Theatre of Operations

Author(s):  
Jean Christophe Martin

This chapter explores ‘theatre of operations’ as a legal concept in international law, with emphasis on the geographical extent—‘boundaries of the battlefield’—of the use of force by belligerents. It addresses the meaning of ‘theatre of operations’ by considering two legal issues: the right of parties to an armed conflict to conduct military operations and the applicable law to armed operations carried out beyond the borders of a state. It examines the notion of the area of war in the context of jus in bello, jus ad bellum, and actions taken by the UN Security Council in response to armed conflicts, with reference to security and exclusion zones. It identifies ‘protected zones’ in which military operations are excluded based on the international law of armed conflicts and looks at issues raised by cyber warfare pertaining to the applicability of classic provisions of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.

Author(s):  
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg

This chapter examines the rules and principles that govern a naval or aerial blockade or some other form of interference with foreign vessels and aircraft in the absence of an explicit authorization by the UN Security Council. After clarifying the concept of blockade under the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, it considers blockades authorized as military enforcement measures. It also discusses some unresolved or even contested issues regarding the legality of blockades, with reference to blockades in situations other than international armed conflict and the principle of proportionality in relation to humanity. The scope of interdiction operations and its legal bases under international treaties are analysed next, together with maritime interdiction operations and the applicability of prize law during non-international armed conflicts. Finally, the chapter explores the right of individual or collective self-defence as a basis for interdiction operations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 741-757
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Schweiger

AbstractOver the last decade, the concept targeted killing has received much attention in debates on the customary interpretation of the right to self-defence, particularly in the context of practices such as US armed drone attacks. In these debates, government silence has often been invoked as acquiescence to the jus ad bellum aspects of targeted killing. Focusing on the question of state silence on targeted killing practices by the Israeli and US governments in recent years, this article investigates over 900 UN Security Council and Human Rights Council debates and argues that there has been no tacit consent to targeted killing. The analysis firstly shows that the majority of states have condemned Israeli targeted killing practices and have raised concerns about armed drone attacks, while falling short of directly protesting against US practices. The article, secondly, applies the customary international law requirements for acquiescence and challenges the idea that silence on US armed drone attacks can be understood as a legal stance towards targeted killing. The article, finally, investigates the political context and engages with alternative interpretations of silence. Contextualizing acts of protest and lack of protest within an asymmetrical political context, the article posits that the invocation of silence as acquiescence in the case of targeted killing is problematic and risks complicity of legal knowledge production with the violence of hegemonic actors.


Author(s):  
Ian Park

The controversy surrounding the applicability of the right to life during armed conflict makes it arguably one of the most divisive and topical issues at the junction of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Recent litigation has, among other things, prompted the UK government to signal an intention to derogate from Article 2, ECHR, subject to certain caveats, in future armed conflicts. The litigation pursuant to Article 2 is also set to continue as the UK, and many other States with right to life obligations, will continue to use lethal force overseas; thus the significance of the issue will remain unabated. The scope and application of the right to life in armed conflict not only concerns parties to the ECHR; the predominance of coalition military operations in recent years has necessitated that it is essential for all troop-contributing States to understand the legal limitations of those States bound by the ECHR. It is equally important that the UN, NATO, NGOs, and other governments not directly involved in the armed conflict are aware of any States’ right to life obligations. Notwithstanding this, the applicability of the right to life in armed conflict is yet to be fully considered in academic literature. This book aims to close this lacuna and address the issue of the right to life in armed conflict by identifying and analysing the applicable law, citing recent examples of State practice, and offering concrete proposals to ensure that States comply with their right to life obligations.


Author(s):  
Nicole Scicluna

This chapter explicates the various ways in which contemporary warfare challenges post-1945 international law on the use of force and the conduct of war. It begins by exploring the rules governing the use of force against non-state actors. This is one of the most pressing issues of the war on terror, much of which has involved military operations against terrorist groups operating from the territory of states that cannot or will not suppress their activities. In particular, campaigns by the US and several other states against ISIS in Syria have seriously undermined the international law framework governing self-defence and the right of states to have their sovereignty and territorial integrity respected. The chapter then looks at another trademark policy of the war on terror: the use of targeted killings, often carried out by unmanned drones, to eliminate suspected terrorists. It also considers a new type of warfare altogether: the emerging phenomenon of cyber warfare, which, too, has implications for both jus ad bellum and jus in bello.


1916 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 689-705 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heinrich Lammasch

In the beginnings of international law, in Grotius and his predecessors and immediate successors, discussion of the Right of War, the jus ad bellum, takes up a great deal of room by the side of the Right in War, the jus in bello. Today, however, the question, When is war justified? has almost ceased to be discussed. The so-called predecessors of Grotius, like himself and his immediate followers, accepted from the Roman law the notion of the bellum justum piumque. This concept was purely formal. To make a war a bellum justum piumque nothing more was required than compliance with the precepts of the fetial law as to the formalities of declaring war. To be sure, these, at least originally, required a resolution of the Senate and its ratification by the Centuriate Comitia. Later, however, this requisite, to which one could perhaps not always deny some material significance, completely disappeared behind the empty ceremony which the Pater Patratus performed at the boundary of the enemy country with the “hasta ferrata aut sanguinea prœusta” hurled across the same. Nay, in the war with Pyrrhus, a deserter from the former’s army was allowed to buy a piece of ground in Rome, into which the spear was flung as into hostile territory, in order that the Pater Patratus might not have to go all the way to the frontier. On these formalities, which naturally became more and more futile, Roman historians based their country’s reputation of never having waged an unjust war. Still, the fetial law had at least the one advantage of giving the adversary a 33 days’ respite for deliberation.


Author(s):  
Vaughan Lowe

‘Freedom from external interference’ focuses on one aspect of the assurance of the sovereign equality and independence of States and the freedom that it entails for each of them: the freedom from external interference and from forcible coercion by other States. In what circumstances may force be used? What weapons and methods of waging war may be used? Who is entitled to use force? The rules of international law relating to war are traditionally divided into the jus in bello, which governs matters such as prohibitions on certain weapons and ways of waging war against other nations, and the jus ad bellum, which limits the circumstances on the right to go to war.


2019 ◽  
pp. 377-406
Author(s):  
Gleider Hernández

This chapter assesses the law of armed conflict. The right to resort to armed force, known as ‘jus ad bellum’, is a body of law that addresses the permissibility of entering into war in the first place. Despite the restrictions imposed by this body of law, it is clear that international law does not fully forbid the use of force, and instances of armed disputes between and within States continue to exist. Consequently, a second, older body of law exists called ‘jus in bello’, or the law of armed conflict, which has sought to restrain, or at least to regulate, the actual conduct of hostilities. The basic imperative of this body of law has been to restrict warfare in order to account for humanitarian principles by prohibiting certain types of weapons, or protecting certain categories of persons, such as wounded combatants, prisoners of war, or the civilian population.


Author(s):  
Michael N. Schmitt

This chapter focuses on the use of cyber force on and off the battlefield within the framework of international law. Drawing on the work of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (2013), it considers the jus ad bellum issues surrounding cyber operations. In particular, it examines when cyber operations violate the prohibition on the use (or threat) of force set forth in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law, and when a state that has been the target of cyber operations may retaliate with its own use of force. The chapter also discusses two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force under Article 51 of the UN Charter, one of which is the exercise of the right of self-defence. Finally, it analyses state interpretations of international law’s prescriptive norms regarding the use of force when applied to cyberspace.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nazanin Baradaran ◽  
Homayoun Habibi

Cyber warfare represents new kinds of weapons in the present era that have the potential to change the battlefields. The different nature of these types of weapons and their ability to create massive and widespread damage to critical infrastructure of a state, subject the traditional means of resort to force to change and is indicative of the importance that the international community must come to some consensus on the meaning of cyber warfare with in the existing jus ad bellum paradigm and legislate its governing rules, On the other hand, the inherent rights of victim states in self-defense must be supported and by detailed explanations of the governing rules for the method of attribution of responsibility to governments committing cyber-attacks, actions must be taken to prevent escape of these governments from the consequences of their illegal actions. In fact, in this article with an analytical method we will examine the issue of whether cyber attacks could be considered as an armed attack trigger the right to self defense for victim states.


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