Part 1 The Cold War Era (1945–89), 29 The US Intervention in Nicaragua—1981–88

Author(s):  
Kammerhofer Jörg

This chapter focuses on the US intervention in Nicaragua from 1981 to 1988, as a contribution to the state practice on the law on the use of force and the right to self-defence under both UN Charter and customary law. After an overview of the background of the so-called ‘contra war’ and of the salient facts regarding the US intervention in that conflict, it discusses the positions of the two parties on the facts and law, and takes note of the reaction of the international community, focusing on the debates at the UN. The next section focuses on the legality of the operation; the ICJ’s holdings in its 1986 Nicaragua judgment form the backbone of that discussion, while taking note of dissent and comment both inside and outside the Court. The contribution concludes by discussing the precedential value and effect of this conflict, and of the ICJ case.

Author(s):  
Starski Paulina

This contribution analyses the normative implications of the US raid against the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in 1993 in reaction to a foiled assassination attempt against former President Bush. It examines the legality of the operation, its precedential value and its evolutive potential regarding the regime on the ius contra bellum and specifically the right to self-defence. After dissecting the multiple contentious dimensions of the US claim of justification, the article concludes that the raid constituted an illegal ‘armed reprisal’. In light of observable state practice, its precedent-setting nature should not be overstated. However, albeit qualified as an ‘one-off incident’ the US raid did not leave the prohibition on the use of force and the contemporary discourse surrounding it untouched. Hence, it appears essential to demystify its frequently asserted evolutive potential particularly regarding the temporal limitations of Article 51 UN Charter to which this article is dedicated.


Author(s):  
Tsagourias Nicholas

This chapter examines the legality of the 1989 US intervention in Panama and assesses its impact on the use of force regime. After recalling the facts of the incident, it goes on to analyse the legal arguments provided by the US government to justify its action. More specifically, the US invoked its right to protect American citizens abroad as part of its right to self-defence; the right to intervene to protect the Panama Canal provided by the Panama Canal Treaties; and the invitation of the democratically elected Leader of the Opposition. The chapter then presents the reactions of states and the views of legal commentators. It concludes by saying that the incident affirms existing law but also contributes to the development of the rules regulating the use of force in international law.


Author(s):  
Kamto Maurice

This contribution discusses the US air strikes against Libya in 1986. It sets out the facts that led to the air strikes – notably the bombing of a West Berlin night club on 5 April 1986 –, the legal positions of the main protagonists (the US and Libya), and the international community’s reactions. It then tests the legality of the US strikes against the international legal framework governing the use of force as it stood at the time of the events, namely the rules governing the right to self-defence. The chapter concludes that the use of force in this particular case could not be convincingly justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter.


Author(s):  
Kreß Claus ◽  
Nußberger Benjamin K

In 1976, Israel conducted a successful, but highly controversial military rescue operation in Entebbe, Uganda, to save its nationals taken hostage on Ugandan territory by members of the ‘Popular Front of Liberation of Palestine’. From an international legal perspective, this case revolves around the existence of a right of a state to take military action to protect its nationals abroad in mortal danger. Following an extensive legal debate in the Security Council on the incident, it appears safe to conclude that a rescue operation such as conducted in Entebbe passes the threshold for a use of force within the meaning of Article 2(4) UN Charter. In light of the ambiguous justification, however, it appears that an Entebbe-type situation falls within a grey area of the prohibition of the use of force. Still, the incident suggests that if states are willing to support the legality of a military rescue operation only the right of self-defence can conceivably justify such a use of force, and only in a case where the local state does not itself deal with the threat in good faith, and under strict conditions of proportionality.


2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAPHAËL VAN STEENBERGHE

AbstractThis article analyses the recent state practice in which the right of self-defence has been invoked in order to justify the use of force in response to attacks by non-state actors. The main purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the law of self-defence has evolved through this practice. It is submitted that the latter confirms the tendency, evidenced by the US operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan in 2001, towards allowing states to respond in self-defence to private armed attacks, that is, attacks which are committed by non-state actors only. The article also aims to shed some light on other fundamental conditions of the law of self-defence which played a significant role in the legal assessment of the recent state practice. It is argued in this respect that this practice confirms that any armed attack must reach some level of gravity – which may be assessed by accumulating minor uses of force – in order to trigger the right of self-defence, and that proportionality of the action taken in self-defence may be assessed in quantitative terms, but only as a means of making a prima facie judgement about the necessity of this action.


Author(s):  
Williamson Myra

This chapter examines Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon on 14 March 1978, often referred to as ‘Operation Litani’. First, the chapter discusses the immediate and long-term causes of the Israeli invasion: the former includes the ‘Coastal Road Massacre’ that occurred on 11 March 1978, whilst the latter includes the effects of the Palestinian presence in southern Lebanon. The second section analyses the positions of the main antagonists, setting forth the positions adopted by Israel, Lebanon, the PLO, Jordan, the US, Syria, Egypt, Kuwait and the United Nations’ Security Council. The third section discusses the legality of this use of force, purportedly an act of anticipatory self-defence to prevent future attacks. Finally, the chapter offers a brief conclusion on the precedential value of this incident. It concludes that the Israeli use of force, which was unanimously condemned by the Security Council, was unlawful.


Author(s):  
Barry Buzan ◽  
Lene Hansen

International security studies (ISS) has significantly evolved from its founding core of “golden age” strategic studies. From the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s through to the 1970s, strategic studies virtually was ISS, and remains a very large part of it. The fact that it continues to stand as the “mainstream” attacked by widening/deepening approaches further speaks to its status as a “core.” This core consists of those literatures whose principal concern is external military threats to the state, and the whole agenda of the use of force which arises from that. This core was originally focused on nuclear weapons and the military-political rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union, but has since adapted its focus to changes in the salience and nature of military threats caused by the end of the Cold War and 9/11. It includes literatures on deterrence, arms racing, arms control and disarmament, grand strategy, wars (and “new wars”), the use of force, nuclear proliferation, military technology, and terrorism. Debates within ISS are structured, either implicitly or explicitly, by five questions: (1) which referent object to adopt, (2) whether to understand security as internally or externally driven, (3) whether to limit it to the military sector or to expand it, (4) what fundamental thinking about (international) politics to adopt, and (5) which epistemology and methodology to choose.


Author(s):  
Williamson Myra

This chapter analyses the context and legality of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, also referred to as the First Lebanon War and ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’. It began on 6 June 1982 and became an 18-year-long occupation, ending on 22 May 2000. The first section discusses the immediate pretext for Israel’s invasion—the attempted assassination in London of the Israeli Ambassador to Britain, Schlomo Argov, by Abu Nidal terrorists—as well as the more complex causes, such as the political animosity between Israel, Lebanon, Syria and the PLO. Section two analyses the positions of the main antagonists—Israel, Lebanon and the PLO—as well as other interested parties (the US, the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly). The third section addresses the legality of Israel’s use of force, citing the arguments of scholars on both sides of the debate. Finally, the chapter assesses the precedential value of this use of force, in light of the Security Council’s refusal to accept that the attempted assassination was an ‘armed attack’ and its condemnation of the Israeli aggression.


Author(s):  
Guilfoyle Douglas

This chapter examines the United States’ air strikes against torpedo boat bases in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in August 1964 in response to two claimed armed attacks against its naval units in the Gulf of Tonkin earlier that month. It considers the facts, historical context and operational environment. It examines the reactions at the time of the main actors, and their allies, in the Security Council. In assessing the incident’s legality it notes that several of the questions raised remain controversial today, including: (i) Can a state validly exercise self-defence based on a mistake of fact? (ii) Can self-defence encompass ‘preventative’ actions? (iii) Can an attack on a single vessel trigger a right of self-defence? (iv) Was the action proportionate and necessary? (v) How proximate in time must a (legal) defensive use of force be to the triggering armed attack in order to avoid being classed as a reprisal?


Author(s):  
Johannes Socher

The book concludes with the suggestion that Russia’s approach to the right of peoples to self-determination may be best understood not only in terms of Russian power politics disguised as legal rhetoric but can be seen as evidence of traits of a regional (re-)fragmentation of international law. Even basic agreement on what self-determination as a concept of international law means and what role related concepts such as territorial integrity, secession, referendum, or the prohibition of the use of force do or should play in that context seems almost unattainable, to the effect that international law as a single epistemological frame is arguably in a similar danger as during Soviet times. Today, apart from Lauri Mälksoo’s work and occasional contributions by a handful of other scholars in the West, analyses of Russia’s post-Soviet state practice and doctrine in the international legal discourse usually confine themselves to assess the legality of Russia’s actions in terms of positive international law. Such a limited approach fails to attempt to understand diverging views on international law, something which was perceived as self-evident during the Cold War period.


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