strengthen research centers, train staff, create observation units and vaccination centers, as well as prepare hospitals for the hospitalization of patients—potential victims of bioterrorist attacks.

6 Means of Combat

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Longobardo Marco ◽  
Fleck Dieter
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Effective Implementation ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons

This chapter provides an overview of treaty and customary international law rules applicable to means of combat. Belligerents do not need an authorization from international humanitarian law in relation to a specific means of combat. Rather, they are free to develop, produce, stockpile, transfer, or use any particular weapon, except for those cases in which a prohibitive rule of international humanitarian law dictates to the contrary. In order to guarantee effective implementation of the prohibition of certain means and methods of warfare, it is necessary to provide for an efficient procedure to ensure the legality of new weapons. This procedure is preventive in nature and aims at providing the belligerents with means of combat that do not violate international law prohibitions. The chapter discusses the prohibition of certain conventional weapons and then looks at weapons of mass destruction, which are simply defined as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. While the production, possession, and use of chemical weapons and biological weapons is prohibited under treaty law, the legal status of nuclear weapons is more complex.

scholarly journals Past as Prologue? The Risk of Adoption of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-State Actors in the EU

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 626-642
Author(s):  
James REVILL
Keyword(s):  
Historical Record ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Relative Advantage ◽  
Public Health Agencies ◽  
European Public ◽  
Health Agencies ◽  
Biological Terrorism ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
State Actors

AbstractThere have been relatively few serious incidents of chemical or biological terrorism in Europe; however, there is growing concern over how non-state groups might exploit chemistry and biology for hostile purposes in the future. This article uses the historical record of past incidents of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) adoption by non-state actors to inform understandings of the current and future risks. To achieve this, the article analyses six interlinked clusters of factors that can be seen as important in assessing the risk of whether or not to adopt such weapons. These are: the perceived relative advantage of CBW and their utilities; the complexity of such weapons; their ideological compatibility; the role of organisational structures; the visibility and ‘fashionability’ of such weapons; and the wider environmental context. Drawing from past cases of CBW adoption and the present European context, an analysis of these factors suggests that sophisticated CBW with gigantic effect are possible, but unlikely; however, the adoption and use of scruffy low-level chemical weapons is a distinct possibility. Accordingly, European public health agencies need to prepare for the possibility of a variety of CBW, not all of which are likely to be weapons of “mass destruction”.

scholarly journals The Place and Potential Role of the OSCE in the Changing Architecture of European Security

2019 ◽  
pp. 27-40
Author(s):  
Viktor Mizin
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
European Security ◽  
The West ◽  
European Continent ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Post War ◽  
Key Aspects ◽  
The Military ◽  
Crisis Situations

The article analyzes the key aspects of the development of relations between Russia and the OSCE from the point of view of the complex issues of Euro-Atlantic security. According to the author, the acсession of Crimea to Russia and the crisis around Ukraine have further exacerbated the preceding tensions in bilateral relations. Today, they are much like the Cold war confrontation. In Europe, the military confrontation is now intensifying. Today Moscow is openly accused of undermining the foundations of the post-war order in Europe, of illegal steps to break the generally accepted international legal norms, of aggressive intentions that threaten European stability. At the same time, the existence of significant distrust between Russia and the West does not mean that we should wait for some pause, abandon attempts to take constructive steps to re-establish cooperation. Such an approach would be counterproductive – especially since both sides are sending, albeit muted, signals of readiness for dialogue. In this situation, the author proposes a number of initial steps that could increase the level of trust between the parties, would ideally move to a meaningful dialogue on the future of the European security architecture. Various OSCE mechanisms could play a useful role. The author emphasizes the importance of increasing the effectiveness of the OSCE-originated crisis mechanisms in the context of the erosion of strategic stability on the European continent as a result of the unprecedented deterioration of relations between Russia and the West. Special emphasis is placed on modernization of the crisis management potential of the OSCE and promotion of dialogue between the West and Russia, including the establishment of a novel consultative platform in the framework of the OSCE to discuss emerging crisis situations. A number of specific confidence-building measures are proposed to restore dialogue and find solutions to crisis situations in the region.

The Western European Union (WEU)

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxime H. A. Larivé
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Defense Policy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Security ◽  
Gulf Region ◽  
European Continent ◽  
The Balkans ◽  
Western European ◽  
The Eu

This empirical and historical analysis of the Western European Union (WEU), an intergovernmental defense organization, contributes to the broader understanding of the construction and integration of European security and defense policy. The WEU was established in 1954 by the Modified Brussels Treaty after the failure of the European Defense Community and at the time of the construction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Over its lifetime, the WEU was confronted by two major trends: the centrality of collective defense agreement providing security on the European continent enforced by NATO and the construction of a European security and defense policy within the broad integration process of the European Union (EU). The WEU provided a platform for Western European powers, particularly France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, to engage in the construction of a European defense. Historically, these countries had diverging visions ranging from an autonomous force to one that should remain under the NATO auspice. The end of the Cold War accelerated the transfer of the WEU mission to the EU, but the crises in the Gulf region and in the Balkans in 1990s led to a period of activity for the WEU. The institutionalization of the EU, beginning with the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, accelerated the construction of a European defense and security policy within EU structures. The transfer from the WEU to the EU began in the late 1990s and the WEU was dissolved in 2011.

Of Questionable Legality: The Military Use of Cluster Bombs in Iraq in 2003

2004 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 143-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Hulme
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Environmental Concerns ◽  
Past Century ◽  
The Past ◽  
Cluster Bombs ◽  
High Propensity ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
The Military ◽  
New Instruments

SummaryOver the past century, the laws of armed conflict have limited or prohibited the use of a number of weapons, principally due to their cruel effects or indiscriminate nature. Among the examples are chemical and biological weapons, anti-personnel mines, and blinding laser weapons. In recent years, one of the most controversial armaments used by states has been the cluster bomb. Cluster weapons are inexpensively produced area weapons with a high propensity for failure. The source of constant condemnation since the Vietnam conflict, the legality of cluster weapons remains highly questionable. With such weapons, the question is not so much whether there is a need to create new instruments of limitation, or indeed prohibition, but whether the existing laws of armed conflict are already sufficient to address any human and environmental concerns.

Unconventional Weapons

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pesach Malovany ◽  
Amatzia Baram ◽  
Kevin M. Woods ◽  
Ronna Englesberg
Keyword(s):  
International Atomic Energy Agency ◽  
Atomic Energy ◽  
Foreign Assistance ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Energy Agency ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Device

The chapter deals with the Iraqi efforts to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological and nuclear. It describes the various projects in each field, their history, the foreign assistance they got, the infrastructure the Iraqis built for them, their achievements and types of weapons the Iraqis produces and their arsenals, especially of the Chemical and Biological weapons. The efforts of the U. N. supervisory commissions (UNSCOM) and the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to disarm Iraq from those weapons and capabilities to renew the development and production of them by Iraq after 1991. The use of chemical weapons by the Iraqis against the Kurds and the Iranian forces during the war between the two countries, and the possibility of using them against coalition forces during the wars in 1991 and 2003. The Iraqi efforts to achieve a nuclear device in a crash program before the war in 1991.

KIEV-MOSCOW CRIMEA CONFLICT

2017 ◽  
Vol 184 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-110
Author(s):  
Radosław SZYMANKIEWICZ
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
The State ◽  
Russian Society ◽  
European Security ◽  
Future Developments ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
Russian Economy ◽  
Survival And Development ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Fundamental Values

Security is understood as a certain state of confidence, the lack of threat and the awareness that the fundamental values of the state, including, among others, existence, survival and development, are preserved and represent the objective of the security policy of each government and state . The lack of these values may exert an adverse impact on its development. The activities of the competent organs of the state, creating such policy, should be purposeful and aimed at its implementation and they should also contribute to its formulation on the international arena . The security of Ukraine, as a result of actions taken by the separatist forces, was put to a great test and the annexation of Crimea slightly redefined the European security environment and resulted only in the imposition of sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Russia. Today, it is difficult to predict the scenario for future developments in Ukraine. It would seem that the chances are 50/50 that the conflict will be resolved. So, the question remains, what will Vladimir V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation, do? Will the pressure exerted by almost the entire world lead to the stabilisation of the situation in Donbass or will it result in the escalation of the conflict and the seizure of further areas, with, perhaps, Kiev included? However, the escalation of the conflict seems to be very unlikely, although it certainly would arouse nationalistic euphoria in the Russian society, as the imposed sanctions, the economic situation and losses that would be suffered by the Russians will prevent such escalation. If Putin decided to go war with Ukraine, he would have to take account of the determined opposition of the world superpowers and even greater sanctions, which the Russian economy might not be able to cope with. The paper contains the information about the genesis of the conflict in Ukraine and attempts to present the objectives of operations in the Kiev-Moscow conflict.

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