Military Necessity

Author(s):  
David Turns

Military necessity is one of the most fundamental yet most misunderstood and misrepresented principles of the international law of armed conflict. It has been invoked by military operators to justify any violent measures deemed necessary to win a given conflict, and it has also been dismissed by human rights groups, nongovernmental organizations, and other critics of the armed forces as a typical military excuse to explain away shocking collateral damage in modern military operations. At one extreme it has been distorted by the Clausewitzian approach of Kriegsraison geht vor Kriegsmanier (roughly, necessity in war overrides the way of fighting a war) into a doctrine that jettisons all restraints on military action in war; thus, at one end of the spectrum of interpretation, it may be seen as a doctrinal justification for the notion of “total war.” However, the modern law of armed conflict, with its strongly humanitarian emphasis, requires careful distinction between military and civilian targets; it is based on a subtle and often-elusive nonarithmetical equation that seeks to balance the military advantage anticipated from a given operation against the likely civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects. If proportionality is the fulcrum of that equation and humanity is one side of the balance, then military necessity is the other. Fundamentally and in its broadest interpretation, military necessity means that armed forces can do whatever is necessary—provided always that it is not otherwise unlawful under humanitarian law—to achieve their legitimate military objectives in warfare. For example, enemy armed forces that have not surrendered or are not hors de combat are always legitimate military targets in themselves and may therefore lawfully be attacked at any time and in any place, irrespective of where they are located or what they are actually doing. A more restrictive approach to the doctrine, however, interprets it as always placing limitations on military action, in the sense that no such action may be undertaken (regardless of its legality otherwise under the law of armed conflict) unless it is actually necessary in military terms. An example would be an invading force deciding not to attack certain enemy military formations that do not impede its attack or would represent a diversion from its main objectives. It should be emphasized that the legal notion of military necessity is not the same as “military advantage” (which is a factual descriptor of the outcome upon which actions are predicated). In sum, “military necessity” is best defined as the requirement, in any given set of circumstances, for the application of armed force (in accordance with the other rules of the law of armed conflict) to achieve legitimate military objectives.

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-290
Author(s):  
Jack Mawdsley

Abstract This article looks at how international humanitarian law may apply to military operations in space. Though the laws of war are well established on earth, space poses new challenges to the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution in attack. Future scenarios whereby operations might be directed against moon-based objects, or where military astronauts might be deployed into space raise further questions as to how these principles should apply. By considering the laws of war as they are enforced on earth, and through engagement with academic opinion, this article seeks to understand the level of protection provided by the law when applied to this new domain. In anticipation of official clarification, this approach leads to reasoned arguments for reform in key areas. The challenges posed are addressed through both a contemporary and a future lens. Broad conclusions that the law of armed conflict does not shift seamlessly into space are strengthened by the numerous anomalies that ensue.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 156-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alon Margalit

State behaviour during armed conflict is increasingly exposed to judicial scrutiny. It may also be subjected to standards developed in human rights law which, at times, are inconsistent with the law of armed conflict. This article draws attention to States’ worry over this process, and to their effort to limit the application of human rights law to military operations. The article discusses this effort, as well as the extent to which it was successful in court, focusing on three operational matters: the use of force, the detention of enemy nationals for security reasons, and the investigation of deaths caused by the armed forces. It concludes that courts tend to be more attentive to States’ concerns than often perceived, and that the latter should remain patient during this ongoing process.


This updated and revised fourth edition sets out a Black Letter text of international humanitarian law accompanied by case analysis and extensive explanatory commentary. The book takes account of recent legal developments, such as the 2017 Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty, as well as the ongoing debate on many old and new issues including the notion of direct participation in hostilities; air and missile warfare; military operations in outer space; military cyber operations; belligerent occupation; operational detention; and the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict. The continuing need to consider borderline issues of the law of armed conflict as well as the interplay of international humanitarian law, human rights law, and other branches of international law is highlighted. Certain topics, such as the law of occupation, protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts, humanitarian assistance, and human rights in armed conflict have been made more visible in separate chapters.


2018 ◽  
pp. 223-258
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Ayres ◽  
Jeffrey S. Thurnher

Legitimacy is a critical factor in operations. States strive to maintain legitimacy of their operations for a variety of reasons. The essence of legitimacy on the battlefield is conducting operations in a manner that enables the fighting force to gain and maintain moral and legal authority. Whenever fighting takes place on a cluttered or complex battlespace, legitimacy is brought to the forefront as the potential for civilian harm is often increased. The desire for legitimacy is perhaps the main reason States voluntarily cede sovereignty to comply with international law. Adherence to the law of armed conflict is a necessary and key component of legitimacy. States, as the primary developers and adherents of international law, created the current law of armed conflict construct and are responsible for ensuring its continued viability. States understand that legitimacy and compliance with the law help shape ultimate victory in complex battlespaces. States further recognize that the law of armed conflict only functions properly when there is a delicate balance between the fundamental principles of humanity and military necessity. In recent years, however, States have been subject to attempts from external entities to tilt this balance in favor of humanitarian considerations and to reshape what are considered legitimate actions on complex battlefields. Simultaneously, States have confronted non-State actors that intentionally seek to flout international law and use it to undermine States’ abilities to respond. This chapter examines the importance of legitimacy to States and the reasons States seek to garner it through their military operations.


Author(s):  
Tsvetelina van Benthem

Abstract This article examines the redirection of incoming missiles when employed by defending forces to whom obligations to take precautions against the effects of attacks apply. The analysis proceeds in four steps. In the first step, the possibility of redirection is examined from an empirical standpoint. Step two defines the contours of the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Step three considers one variant of redirection, where a missile is redirected back towards the adversary. It is argued that such acts of redirection would fulfil the definition of attack under the law of armed conflict, and that prima facie conflicts of obligations could be avoided through interpretation of the feasibility standard embedded in the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Finally, step four analyzes acts of redirection against persons under the control of the redirecting State. Analyzing this scenario calls for an inquiry into the relationship between the relevant obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law.


2012 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-201
Author(s):  
Vladan Joncic ◽  
Milos Petrovic

The fundamental question of international law of armed conflict is the question of military necessity principle in international law of armed conflict, ie. in international humanitarian law. Hearings on this issue is necessary because it is still the danger that the principle of recognition of the needs of military regulations and deceive the application of international law of armed conflict. That?s why the military needs to be seen as a permitted deviation from compliance with rules of war. Extreme, this concept has led to the emergence of the theory of the military. Its radical variant of the proceeds from the Maxims of German classical scholars of international law. The result of theoretical assumptions had the effect of limiting the acceptance of military necessity of the first codification of the day. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The heavily consider the military. In all the texts of international conventions is determined by military necessity, as a circumstance or set of circumstances which affect the duty of obeying the regulations of international law. In international law there is no general rule of military necessity as a basis or reason for justified violations of rules of international law of armed conflict. The rules of international law represent a compromise between the desire for a decoration rules of warfare and the need to ensure all the necessary tools that can lead to victory. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949. the military need to provide in terms of the principles of humanity. Set rules on military necessity in the Geneva Conventions give the right correction factor in the role of the law of armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions there is a degree of confusion in terminology, where the concept of military necessity needlessly allocated a number of synonyms. This is because the international law of armed conflict and emerged as a normative regulation of proportionality between the military needs) and general principles and humane principles.


Author(s):  
L. C. Green

In HisDe Jure Belli ac Paris, Grotius, quoting Cicero, stated that “there is no Middle between War and Peace,” and this sentiment seems to have received general agreement well into the twentieth century. Thus, inJansonv.Driefontein Consolidated Mines, Lord Macnaghten stated: “I think the learned counsel for the respondent was right in saying that the law recognises a state of peace and a state of war, but that it knows nothing of an intermediate state which is neither one thing nor the other — neither peace nor war.” One might have thought that the English courts would have abandoned this view in the light of their own experience during the Manchukuo incident, for by 1939 inKawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha of Kobev.Bantham S.S. Co.the Court of Appeal was prepared to concede that “war” might exist for some commercial purposes but not in so far as other legal relationships were concerned.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 252-260
Author(s):  
Bartłomiej Krzan

Abstract The present study analyses climate change from the perspective of the law of armed conflict. Climate may be both a victim and a means of warfare. Arguably, the existing normative framework is broad enough to allow for accommodating climate change. It cannot be denied that the environment is easily harmed, or at least jeopardized in times of armed conflicts. Despite the obvious lack of explicit references in the instruments of international humanitarian law, it may be argued that it is possible to fit climate change in. The accompanying analysis addresses the respective potential and the ensuing hurdles.


Author(s):  
Bothe Michael

This chapter focuses on rules of the law of neutrality concerning the protection of the victims of armed conflicts, which must be considered as part of international humanitarian law. ‘Neutrality’ describes the particular status, as defined by international law, of a state not party to an armed conflict. This status entails specific rights and duties in the relationship between the neutral and the belligerent states. On one hand, there is the right of the neutral state to remain apart from, and not to be adversely affected by, the conflict. On the other hand, there is the duty of non-participation and impartiality. The right not to be adversely affected means that the relationship between the neutral and belligerent States is governed by the law of peace, which is modified only in certain respects by the law of neutrality. In particular, the neutral State must tolerate certain controls in the area of maritime commerce. The duty of non-participation means, above all, that the state must abstain from supporting a party to the conflict. This duty not to support also means that the neutral state is under a duty not to allow one party to the conflict to use the resources of the neutral state against the will of the opponent.


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