The Politics of Investment Treaty Arbitration

2020 ◽  
pp. 739-766
Author(s):  
Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen
Keyword(s):  
State Politics ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Host State ◽  
Home State ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

This chapter describes the politics of investment treaty arbitration. It first looks at two core political justifications for investment treaty arbitration. The first relates to home state politics and diplomacy: the ability of investment treaty arbitration to depoliticize investor–state disputes. The second justification relates to host state politics and institutions: the ability of investment treaty arbitration to convince certain types of foreign investors to commit capital into certain types of jurisdictions due to its effects on host state governments. On this basis, the chapter then discusses the politics of investment treaty arbitration in recent years, particularly surrounding the unintended consequences of the investment treaty regime as well as the controversy about investment arbitrators themselves.

Exploring the prospects of host-state counterclaims in corruption disputes

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 583-600
Author(s):  
Chitransh Vijayvergia ◽  
Pavan Belmannu
Keyword(s):  
Bilateral Investment Treaties ◽  
International Arbitration ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
The Public ◽  
Host State ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Investment Treaties ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

Abstract While the regime of investment treaty arbitration has evolved manifold over the decades, has the position of the host-states as a Respondent improved? The authors argue that it has not. Bilateral Investment Treaties (hereinafter BIT(s)) are still asymmetrical in nature where the states are obliged to protect the rights of the foreign investors but are not provided with any remedy against the corrupt activities of the investors. While tribunals have denied jurisdiction over the investors’ claims tainted with corruption, they have provided states with no consequent remedy against such investors. Consequently, the states have to first bear the loss of a failed investment in its territory and then pay for the exorbitant costs of international arbitration as well. Where scholars are arguing for attribution of liability of corrupt activities of the public officials to the states, the authors here raise an important question of what if the liability cannot be attributed to the states due to lack of apparent authority? Should the states be then allowed to move forward from the jurisdictional stage to raise counterclaims to seek damages for the loss caused by the investors? In this article, the authors explore these questions and present arguments in favour of the inclusion of corruption-based counterclaims.

scholarly journals Let Us Not Forget about the Role of Domestic Courts in Settling Investor-State Disputes

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-415
Author(s):  
Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Working Group ◽  
Reform Process ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Host State ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

Abstract This overview illustrates that there is a gap in our knowledge of how domestic courts handle investor-State disputes. As it turns out, some foreign investors use the domestic courts of the host State prior to initiating investment treaty arbitration. Subject matter-wise, these cases are very diverse and not all of them are initiated by investors against the host State. Moreover, in the four countries analysed, investors often appealed to the highest courts of the land, but they lost more cases than they won. These findings should help UNCITRAL Working Group III conceptualize the meaning of “investor-State dispute” and the relationship between domestic and international methods of ISDS. This overview concludes by inviting further empirical research to understand how domestic courts handle investor-State disputes. This in turn can help us develop normative arguments as to why domestic courts should be included in the reform process.

15 Investment Treaty Dispute Settlement

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salacuse Jeswald W
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Rule Based ◽  
Host State ◽  
Rule Based System ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Diplomatic Protection ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
Investment Treaties

This chapter focuses on investment treaty dispute settlement, examining the nature of conflicts between investors and states and the various means provided by treaties to resolve them. In general, investor–state disputes governed by treaties occur because a host state has taken a ‘measure’ that allegedly violates that state's treaty commitments on the treatment it has promised to accord to investments protected by that treaty. Before the advent of investment treaties, investors basically had three methods to seek resolution of their disputes with host states: (a) direct negotiation with host state governments; (b) domestic courts in the host country; and (c) diplomatic protection by their home states. In order to establish a stable, rule-based system for international investment, treaties provide means to resolve disputes about the interpretation and application of treaty provisions. Most investment treaties provide four separate dispute settlement methods: (1) consultations and negotiations between contracting states; (2) arbitration between contracting states; (3) consultations and negotiations between covered investors and host governments; and (4) investor–state arbitration.

5 The Microeconomics of Investment Treaties

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bonnitcha Jonathan ◽  
Skovgaard Poulsen Lauge N ◽  
Waibel Michael
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Foreign Investment ◽  
Fiscal Illusion ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Host State ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
The Third ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Investment Treaties ◽  
The Impact

This chapter surveys the impact of investment treaties on decision-making at the firm and government levels. The focus is on whether investment treaties’ influence on the decisions of firms and states leads to improvements in efficiency. The first section examines the ‘hold-up’ problem, which provides the most influential and coherent microeconomic justification for the inclusion of investment protection provisions in investment treaties. The second section explores the problem of ‘fiscal illusion’ in host state decision-making, which could result in ‘over-regulation’ of foreign investment in the absence of an investment treaty. The third section considers whether investment treaties solve problems of discrimination against foreign investors, as well as the possibility that investment treaties lead to discrimination in favour of foreign investors.

Striking the Right Balance Between the Interests of the Foreign Investors and the Host State – A Case Study of the Tanzania-Germany BIT 50 Years After Its Conclusion

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Tomasz P. Milej
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Investments ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Host State ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
General Feeling ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
The Right ◽  
Development Objectives ◽  
The Relationship

Fifty years ago, Tanzania and Germany concluded a bilateral investment treaty (BIT). The main features of this BIT differ from what is common today. The article examines the adequacy of the Treaty's stipulations against the backdrop of the controversies which the conclusion of the BITs has recently sparked in developing states and in Tanzania in particular. It discusses the nexus between the conclusion of the BITs and the inflow of foreign investments. As there is a general feeling among Tanzanian scholars that the BITs are too favourable to investors at the expense of local firms and legitimate policy objectives of the host state, various claims have been made with respect to the content of the investment treaties. Taking the Tanzania-Germany BIT as a case study, the article analyses these claims in the context of a global debate on the relationship between the need for the protection of foreign investors and sustainable development objectives. Finally, the future of the Tanzania-Germany BIT is discussed in the light of the post-Lisbon EU approach to the investment policy.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document