Part 1 The Cold War Era (1945–89), 36 The US Intervention in Panama—1989

Author(s):  
Tsagourias Nicholas

This chapter examines the legality of the 1989 US intervention in Panama and assesses its impact on the use of force regime. After recalling the facts of the incident, it goes on to analyse the legal arguments provided by the US government to justify its action. More specifically, the US invoked its right to protect American citizens abroad as part of its right to self-defence; the right to intervene to protect the Panama Canal provided by the Panama Canal Treaties; and the invitation of the democratically elected Leader of the Opposition. The chapter then presents the reactions of states and the views of legal commentators. It concludes by saying that the incident affirms existing law but also contributes to the development of the rules regulating the use of force in international law.

Author(s):  
Kammerhofer Jörg

This chapter focuses on the US intervention in Nicaragua from 1981 to 1988, as a contribution to the state practice on the law on the use of force and the right to self-defence under both UN Charter and customary law. After an overview of the background of the so-called ‘contra war’ and of the salient facts regarding the US intervention in that conflict, it discusses the positions of the two parties on the facts and law, and takes note of the reaction of the international community, focusing on the debates at the UN. The next section focuses on the legality of the operation; the ICJ’s holdings in its 1986 Nicaragua judgment form the backbone of that discussion, while taking note of dissent and comment both inside and outside the Court. The contribution concludes by discussing the precedential value and effect of this conflict, and of the ICJ case.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Christopher R. W. Dietrich

Abstract This article examines Libyan–US relations through the historical lenses of decolonization, international law, the Cold War, and the international political economy. The Libyan government exercised its newfound sovereignty in the postwar era through the negotiation of ‘base rights’ for the US government and ‘oil rights’ for corporations owned by US nationals. They did so in conjunction with other petrostates and through international organizations such as the United Nations, the Arab League, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Libyan leaders’ strategy of using sovereignty to promote corporate competition relied on connections with similarly situated nations, and it was through global circuits of knowledge that they pressed the outer limits of economic sovereignty. At the same time, the US government consistently accommodated Libyan policies through Cold War arguments that linked the alliance with Libya to US national security. Those deep foundations of sovereignty and security created the conditions for the transformation of the global oil industry after Libya’s 1969 revolution.


Author(s):  
Orakhelashvili Alexander

This chapter begins with examining the context in which the US government decided to impose the quarantine against Cuba in 1962, in response to the Soviet nuclear missile placement in Cuba. The legality of the US measures is examined against the Charter of the United Nations, the OAS regional security framework, and general international law including the regime of belligerent rights. The final section addresses the precedential value of this incident, especially the ways in which legal advisers addressed the complex legal issues surrounding the Cuban missile crisis.


Author(s):  
Kamto Maurice

This contribution discusses the US air strikes against Libya in 1986. It sets out the facts that led to the air strikes – notably the bombing of a West Berlin night club on 5 April 1986 –, the legal positions of the main protagonists (the US and Libya), and the international community’s reactions. It then tests the legality of the US strikes against the international legal framework governing the use of force as it stood at the time of the events, namely the rules governing the right to self-defence. The chapter concludes that the use of force in this particular case could not be convincingly justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter.


Religions ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 592 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glen E. Swanson

The origins and use of national space rhetoric used by NASA, the US government, and the media in America began during the Cold War era and relied, in part, on religious imagery to convey a message of exploration and conquest. The concept of space as a “New Frontier” was used in political speech, television, and advertising to reawaken a sense of manifest destiny in postwar America by reviving notions of religious freedom, courage, and exceptionalism—the same ideals that originally drove expansionist boosters first to the New World and then to the West. Using advertisements, political speeches, NASA documents, and other media, this paper will demonstrate how this rhetoric served to reinforce a culture held by many Americans who maintained a long tradition of believing that they were called on by God to settle New Frontiers and how this culture continues to influence how human spaceflight is portrayed today.


Author(s):  
Starski Paulina

This contribution analyses the normative implications of the US raid against the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in 1993 in reaction to a foiled assassination attempt against former President Bush. It examines the legality of the operation, its precedential value and its evolutive potential regarding the regime on the ius contra bellum and specifically the right to self-defence. After dissecting the multiple contentious dimensions of the US claim of justification, the article concludes that the raid constituted an illegal ‘armed reprisal’. In light of observable state practice, its precedent-setting nature should not be overstated. However, albeit qualified as an ‘one-off incident’ the US raid did not leave the prohibition on the use of force and the contemporary discourse surrounding it untouched. Hence, it appears essential to demystify its frequently asserted evolutive potential particularly regarding the temporal limitations of Article 51 UN Charter to which this article is dedicated.


Author(s):  
Forteau Mathias ◽  
Ying Xiu Alison See

The present contribution discusses the US hostage recuse operation in Iran in 1980. After the presentation of the relevant facts and context of the (eventually aborted) operation, including the official positions of the US and Iran as publicly expressed at that time, the present contribution assesses the legality of the operation, taking into account the reactions of other states and competent international organizations. The legality of the operation is assessed under Article 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter and other possible exceptions under customary international law such as self-help. It concludes that it is doubtful that the operation was in conformity with international law.


Author(s):  
Barry Buzan ◽  
Lene Hansen

International security studies (ISS) has significantly evolved from its founding core of “golden age” strategic studies. From the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s through to the 1970s, strategic studies virtually was ISS, and remains a very large part of it. The fact that it continues to stand as the “mainstream” attacked by widening/deepening approaches further speaks to its status as a “core.” This core consists of those literatures whose principal concern is external military threats to the state, and the whole agenda of the use of force which arises from that. This core was originally focused on nuclear weapons and the military-political rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union, but has since adapted its focus to changes in the salience and nature of military threats caused by the end of the Cold War and 9/11. It includes literatures on deterrence, arms racing, arms control and disarmament, grand strategy, wars (and “new wars”), the use of force, nuclear proliferation, military technology, and terrorism. Debates within ISS are structured, either implicitly or explicitly, by five questions: (1) which referent object to adopt, (2) whether to understand security as internally or externally driven, (3) whether to limit it to the military sector or to expand it, (4) what fundamental thinking about (international) politics to adopt, and (5) which epistemology and methodology to choose.


Author(s):  
Reinold Theresa

This chapter discusses the legality of South Africa’s incursion in Lesotho in 1982. After describing the facts of the case, it presents the legal arguments of the main protagonists – South Africa and Lesotho - and canvasses the positions taken by the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council, as well as other important diplomatic players. It then assesses the legality of the intervention and discusses its impact on the progressive development of international law. It concludes that the incursion violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and that, in light of the overwhelmingly negative international reaction, the raid could not trigger an expanded reading of the right to self-defense, as was claimed by South Africa.


Author(s):  
Williamson Myra

This chapter analyses the context and legality of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, also referred to as the First Lebanon War and ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’. It began on 6 June 1982 and became an 18-year-long occupation, ending on 22 May 2000. The first section discusses the immediate pretext for Israel’s invasion—the attempted assassination in London of the Israeli Ambassador to Britain, Schlomo Argov, by Abu Nidal terrorists—as well as the more complex causes, such as the political animosity between Israel, Lebanon, Syria and the PLO. Section two analyses the positions of the main antagonists—Israel, Lebanon and the PLO—as well as other interested parties (the US, the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly). The third section addresses the legality of Israel’s use of force, citing the arguments of scholars on both sides of the debate. Finally, the chapter assesses the precedential value of this use of force, in light of the Security Council’s refusal to accept that the attempted assassination was an ‘armed attack’ and its condemnation of the Israeli aggression.


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