The Origin and Classification of Ideas

Author(s):  
Georges Dicker

This chapter (1) expounds Locke’s empiricist principle that all of our ideas are derived from experience, and (2) offers a clarification of the structure of Book II of the Essay. Regarding (1), it explains his twofold use of the term “idea” to mean both any sensory or introspectible state and any concept, his distinctions between ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection and between simple and complex ideas, and his classification of simple ideas. It identifies some noteworthy points about the idea of solidity. Regarding (2), it provides a clarification of the organization of Book II, in light of the facts that Locke (a) digresses into the theory of primary qualities and secondary qualities in Book II Chapter viii before continuing his aetiology of ideas, and (b) discusses several complex ideas of reflection, in Book II Chapters x and xi, before officially turning to complex ideas in Chapter xii.

Author(s):  
Cynthia M. Horne

Chapter 2 explores each of the country cases in this project, namely the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, and Albania. The chapter provides historical details of the transitional justice reforms in all twelve countries from 1989–2013, covering lustration, file access, public disclosures, and truth commissions. This material is then used to place each country case within the typology developed in Chapter 1, according to whether the measures were expansive and included compulsory employment change, limited and included largely voluntary employment change, informal and largely symbolic, or actively rejected. The chapter provides variable conceptualization and operationalization specifics to be used in the subsequent statistical analyses, including three different lustration variables, a truth commission variable, and timing of reform variables. It provides qualitative, comparative historical details to justify the classification of countries according to the primary independent variable, namely lustration and public disclosure programs.


Philosophy ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 55 (212) ◽  
pp. 149-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud

Locke was once supposed to have argued that since the colours, sounds, odours, and other ‘secondary’ qualities things appear to have can vary greatly according to the state and position of the observer, it follows that our ideas of the ‘secondary’ qualities of things do not ‘resemble’ anything existing in the objects themselves. And Berkeley has been credited with the obvious objection that similar facts about the ‘relativity’ of our perception of ‘primary’ qualities show that they do not ‘resemble’ anything existing in the objects either, so that both ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities exist only ‘in the mind’. The falsity of this view of Locke has been amply demonstrated in recent years, but no corresponding revision has been made in what remains the standard interpretation of Berkeley's criticisms of Locke. His objections therefore appear to be based on misunderstanding and to be irrelevant to what is now seen to be Locke's actual view and his reasons for holding it. I think this account of Berkeley, like the old view of Locke, is a purely fictional chapter in the history of philosophy, and in this paper I try to show that Berkeley's criticisms involve no misunderstanding and amount to a direct denial of the view Locke actually held.


Author(s):  
Allison G. Harvey ◽  
Edward Watkins ◽  
Warren Mansell ◽  
Roz Shafran

Chapter 1 presents an introduction to this title. It discusses the classification of psychological disorders (the DSM and ICD), the advantages of a transdiagnostic perspective (comorbidity, treatment development, response to treatment) and disadvantages. Processes for evaluating the transdiagnostic process perspective are also outlined (the cognitive behavioural processes, psychological disorders, quality of evidence, and research samples), and the aims of this title.


2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabine L. Grotkamp ◽  
Wolfgang M. Cibis ◽  
Elisabeth A.M. Nüchtern ◽  
Gert von Mittelstaedt ◽  
Wolfgang K.F. Seger

The goal of this study was to propose a systematic classification of relevant personal factors for describing the background of an individual's life and way of living. The German Society of Social Medicine and Prevention constituted an ICF working group consisting of members from Medical Advisory Boards of Statutory Health Insurances (n = 6) and other institutions (n = 12) in 2009. A two-tier consensus building approach was utilised to construct and document the personal factors, with an initial team of experts compiling the personal factors and a second group of experts, who had not participated in developing the initial proposal, validating the process. The consensus process resulted in personal factors classified into 72 categories and arranged in six chapters as follows: general factors normally unchangeable (chapter 1); a person's inherent physical and mental constitution (chapters 2 and 3); more modifiable factors, such as attitudes, basic skills and behaviour patterns (chapter 4); life situation and socioeconomic/sociocultural factors (chapter 5); and other health factors e.g., prior interventions (chapter 6). We believe the personal factors from this effort to be a good basis for a wider global dialogue on their operationalisation.


Locke Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Nathan Rockwood

In this paper I will defend the view that, according to Locke, secondary qualities are dispositions to produce sensations in us. Although this view is widely attributed to Locke, this interpretation needs defending for two reasons. First, commentators often assume that secondary qualities are dispositional properties because Locke calls them “powers” to produce sensations. However, primary qualities are also powers, so the powers locution is insufficient grounds for justifying the dispositionalist interpretation. Second, if secondary qualities are dispositional properties, then objects would retain secondary qualities while not being observed, but Locke says that colors “vanish” in the dark. Some commentators use this as evidence that Locke rejects the dispositionalist view of secondary qualities, and even those that are sympathetic to the traditional interpretation find these comments to be problematic. By contrast, I argue that even in these supposedly damning passages Locke shows an unwavering commitment to the view that the powers to produce sensations in us, i.e., the secondary qualities, remain in objects even when they are not being perceived. Thus, the arguments against the traditional interpretation are unpersuasive, and we should conclude that Locke does indeed hold that secondary qualities are dispositions to cause sensations in us.


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