‘Targeted killing’ and the lack of acquiescence

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 741-757
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Schweiger

AbstractOver the last decade, the concept targeted killing has received much attention in debates on the customary interpretation of the right to self-defence, particularly in the context of practices such as US armed drone attacks. In these debates, government silence has often been invoked as acquiescence to the jus ad bellum aspects of targeted killing. Focusing on the question of state silence on targeted killing practices by the Israeli and US governments in recent years, this article investigates over 900 UN Security Council and Human Rights Council debates and argues that there has been no tacit consent to targeted killing. The analysis firstly shows that the majority of states have condemned Israeli targeted killing practices and have raised concerns about armed drone attacks, while falling short of directly protesting against US practices. The article, secondly, applies the customary international law requirements for acquiescence and challenges the idea that silence on US armed drone attacks can be understood as a legal stance towards targeted killing. The article, finally, investigates the political context and engages with alternative interpretations of silence. Contextualizing acts of protest and lack of protest within an asymmetrical political context, the article posits that the invocation of silence as acquiescence in the case of targeted killing is problematic and risks complicity of legal knowledge production with the violence of hegemonic actors.

Author(s):  
Theodora Christodoulidou ◽  
Kalliopi Chainoglou

This chapter analyses the principle of proportionality from a jus ad bellum perspective and its application in the exercise of the right of self-defence, in the use of force to protect human rights, and against terrorism. It first gives an overview of the contemporary law of the use of force as codified in the UN Charter, followed by a discussion on proportionality in customary international law. It then considers the measures by which double proportionality is calculated and, in particular, how proportionality can be measured when it seeks to meet the general objective of the use of force. Finally, the chapter examines the concept of proportionality as reflected in the judicial decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and in the legal opinions of the ICJ judges.


Author(s):  
Michael N. Schmitt

This chapter focuses on the use of cyber force on and off the battlefield within the framework of international law. Drawing on the work of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (2013), it considers the jus ad bellum issues surrounding cyber operations. In particular, it examines when cyber operations violate the prohibition on the use (or threat) of force set forth in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law, and when a state that has been the target of cyber operations may retaliate with its own use of force. The chapter also discusses two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force under Article 51 of the UN Charter, one of which is the exercise of the right of self-defence. Finally, it analyses state interpretations of international law’s prescriptive norms regarding the use of force when applied to cyberspace.


Author(s):  
Jean Christophe Martin

This chapter explores ‘theatre of operations’ as a legal concept in international law, with emphasis on the geographical extent—‘boundaries of the battlefield’—of the use of force by belligerents. It addresses the meaning of ‘theatre of operations’ by considering two legal issues: the right of parties to an armed conflict to conduct military operations and the applicable law to armed operations carried out beyond the borders of a state. It examines the notion of the area of war in the context of jus in bello, jus ad bellum, and actions taken by the UN Security Council in response to armed conflicts, with reference to security and exclusion zones. It identifies ‘protected zones’ in which military operations are excluded based on the international law of armed conflicts and looks at issues raised by cyber warfare pertaining to the applicability of classic provisions of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.


Author(s):  
Ndjodi Ndeunyema

This article evaluates the existence of a freestanding, general human right to water under each of the three principal sources of international law: treaty, customary international law, and the general principles of law. To date, the right to water has been derived from treaty law, most prominently as part of the right to an adequate standard of living in article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (as implied by General Comment 15 to the ICESCR). The potential importance of a non-treaty based right to water––as a matter of customary international law or a general principle of law––is that it would bind all states, including states that are not parties to treaties with right to water provisions. Therefore, this article evaluates the state practice and opinio juris elements of custom supporting a right to water. Recognizing the disputed nature of how these two elements generally interact to crystallize into a customary norm, the article considers the problem using two distinct methodological approaches: the sliding scale approach and the reflective equilibrium approach. Finally, the paper considers whether a right to water is supported by the general principles of law. Although the right to water is not directly created by the general principles of law, the principles can nevertheless be applied to develop states’ positive and negative obligations for water provision.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Brian Sang YK

Despite criticism of targeted killing of suspected terrorists, states continue to justify extensive bases for lethal-force responses to terrorism by arguing that rigid adherence to prescriptive law cannot always be observed in the context of clear and present danger. But, while seemingly cogent, this view wrongly presumes the mutual exclusivity of security considerations and the imperatives of law. It risks exceeding the limits of permissible use of lethal force prescribed in conventional and customary international law. A contrary and more balanced view is advanced in this article. It argues that current international law protecting individuals against intentional killing offers sufficient and practicable guidance for states confronting terrorism. Systematic legal criteria are thus expounded to clarify the legality and admissible limits of targeted killing of suspected terrorists in three contexts: law enforcement, self-defence and armed conflict. With reference to treaties, policy documents and state practice, the article critically examines the preconditions for lawful state-sanctioned killings in counter-terrorist operations. It also identifies the legal challenges and policy implications of resorting to targeted killing. Using comparative case law and operational practice, a legal basis is offered on which Kenya and other nations can effectively tackle the spectre of terrorism within the fair strictures of the law. Every struggle of the state – against terrorism or any other enemy – is conducted according to rules and law. There is always law which the state must comply with.


Author(s):  
Isabel V. Hull

Isabel V. Hull uses the German declarations of war in 1914 to examine three issues: 1) the role of customary international law (CIL) in statesmen’s decision to go to war (using Germany as an example); 2) the assumptions that state actors held a jus ad bellum; and, especially, 3) how they distinguished self-defence, prevention, pre-emption, and aggression. Hull uses not the claims of jurists, but the arguments and actions of civilian and military leaders, i.e. those who actually made the decisions for war. With this, she continues Anuschka Tischer’s and Hendrik Simon’s examination of the question whether there was a transformation of war discourses in (early) modernity that led to overcoming the need to justify war. The chapter confirms that, even as Germany began a ‘preventive war’, the European state consensus held that, on the continent, preventive war was illegal, pre-emptive war was severely restrained, and genuine self-defence – meaning both fending off armed attack against one’s territory, independence, or sovereignty, and defending the treaty-structure that guaranteed the inter-state order – was the only justification for war acceptable to the community of states.


Author(s):  
De Wet Erika

This chapter explores potential formal requirements that may affect the validity of consent to direct military assistance. Customary international law only imposes two specific, formal limitations on the legal construct of military assistance on request. The first would be that the request for or consent to military assistance must be issued (and withdrawn) by the highest officials of a state, namely, the head of state and/or government. Where these two positions are not combined within the same person and there is disagreement between them as to whether consent exists, the domestic law of the country in question may be decisive in determining who has the final say in the matter. However, such disagreement between the two highest state officials is likely to be an indication of the political fragility of the consent, which should caution against relying exclusively on consent as the legal basis for the forcible measures. The second constraint imposed by customary international law concerns the requirement that ex ante consent as expressed in pro-invasion treaty clauses must be complemented by ad hoc consent at the time of the forcible measures. Apart from these two constraints, customary international law does not seem to impose any particular formal requirements on states expressing consent to forcible measures on its territory.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (7) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shirley Ayangbah

<p>International Investment in recent times is seen as one of the fastest-developing areas of international law. In the past decades, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of bilateral investment treaties and other agreements with investment related provisions that grant foreign investors important substantive and procedural rights, including, most importantly, the right to sue individuals, organizations and even the state hosting their investment for violations of customary international law and treaty obligations. Dispute becomes an inevitable phenomenon as individuals, organizations and countries continue to engage in foreign investment and as such there is the need for dispute solving mechanism to resolve such disputes as and when they arises. Even though there are several dispute solving mechanisms, arbitration seems to be a well-established and widely used mechanism to end dispute probably due to the efficiency and flexibility nature of it. The laws governing arbitration differ from one country to the other and it is for this reason that investors need to be abreast with the different arbitration laws  so as to enable them make inform decisions as to whether to resort to arbitration  or not. This paper analyses the arbitration laws of The Republic of Ghana and Peoples Republic of China in a comparative manner by drawing on the similarities and difference with respect to arbitration laws and procedure in these two countries. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part of this paper gives a brief background as well as the characteristics of the concept of arbitration. The second part looks as the similarities and difference of arbitration between the selected countries, and the final part looks at the arbitration phase and post arbitration phase of the two countries.</p>


Author(s):  
Byers Michael

This chapter addresses the US and NATO-led intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 to the present day. It examines the different legal justifications advanced or available for the intervention, namely self-defence, UN Security Council authorization, and intervention by invitation. It explores the complex relationships between these justifications and, particularly, the strategies adopted by states in choosing between them. The chapter concludes by considering the effects of the intervention on the customary international law of self-defence as it concerns non-state actors located in “unaware or unable” states, and anticipatory or pre-emptive responses.


Author(s):  
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg

This chapter examines the rules and principles that govern a naval or aerial blockade or some other form of interference with foreign vessels and aircraft in the absence of an explicit authorization by the UN Security Council. After clarifying the concept of blockade under the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, it considers blockades authorized as military enforcement measures. It also discusses some unresolved or even contested issues regarding the legality of blockades, with reference to blockades in situations other than international armed conflict and the principle of proportionality in relation to humanity. The scope of interdiction operations and its legal bases under international treaties are analysed next, together with maritime interdiction operations and the applicability of prize law during non-international armed conflicts. Finally, the chapter explores the right of individual or collective self-defence as a basis for interdiction operations.


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