VI Attempt as a Special Form of Individual Criminal Responsibility

Author(s):  
Ambos Kai

This chapter first explains why attempt – an incomplete offence lacking the fulfilment of the actus reus of the respective crime – should be punishable at all and whether/how it is punishable under International Criminal Law. This chapter develops the essential elements of attempt liability on the basis of comparative law with a view to most important national legal systems . It analyses in detail the provision in the Rome Statute and proposes a ‘formula of approximation’ with regard to ‘commencement of execution’ stage (that is the moment of punishability) of attempt. It then applies this attempt formular to the international core crimes. Last but not least, abandonment of attempt is also discussed.

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 629-664 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Aksenova

The provision in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (icc) on individual criminal responsibility can be considered sufficiently elaborated. The level of detail of Article 25(3) does not, however, prevent heated debates on its practical application. The Court initially leaned towards the expanded notion of “commission”, interpreted to cover instances where persons do not physically perpetrate the crime but enjoy certain degree of control over it. Underlying this trend was the premise that “commission” denotes a higher degree of blameworthiness, and is therefore more appropriate to describe involvement in mass atrocities. In contrast, the Katanga trial judgement, issued in March last year, undermined the conception of perpetration as a superior form of responsibility in international criminal law. Which position will prevail in a long run? The article explores the two convictions rendered by the Court to date and argues that the answer to this question is still unclear.


Author(s):  
Barry de Vries

Abstract Twenty years after the adoption of the Rome Statute questions concerning complementarity remain. There is no clear indication as to how international involvement would influence the admissibility of a case. One of the responses to human rights violations and possible international crimes that has risen to prominence in the past decades is fact-finding mandated by UN organs. At the same time these mechanisms have started to incorporate a focus on issues of international criminal law and individual criminal responsibility. As these mechanisms are starting to attempt to resemble a criminal investigation in some regards the question starts to rise as to what effect an international fact-finding mechanism can have on the admissibility of a case before the International Criminal Court. This article explains how these mechanisms need to be viewed in the context of the complementarity-regime of the Rome Statute.


Author(s):  
Ambos Kai

This chapter continues the effort of this Volume to combine both comparative legal concepts with unique features of International Criminal Law. It is thus a direct result of the foundational work in Chapter II: International Criminal Law’s focus on individual criminal responsibility leads to an expressive purpose of punishments that again requires a criminalization of remote behavior by commanders and State leaders. This criminalization is based on the centuries old debate revolving around liability for omission. The chapter thus starts with a general explanation of the concept of omission vis-á-vis action. The author answers the question of whether a general omission liability exists in International Criminal Law affirmatively, recognizing a general principle of law, albeit with strict requirements. Drawing on the results from Chapter II, the author argues in favor of a criminalization of omission based on the prevention of harm and the protection of important legal goods/interests. The basis for this criminalization/liability is the respective person’s duty to act.


Author(s):  
Kai Ambos

This chapter analyses the concept of defences in international criminal law. It starts off with some general conceptual remarks defining defences, on a meta level, as exceptions to the (secondary) rule expressed by the respective offence; as such, they do not invalidate this rule—the prohibition sub poena by the offence—but entail its non-application. In the main part, the chapter proposes a systematization along the lines of a substantive/procedural distinction (substantive reasons to exclude individual criminal responsibility versus procedural obstacles/bars to criminal prosecution) and further distinguishing between full and partial defences, justifications and excuses, failure of proof defences, and alibi. On the basis of this classification, a hierarchy of defences is suggested.


Author(s):  
Karolina Wierczyńska ◽  
Andrzej Jakubowski

This chapter examines the ongoing process of consolidating international criminal law regimes for counteracting cultural heritage crimes, with particular focus on reparations for cultural harm. It begins with a wider panorama of international criminal law and jurisprudence in relation to cultural heritage crimes. This background outlines the limited provisions of the Rome Statute and offers some critical observations in relation to the evolving system of individual criminal responsibility for cultural heritage crimes. Second, it scrutinizes the approach taken by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in convicting Al Mahdi for the crime of intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion and/or historical monuments. Third, this chapter considers the issue of remedies and reparations for cultural harm suffered in light of the relevant provisions of the Rome State and the practice of international human rights bodies. Next, it analyzes the approach taken by the ICC in Al Mahdi regarding the methodology of determining reparations for the international destruction of cultural heritage. This chapter also analyzes the possible reconsideration of the crime of deliberate attacks against protected cultural sites going beyond the notion and scope of war crime.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 27 consists two paragraphs that are often confounded but fulfil different functions. Paragraph 1 denies a defence of official capacity, i.e. official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall not exempt a person from criminal responsibility under the Statute. Paragraph 2 amounts to a renunciation, by States Parties to the Rome Statute, of the immunity of their own Head of State to which they are entitled by virtue of customary international law. In contrast with paragraph 1, it is without precedent in international criminal law instruments.


2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Fournet

AbstractDue to the heinous nature of international crimes, admissible defences in the context of international criminal justice understandably constitute an issue surrounded with controversy. Yet, while International Criminal Law precludes the use of a series of defences, it also admits that certain grounds may exclude individual criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment even in the case of the most serious international crimes. The present study thus proposes to analyse the permissibility of these defences and the availability of such grounds for excluding responsibility by drawing a comparison between Public International Law and International Criminal Law and by highlighting the differences and discrepancies between the two systems. Ultimately, this analysis aims at demonstrating that International Criminal Law, one of Public International Law's children, has now surpassed its parent to become a more sophisticated and a fairer legal and judicial system, for both the defendants and the victims.


Author(s):  
Asif Khan ◽  
Shaukat Hussain Bhatti ◽  
Abid Shah

Over the last few years, international criminal law has included an internationally recognized definition of the crime of aggression. One may sight the respective portion from part two (Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Laws) Article 8 of the respective document. The purpose of this research represents the historical background of individual criminal responsibility under international law and the concept of individual criminal accountability for the crimes falling under the ambit of international criminal law committed by persons. Whereas the idea of how an individual could be brought to justice, for one of the core crimes of ICC's statutes, i.e., crime of aggression, was recently adopted and envisaged into Rome statutes, after the Kampala conference 2010. The concept of individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression faced many difficulties in at-least adopting its proper definition, which was leftover for future when Rome statue was formulated. To keep pace, this concept needs further evolution. Such an evolution demands such a condition wherein while granting the characteristics of adaptability with the contextual conditions and principles of criminal law. This article explores the anatomy of the crime of aggression and highlights issues that remain to be resolved


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