Part 1 Freedom of Religion or Belief, 1.1 Freedom to Adopt, Change, or Renounce a Religion or Belief

Author(s):  
Bielefeldt Heiner, Prof ◽  
Ghanea Nazila, Dr ◽  
Wiener Michael, Dr

This chapter focuses on everyone’s right to adopt, change, or renounce a religion or belief without restraints. That part of freedom of religion or belief has always been particularly controversial and it continues to be contested in theory and practice. In many countries, converts suffer societal harassment, open or concealed forms of discrimination and sometimes brutal acts of persecution committed by State agencies or non-State actors. While the freedom to convert to another religion or belief (including non-belief) enjoys unconditional protection in human rights law, the freedom to induce others to convert by employing non-coercive measure of persuasion can be limited, if deemed necessary and in accordance with the criteria set out for imposing limitations. Nonetheless, the two issues of conversion and missionary activities closely belong together in practice, since restrictions imposed by States on ‘proselytism’ often aim at de-legitimizing acts of ‘apostasy’ as well.

2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (863) ◽  
pp. 491-523 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Clapham

AbstractThe threat to human rights posed by non-state actors is of increasing concern. The author addresses the international obligations of belligerents, national liberation movements and insurgent entities, looks at the growing demands that such armed groups respect human rights norms and considers some of the options for holding private military companies accountable with regard to human rights abuses. The argument developed throughout this article is that all sorts of non-state actors are increasingly expected to comply with principles of international human rights law.


Author(s):  
Féilim Ó hAdhmaill ◽  
Mike Ritchie

International Human Rights Law is supposed to operate at all times. However, during war/conflict it is often suspended to address an ‘emergency’. International Humanitarian Law attempts to deal with human rights protections during the specific circumstances of war. However, what happens when states refuse to recognise a conflict situation as a ‘war’? In a world where violent conflict increasingly involves non-state actors, where does that leave existing international human rights’ mechanisms? This chapter looks at the changing forms of conflict globally and the development of what has been termed ‘terrorism’. It critically assesses the concept of ‘terrorism’ and discusses the difficulties it poses for social science, universal human rights and the development of equality, stability and global peace.


Author(s):  
Andreas Th Müller

One of the asymmetries faced by military missions in areas of limited statehood are diverging legal obligations of state and non-state actors, in particular in relation to human rights duties. From a perspective of states bound by human rights treaties, there is a certain danger that armed groups opposing them might abuse the obligations incumbent upon state actors. Against this perception, the potential application of human rights law to armed groups is not only relevant as a tool for protecting civilians but also from a reciprocity perspective in view of the fluidity of armed conflicts and with a view to convergence of standards. The chapter assesses how international law and international legal practice in relation to armed groups have evolved over the past decade. It takes stock of recent developments and analyses the degree to which human rights obligations apply to armed groups.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-305
Author(s):  
Amrei Müller

Abstract Recent literature and United Nations documents advocate that most armed non-state actors (ANSAs) should be bound by human rights law. This article takes a more critical stance on this issue. It argues that only a limited number of ANSAs should potentially become human rights duty-bearers: those that exercise de facto (human rights) jurisdiction and thus have considerable institutional and military capacities, as well as particular normative characteristics. It specifies these capacities and characteristics with an analysis of ANSAs’ practice that tentatively indicates that some of these entities may indeed exercise de facto jurisdiction. The argument is justified by highlighting the broader consequences that recognising ANSAs as human rights duty-bearers will entail. It will also endow them with privileges that will legitimise their authority over time. This is grounded in the normative logic of human rights law that emphasises the interrelationship between human rights, equality and democracy that also permeates the notion of jurisdiction and is further supported by a political understanding of the right to self-determination. The article closes with a brief sketch of two complementary ways to develop international law binding ANSAs to be further explored in future research: the so-called ‘responsibilities for human rights’ and an adapted law of occupation.


2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Dennis de Jong

AbstractIn this article, the author examines the consequences of the recent recognition of the idea that not only States but also non-State actors can violate human rights. While this development can help in defining the positive obligations of States concerning the protection of freedom of religion or belief, it can also undermine its protection. In particular, the author warns against implications for State interference with what used to be the internal affairs of religious communities. Whereas positive State obligations concerning the acts of non-State actors can be relatively easily established in the case of clear criminal offences, it is much more difficult to establish these in the case of conflicts between various human rights. The author therefore concludes that a new comment by the Human Rights Committee is called for to clarify the implications of these new legal developments.


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