The Limitations of Traditional Rules and Institutions Relating to the Use of Force

Author(s):  
Michael Glennon

This chapter examines the limitations of traditional rules and institutions with respect to the use of force. It considers international cooperation in managing the use of force, and whether and when the use of force is justified, within the framework of the jus ad bellum. The chapter discusses three factors that help to explain why the rules and institutions that regulate the use of force have not been effective. First is the weakness of international law’s secondary rules concerning consent, obligation, and causation. Second is the weaknesses in the UN Charter rules due to deficiencies in the wording of the rules themselves, especially with regard to pre-emptive self-defence. Third is the weakness in compliance resulting from the UN Security Council’s dysfunctionality, in part due to the UN’s professed reliance upon the principle of sovereign equality.

Author(s):  
Nicole Scicluna

This chapter explores the justness, legitimacy, and legality of war. While 1945 was a key turning point in the codification of jus ad bellum (i.e. international law on the use of force), that framework did not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, it was the product of historical political contingencies that meant that codification of the laws of war was contemporaneous, both geographically and temporally, with the solidification of the norms of sovereign nation-statehood and territorial integrity. The chapter focuses on the UN Charter regime and how it has shaped the politics of war since 1945. Importantly, the Charter establishes a general prohibition on the use of force in international relations. It also grants two exceptions to the prohibition: actions undertaken with Security Council authorization and actions taken in self-defence. Today, many of the most serious challenges to the Charter regime concern the definition and outer limits of the concept of self-defence. Another set of challenges to the Charter regime concerns the contested concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. The chapter then looks at the development of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine.


2021 ◽  
pp. 251-272
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter discusses the regulation of when and for what purpose a state may use force against another state jus ad bellum. It provides an overview of the legal framework in the 1945 UN Charter. It analyses the content of the prohibition on the use of force in article 2(4) of the Charter; discusses the competences of the UN Security Council; and examines the right to self-defence. The Security Council is entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council may authorize the use of force if required to maintain and/or restore the peace. Article 51 of the Charter allows a state to defend itself in the case of armed attack.


Author(s):  
J.F.R. Boddens Hosang

This chapter discusses the various legal bases for the use of force, including national self-defence and the criteria for national self-defence, examining the law governing the initiation of the use of force, jus ad bellum. It also looks at the various command and control systems applicable to both the operations and the operational planning process. Further, it discusses the role of non-State actors in the context of national self-defence as well as the use of force on the territory of third States in the context of a non-international armed conflict.


2019 ◽  
pp. 254-278
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter discusses the regulation of when and for what purpose a state may use force against another state—jus ad bellum. It provides an overview of the legal framework in the 1945 UN Charter. It analyses the content of the prohibition on the use of force in article 2(4) of the Charter; discusses the competences of the UN Security Council; and examines the right to self-defence. The Security Council is entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council may authorize the use of force if required to maintain and/or restore the peace. Article 51 of the Charter allows a state to defend itself in the case of armed attack.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (864) ◽  
pp. 779-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Enzo Cannizzaro

AbstractThis article analyses the role and content of proportionality under contemporary international law governing the use of force, with a view to clarifying the legal framework governing the conduct of the parties to an armed conflict. In the system of jus ad bellum, protection is primarily granted to the interest of the attacked state in repelling the attack; the other competing interests are considered only to curtail the choice of the means to be employed in order to achieve that aim. Conversely, in the system of jus in bello there is by definition no prevailing interest, but instead a variety of interests and values which are entitled to equal protection of the law and must be balanced against each other. The existence of two distinct normative systems, with distinct standards of legality applicable to the same conduct, does not as a rule give rise to major problems. The legality of recourse to force is measured against the proportionality of self-defence, whereas individual actions would have to conform to the requirement of proportionality in jus in bello. However, beyond the large area in which these two standards overlap, there might be situations in which the strict application of the jus ad bellum standard makes it impossible to achieve the aims of jus in bello. In these cases, the proportionality test under jus in bello must be regarded as part of the proportionality test under jus ad bellum. States must thus take humanitarian implications into account in determining the level of security they may seek to obtain using military action.


Author(s):  
Michael N. Schmitt

This chapter focuses on the use of cyber force on and off the battlefield within the framework of international law. Drawing on the work of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (2013), it considers the jus ad bellum issues surrounding cyber operations. In particular, it examines when cyber operations violate the prohibition on the use (or threat) of force set forth in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law, and when a state that has been the target of cyber operations may retaliate with its own use of force. The chapter also discusses two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force under Article 51 of the UN Charter, one of which is the exercise of the right of self-defence. Finally, it analyses state interpretations of international law’s prescriptive norms regarding the use of force when applied to cyberspace.


Author(s):  
Jordan Paust

This chapter examines the use of remotely piloted and other robotics during war and outside the context of war during permissible measures of self-defence and their implications for the jus ad bellum, interpretation of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, and applications of underlying general principles. It discusses the phenomenon of ‘remotely piloted warfare’ as it applies to the use of force by state and non-state actors with respect to self-defence, collective self-defence, self-determination assistance, regional action, and enforcement action authorized by the Security Council. It then considers the use of remotely piloted attacks, self-defence, and warfare in relation to compliance with the principles of reasonable necessity, distinction in targeting, and proportionality. In particular, the chapter looks at the use of weaponized drones and the possible challenges they present to compliance with basic legal principles that limit violence, and some current applications and issues regarding compliance.


Author(s):  
James Crawford ◽  
Rowan Nicholson

This chapter examines the relevance of the international law and institutions governing the use of force (jus ad bellum). It considers a number of critiques centred on whether the rules expressed in the UN Charter are effective in practice, too indeterminate, or too strict. First is the realist critique that views the rules on the use of force as ineffective. Second is the legal critique that the prohibition on the use of force does not amount to international law at all. In particular, the chapter discusses Michael Glennon’s argument in Chapter 3 of this volume that the principle of ‘sovereign equality’ has prevented the United Nations, especially the Security Council, from addressing emerging crises. It also argues that the UN Charter rules, while not always optimally effective, have played a key role in reducing interstate armed conflict since 1945.


Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter discusses the regulation of when and for what purpose a state may use force against another state — jus ad bellum. It provides an overview of the legal framework in the 1945 UN Charter. It analyses the content of the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter; discusses the competences of the UN Security Council; and examines the right to self-defence. The Security Council is entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council may authorize the use of force if required to maintain and/or restore the peace. Article 51 of the Charter allows a state to defend itself in the case of armed attack.


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