scholarly journals A Deflationary Account of Mental Representation

Author(s):  
Frances Egan

Among the cognitive capacities of evolved creatures is the capacity to represent. Theories in cognitive neuroscience typically explain our manifest representational capacities by positing internal representations, but there is little agreement about how these representations function, especially with the relatively recent proliferation of connectionist, dynamical, embodied, enactive, and Bayesian approaches to cognition. This paper sketches an account of the nature and function of representation in cognitive neuroscience that couples a realist construal of representational vehicles with a pragmatic account of representational content. The resulting package is called a deflationary account of mental representation, and the chapter argues that it avoids the problems that afflict competing accounts.

2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (8) ◽  
pp. 1471-1491 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Medaglia ◽  
Mary-Ellen Lynall ◽  
Danielle S. Bassett

Network science provides theoretical, computational, and empirical tools that can be used to understand the structure and function of the human brain in novel ways using simple concepts and mathematical representations. Network neuroscience is a rapidly growing field that is providing considerable insight into human structural connectivity, functional connectivity while at rest, changes in functional networks over time (dynamics), and how these properties differ in clinical populations. In addition, a number of studies have begun to quantify network characteristics in a variety of cognitive processes and provide a context for understanding cognition from a network perspective. In this review, we outline the contributions of network science to cognitive neuroscience. We describe the methodology of network science as applied to the particular case of neuroimaging data and review its uses in investigating a range of cognitive functions including sensory processing, language, emotion, attention, cognitive control, learning, and memory. In conclusion, we discuss current frontiers and the specific challenges that must be overcome to integrate these complementary disciplines of network science and cognitive neuroscience. Increased communication between cognitive neuroscientists and network scientists could lead to significant discoveries under an emerging scientific intersection known as cognitive network neuroscience.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jazlyn Nketia ◽  
Dima Amso ◽  
Natalie Hiromi Brito

Brain and cognitive development is a burgeoning area of scientific inquiry, with tremendous potential to better the lives of children. Large scale longitudinal neuroimaging studies offer opportunities for significant scientific advances in our understanding of developing brain structure and function. The proposed manuscript will focus on the scientific potential of the HEALthy Brain and Cognitive Development (HBCD) Study, highlighting what questions these data can and what they cannot answer about child development. Specifically, we caution against the misuse of these data for advancing de-contextualized and scientifically questionable narratives about the development of children from marginalized communities. We will focus on building and organizing a framework for interpreting HBCD data through the lens of sampling, cultural context, measurement, and developmental science theory. Our goal is to thoughtfully offer the scientific community opportunities to use the large scale and collaborative nature of HBCD to collectively revise practices in developmental science that to-date have not carefully considered their own role in perpetuating narratives that support systemic injustice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 640-656 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Povich

Autonomist accounts of cognitive science suggest that cognitive model building and theory construction (can or should) proceed independently of findings in neuroscience. Common functionalist justifications of autonomy rely on there being relatively few constraints between neural structure and cognitive function. In contrast, an integrative mechanistic perspective stresses the mutual constraining of structure and function. In this article, I show how Model-Based Cognitive Neuroscience (MBCN) epitomizes the integrative mechanistic perspective and concentrates the most revolutionary elements of the cognitive neuroscience revolution. I also show how the prominent subset account of functional realization supports the integrative mechanistic perspective I take on MBCN and use it to clarify the intralevel and interlevel components of integration.


Author(s):  
Andrew Poppe ◽  
Angus W. MacDonald III

This chapter describes a cognitive neuroscience approach to understanding the psychological and neural processes that underlie personality and behavior. It explicates the utility of the cognitive neuroscience approach and the fundamental principles of the methods and how to interpret the findings. The chapter reviews the different neuroimaging tools and approaches that can be used to investigate brain structure and function. In doing so, it provides detailed information about what each method measures and how issues to consider when evaluating these measurements and their functional significance. The chapter provides the reader an appreciation of how understanding brain structure and function in vivo can serve as a bridge between molecular/genetic and symptom-based data to enrich the pathophysiology of personality disorders.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Renoult ◽  
Michael Rugg

The distinction between episodic and semantic memory, proposed by Endel Tulving in 1972, remains a key concept in contemporary Cognitive Neuroscience. Here we review how this dichotomy evolved in Tulving`s writings over the years. Crucially, from 1972 onward, he argued that the two forms of memory were inter-dependent and that their interaction was an essential feature of normal episodic memory function. Moreover, later elaborations of the theory clearly proposed that these interactions were at the basis of normal declarative memory functioning. A later but crucial aspect of Tulving’s contribution was his stress on the importance of subjective experience, which, according to him, “should be the ultimate object of interest, the central aspect of remembering that is to be explained and understood”. We relate these and his numerous other ideas to current perspectives about the organization and function of human memory.


Author(s):  
Adina L. Roskies

This article examines whether, and in what ways, neuroscience can illuminate those questions associated with neurophilosophy. It begins by discussing the relation between philosophy and neuroscience, in particular how they can each influence each other. It then considers how neuroscience can illuminate philosophical questions about mind, including metaphysical questions about the relation of mind and brain, questions about the nature of mental representation and content, consciousness, and even moral theory. It also looks at some of the most prevalent techniques employed by neuroscience for investigating brain structure and function; how neuroscience provides potential counterexamples to philosophical claims, by showing how brains work and suggests new interpretations of data; and the influence of neuroscience on philosophy in the area of normativity. The article concludes by examining attempts to use neuroscience to inform philosophical argument about free will.


2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Haier ◽  
Rex E. Jung

AbstractThe commentaries address conceptual issues ranging from our narrow focus on neuroimaging to the various definitions of intelligence. The integration of the P-FIT and data from cognitive neuroscience is particularly important and considerable consistency is found. Overall, the commentaries affirm that advances in neuroscience techniques have caused intelligence research to enter a new phase. The P-FIT is recognized as a reasonable empirical framework to test hypotheses about the relationship of brain structure and function with intelligence and reasoning.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Casasanto ◽  
Tom Gijssels

AbstractWhat does it mean for metaphors to be “embodied”? Here we describe an influential theory of embodied cognition according to which thoughts are implemented in perceptuo-motor simulations, in the brain’s modality-specific systems. This theory is invoked in nearly every paper on “embodied metaphor,” across linguistics, philosophy, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. There appears to be overwhelming support for the conclusion that representations of metaphorical “source domains” are embodied in perceptuo-motor simulations. Here we show, however, that when the data are evaluated appropriately there is very little evidence that metaphors are embodied in this sense. The kind of data that offer compelling support for the embodiment of concrete, literal ideas like “grasping the ball” are nearly absent for abstract, metaphorical ideas like “grasping the explanation.” There is now abundant evidence that metaphors structure our thoughts, feelings, and choices in a variety of conceptual domains. But evidence for metaphorical mental representation is not necessarily evidence for embodiment. If any metaphorical source domains are embodied in modality-specific simulations, they may be the exception rather than the rule.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Kořenář

Thinking and speaking about events is a process tightly connected with time perception. We can express when an event has occurred with respect to other events, whether it was a durative or a one-time event, whether it was an ongoing or already finished event, etc. Every human language has its own way and extent to which this complex temporal structure of experienced events is expressed. Upon hearing a story we construct a mental representation of the communicated event (e.g. Givón 1992). Some studies show that this construction already evolves during online processing, thanks to instantly accessible language processing cues (Altman and Kamide 1999, Ferretti, McRae and Hatherell 2001, McRae, Ferretti and Amyote 1997). These cues are employed to capture the intricate temporal structure of the story, for instance. They arise from the interplay of the three basic linguistic components (structure, meaning and function) and as such are consistent with a constructional view of language (e.g. Fillmore 1988). Even subtle changes of any of the linguistic cues may lead to a different mental representation. Examples of the sources of grammatical markers and lexical categories from which the linguistic cues arise are grammatical and lexical aspect. In the linguistic field, a lot of attention has been paid to analyses of how those sources of temporal cues function within a language system. However, there is a lack of empirical data on how grammatical and lexical aspect interact, and what the effects of such an interaction are. The present study aims to investigate the link between the complex system of temporal cues and sensorimotor representation in Czech speakers, with specific focus on grammatical verb aspect and so-called event telicity, i.e. lexical aspect, all of which will be further described below.


2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 235-236
Author(s):  
Eric M. Patterson ◽  
Janet Mann

AbstractContrary to Vaesen's argument that humans are unique with respect to nine cognitive capacities essential for tool use, we suggest that although such cognitive processes contribute to variation in tool use, it does not follow that these capacities are necessary for tool use, nor that tool use shaped cognition per se, given the available data in cognitive neuroscience and behavioral biology.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document