Peace of Utrecht

Author(s):  
Marsha Frey ◽  
Linda Frey

The agreements that concluded the War of the Spanish Succession, often collectively referred to as the Peace of Utrecht, include the twenty-three treaties signed from January 1713 to February 1715 and that between Austria and Spain in 1725, prompting one contemporary to note that Utrecht “like the peace of God, [was] beyond human understanding” (Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough, quoted in A. D. Machlachan, “The Road to Peace,” in Britain after the Glorious Revolution, 1689–1714, edited by Geoffrey Holmes [London: Macmillan, 1969], p. 197). Moreover, the decisive military advantage of the powers allied against Louis XIV was not reflected in the settlement, except for that with Britain. That pacification, which may be considered the last of the partition treaties, ended a war that broke out in 1702 over the question of who would succeed Charles II. Negotiations began as early as 1706 and more seriously, though no less successfully, through 1709, until the Tory victory (1710) allowed the British ministry to initiate secret negotiations with the French. The negotiations at Utrecht, for the most part, merely ratified decisions reached previously either in Paris and or in London. During these diplomatic maneuvers the British managed to secure their own interests to such a degree that the duke of Shrewsbury refused to sign. He condemned the proceedings as “bargaining for ourselves apart and leaving your friends to shift” (Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, eds., The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession: An Historical and Critical Dictionary [Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995], p. 431). The conference that began in January 1712 ended fifteen months later. Issues of religion, trade, and colonies bedeviled the congress. Many delegates signed the pacification on 11–12 April 1713, but the representatives of the Holy Roman Empire and of Emperor Charles VI decided to continue the fight until 1714 (the Treaties of Rastatt [Rastadt] and Baden). Charles VI gained the Spanish Netherlands and a strong hand in Italy, including Sardinia, Naples, Milan, Mantua, and the Tuscan ports. The Holy Roman Empire fared less well; it basically retained the Ryswick settlement. Britain gained Newfoundland, Acadia, the Asiento (or Assiento), recognition of the Protestant succession, and with its acquisition of Gibraltar and Minorca, naval supremacy in the western Mediterranean. The Netherlands acquired a barrier (ultimately ineffective), and Savoy gained a more defensible, although not a more extended, Alpine barrier. Portugal had to be content with an antebellum frontier but did acquire Sacramento in the New World. Prussia gained recognition of the kingship and some minor territories. France kept the entire left bank of the Rhine but ceded all lands on the right bank except Landau. Louis XIV retained Cape Breton, what became Prince Edward Island, and the fishing rights in Newfoundland. Louis XIV’s grandson, Philip V, kept Spain and Spanish America but had to renounce his right of succession to the French throne. Louis XIV abandoned his Italian allies, but he continued to support the Wittelsbach electors of Bavaria and Cologne, who were restored. The British abandoned the Catalans, who lost their historic liberties. Except in Italy and North America, the frontiers remained remarkably durable.

Author(s):  
Edeltraud Klueting

The chapter addresses the history of monasticism in the German-speaking territories of the Holy Roman Empire from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. Whether the Reformation movement unleashed by Martin Luther represented a continuation of late medieval monastic reforms or, rather, an abrupt departure from them, is a contentious issue. In the Catholic parts of Germany, after the Council of Trent, monasteries became significant agents in the renewal of the Church, especially in the areas of education and social and charitable activity. On the other hand, the Enlightenment, with its narrow conception of utility, called into question the very basis of monastic life, and hence the right of monasteries to exist. The fallout of the French Revolution and the French occupation of the left bank of the Rhine led to a great wave of monastic dissolutions. It was only under the influence of German Romanticism that monasticism experienced another revival.


Author(s):  
Caleb Karges

The War of the Spanish Succession was a large military conflict that encompassed most of western and central Europe spawning additional fighting in the Americas and the world’s oceans. Hostilities began with the invasion of Lombardy by imperial forces in 1701 and were concluded be the treaties of Utrecht (1713), Rastatt, and Baden (1714). The trigger for the war was the long-anticipated death of the childless King Charles II of Spain in 1700 and his will, which ignored several partition treaties signed by other powers and passed the entirety of the Spanish monarchy to Louis XIV of France’s grandson, Philip, Duke of Anjou (Philip V of Spain). The Austrian Habsburgs under Emperor Leopold I contested the will on the behalf of his second son the Archduke Charles (Charles VI of the Holy Roman Empire). With the European balance of power jeopardized by the prospect of a Bourbon succession in Spain, the Kingdom of England (Great Britain after 1707) and the United Provinces joined the Holy Roman Emperor in forming the Grand Alliance in 1702. The Grand Alliance, heretofore referred to as the Allies, expanded to consist ultimately of the emperor of and the states of the Holy Roman Empire (with a few notable exceptions), Great Britain, the United Provinces, Portugal, and the Duchy of Savoy-Piedmont. The pro-Bourbon alliance opposing the Grand Alliance consisted of France, Spain, the Electorate of Bavaria, and the Archbishopric of Cologne. The main military operations largely occurred along the frontiers of France and in the Spanish possessions in Europe such as the Spanish Netherlands, Italy, and the Iberian Peninsula. Of notable exception were the Bavarian campaigns in 1703 and 1704. Throughout the war, each side tried to exploit real and potential revolts/insurgencies in the other’s territory. The Allies maintained a large military presence in Catalonia and set up a rival court in Barcelona under the Archduke Charles as “Charles III of Spain.” The land war in Europe was characterized by the military victories of the Allied commanders, the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy in Flanders, Germany, and Italy. However, the Bourbons maintained their supremacy in Spain itself. As the war protracted, financial and political exhaustion beset all sides. Despite sustained losses bringing France to the brink of collapse, Louis XIV continued to resist until Allied resolve softened with the events of 1710 and 1711 (the Tory victory in the British elections, the battle of Brihuega, and the death of Emperor Joseph I). The war ended with the signing of the treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt, and Baden (collectively known as the Peace of Utrecht) in 1713 and 1714. The British gained significant colonial possessions and concessions from the Bourbon powers as well as the territories of Gibraltar and Minorca. The Dutch received a reinforced barrier in the Low Countries. The Austrians received Spain’s possessions in Italy and the Low Countries. Philip V retained Spain and its colonial possessions.


1978 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-208
Author(s):  
Dennis A. Rubini

William of Orange tried to be as absolute as possible. Inroads upon the power of the executive were fiercely resisted: indeed, William succeeded in keeping even the judiciary in a precarious state of independence. To maintain the prerogative and gain the needed supplies from parliament, he relied upon a mixed whig-tory ministry to direct court efforts. Following the Glorious Revolution, the whigs had divided into two principle groups. One faction led by Robert Harley and Paul Foley became the standard-bearers of the broadly based Country party, maintained the “old whig” traditions, did not seek office during William's reign, tried to hold the line on supply, and led the drive to limit the prerogative. The “junto,” “court,” or “new” whigs, on the other hand, were led by ministers who, while in opposition during the Exclusion crisis, held court office, aggressively sought greater offices, and wished to replace monarchy with oligarchy. They soon joined tory courtiers in opposing many of the Country party attempts to place additional restrictions upon the executive. To defend the prerogative and gain passage for bills of supply, William also developed techniques employed by Charles II. By expanding the concept and power of the Court party, he sought to bring together the executive and legislative branches of government through a large cadre of crown office-holders (placemen) who sat, voted, and directed the votes of others on behalf of the government when matters of importance arose in the Commons. So too, William claimed the right to dissolve parliament and call new elections not on a fixed date, as was to become the American practice, but at the time deemed most propitious over first a three-year and then (after 1716) a seven year period.


Author(s):  
Friedrich Beiderbeck

This chapter examines Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s political vision for Europe, beginning with his views on the Holy Roman Empire and the Peace of Westphalia. It considers how Leibniz viewed Germany’s political and cultural structures and his support for the Reich, along with his thoughts on order, security, and law. It also discusses Leibniz’s modern notion of state and his ideas of territorial power, diplomacy, and international politics; his views on France’s foreign policy under Louis XIV and the War of Spanish Succession (1701–1713/14); and his dispute with Abbé de Saint Pierre over peace and balance of power in Europe. Finally, the chapter looks at Leibniz’s pronouncements on denominational issues and church politics, particularly the presence of Protestants and Catholics in Germany, and his arguments with regards to the House of Hanover and the role played by Great Britain in power politics as a counterbalance to French hegemony.


Author(s):  
Noel Cox

AbstractThe title of prince of the Holy Roman Empire was conferred in 1704 upon all the children heirs and lawful descendants, male and female, of John Churchill, the first duke of Marlborough. The title of prince of Mindelheim was granted in 1705 to all male descendants and daughters of the first duke. But following the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and the Treaty of Rastatt in 1714 the principality passed to Bavaria. The right of the dukes of Marlborough to use the style and title was thus lost, and any residual rights would have expired in 1722 on the death of the duke, as they could not pass to a daughter (unlike his British titles). Despite this it is still common practice to describe the Duke of Marlborough as a Prince of the Holy Roman Empire and Prince of Mindelheim. This paper considers the differences in the treatment of the descent of the British and imperial titles.


2004 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-144
Author(s):  
Deborah Payne Fisk

This superb monograph examines how radical politics found expression in performance in the decade prior to the Glorious Revolution. The years from 1678 to 1688 saw the English monarchy rocked by successive crises, ranging from allegations of secret Catholic plots to murder the king (largely fabricated) to murmurings of dark dealings between Louis XIV and Charles II (largely true). The inability of Charles II to produce a legitimate heir also worried a Protestant citizenry who feared that the line of succession would devolve to James, the Catholic brother of Charles II. Arbitrary rule, strict censorship, excessive taxation, and an atmosphere of Stalinesque surveillance further inflamed the populace. As Johnson wryly notes, the problem with the Restoration was that it restored too much, especially the oppressive political attitudes that caused the Civil War in the first place. Amid this tumult, Johnson situates the patent theatres and street performance. He is certainly not the first scholar to do so, but he is, happily, the first in a long time to combine keen intelligence with common sense. That he tells this compelling story stylishly and with verve gives one all the more reason to read this first-rate study.


Author(s):  
Rafael Valladares

La relación entre España y Francia a partir de 1661 revistió un interés particular a causa de la confluencia de dos fenómenos: el fin de la hegemonía hispánica y la extinción del valimiento en ambas coronas. Esto último dio paso al restablecimiento del gobierno personal, primero en Francia, en marzo de aquel año, y luego en España, en noviembre. En el caso español, menos conocido que el francés, Felipe IV llevó a cabo esta restauración no solo, ni principalmente, por la necesidad de emular a su sobrino Luis XIV, sino, recurriendo a la tradición de su propia historia y dinastía, con el objetivo de incluir este modo de gobierno en el legado del futuro Carlos II, consciente de que la persistencia del valimiento en España con un rey niño haría inviable la Monarquía.AbstractThe relationship between Spain and France from 1661 has a particular interest owing to the coincidence of two political phenomena: the end of the Hispanic hegemony and the abolition of the favouritism in both countries –and consequently the restauration of the personal rule, first in France, in March 1661, and then in Spain, in November. The Spanish case is less known but is very interesting. Philip IV decided to restore the absolute government not only to emulate his nephew Louis XIV, but above all to guide the future rule of his son, Crown Prince Charles, according to the historical tradition of the Habsburg dynasty. The ultimate goal of Philip IV was to avoid the weakening or even the disappearance of the Spanish Monarchy during the Royal minority of Charles II –a four-year-old child in 1665.


Traditio ◽  
1957 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 119-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giles Constable

Among the many disputed episcopal elections of the twelfth century, there are few that present both as many problems and as many points of interest as that at Langres in 1138. The diocese of Langres had since the time of the Carolingian emperors been among the most important in France. As early as 872 Charles the Bald, at the request of bishop Isaac, granted jointly to the cathedral of St. Mamas at Langres and to St. Stephen at Dijon the right, previously held by the local count, to coin money. In 967, the lay count was officially replaced by the bishop, although most of his rights were subinfeudated to a vidame. ‘Par Langres,’ wrote Ferdinand Lot, ‘suzeraine du Langogne, du Dijonnais et de ses annexes (Atuyer, Oscheret, Mémontois), du Boulenois, du Bassigny, du Lassois, du Tonnerrois, etc., c'est-à-dire de la moitié de la Bourgogne française, le roi pouvait exercer, à l'occasion, une grande influence en cette région.’ In 1179, the bishop recovered direct control over his rights as count and became tenant-in-chief of the crown for all his lands and powers, whereas among his own vassals he numbered the duke of Burgundy and the count of Champagne. Later, between 1179 and 1356, he rose to the rank of duke and was recognized as the third ecclesiastical peer of the realm, taking precedence over his own metropolitan, the archbishop of Lyons, at the coronation of the king. Already in the first half of the twelfth century, the diocese of Langres compared in power and size to the great ecclesiastical principalities of the Holy Roman Empire. It included practically all the present bishoprics of Langres and Dijon and extended almost to the towns of Troyes and Auxerre to the north and west and beyond Dijon to the south. Within its boundaries lay not only the great old Benedictine abbeys of Bèze and of St. Bénigne and St. Stephen at Dijon, but also Molesme, the mother-house of Cîteaux, and the newly-founded Cistercian monasteries of Clairvaux and Morimund.


Aschkenas ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thorsten Burger

AbstractThe Stättigkeit of Frankfurt as an element of standardization of the conditions of the Jewish community in the years 1462 to 1614: Frankfurt am Main had had one of the oldest, largest and most important Jewish settlements within the Holy Roman Empire. In the imperial city the term Stättigkeit was used from the Middle Ages onwards to denote the right of residence and to describe the special status of the Jews within Frankfurt society. Stättigkeit referred to political, legal, commercial and social aspects concerning Jewish residents in Frankfurt as well as to foreign Jews who stayed in the city temporarily or were passing through. The essay describes the development and content of the regulations in the Stättigkeit from 1462 – when the Jews of Frankfurt were ordered to move into the Ghetto – up until the Fettmilch uprising in 1614. The author shows that the residence code gave the Jews a high degree of freedom to act as well as a stable legal framework. However, the Stättigkeit also imposed restrictions on their daily life, for instance regarding questions of trade.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document