Part 2 Determining the Applicable Attorney–Client Privilege Standard, 9 Applicable Privilege Standard in Investor–State Arbitration and Comparison with International Commercial Arbitration

Author(s):  
Möckesch Annabelle

In investor–state arbitrations, which are concerned with the resolution of disputes between foreign investors and states parties over the state’s exercise of its public authority in relation to legislative, administrative, or judicial measures, the parties often invoke attorney–client privilege as a defence to document production requests. This chapter therefore examines how arbitral tribunals have determined the applicable attorney–client privilege standard in investor–state arbitration. It reports on several procedural orders and decisions issued by arbitral tribunals constituted under the North American Free Trade Agreement and other bilateral or multilateral treaties. As in these proceedings attorney–client privilege claims often arise together with Cabinet privilege claims, the tribunals’ findings on the applicable Cabinet privilege standard are presented as well. Lastly, the chapter explores whether the solution proposed for international commercial arbitration can also be adopted in investor–state arbitration.

1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 324-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier ◽  
Laura W. Arnold ◽  
Christopher J. W. Zorn

A critical element of decision making is the timing of choices political actors make; often when a decision is made is as critical as the decision itself. We posit a dynamic model of strategic position announcement based on signaling theories of legislative politics. We suggest that members who receive clear signals from constituents, interest groups, and policy leaders will announce their positions earlier. Those with conflicting signals will seek more information, delaying their announcement. We test several expectations by examining data on when members of the House of Representatives announced their positions on the North American Free Trade Agreement. We also contrast the timing model with a vote model, and find that there are meaningful differences between the factors influencing the timing of position announcements and vote choice. Our research allows analysts to interpret the process leading up to the House action and the end state of that process.


2007 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dwi Susanto ◽  
C. Parr Rosson ◽  
Flynn J. Adcock

This paper examines the effect of the U.S.-Mexico trade agreement under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The results suggest that U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico have been responsive to tariff rate reductions applied to Mexican products. A one percentage point decrease in tariff rates is associated with an increase in U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico by 5.31% in the first 6 years of NAFTA and by 2.62% in the last 6 years of NAFTA. U.S. imports from Mexico have also been attributable to the pre-NAFTA tariff rates. Overall, the results indicate that the U.S-Mexico trade agreement under NAFTA has been trade creating rather than trade diverting.


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