Private Law and Rawls’s Principles of Justice

Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

This chapter discusses the application of Rawls’s principles of justice to private law, or the law of legal relationships between individuals, including the law of property, contracts, and torts. Some have argued that Rawls’s principles of justice apply only to public law—legislation affecting government’s relationships to individuals. This chapter contends that the first principle plays a crucial role in assessing and determining private law; moreover, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle are to be applied to the assessment of many rules of private law. The difference principle addresses the question of how a society is to fairly design and efficiently organize the institutions that make economic cooperation possible among free and equal persons actively engaged in productive activity. Certain core legal institutions, including property and economic contract, are necessary for economic cooperation and are among the institutions covered by the second principle of justice.

Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.


Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

This chapter analyzes Rawls’s complex account of distributive justice. Rawls’s difference principle requires that economic systems be organized so that the least advantaged members of society are better off than they would be in any alternative economic arrangement. The following questions are addressed here: What constraints are imposed by equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity on inequalities allowed by the difference principle? What are the difference principle’s broad and narrow requirements? Is maximizing the least advantaged position mandatory regardless of the inequalities created, or is it optional so that a society can choose to limit inequalities permitted by the difference principle? In what respect is the difference principle a reciprocity principle and not prioritarian? What measures are required to realize the difference principle under ideal conditions of a well-ordered society versus non-ideal conditions of an unjust society? Why should property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism satisfy Rawls’s principles of justice?


Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

This chapter analyzes Rawls’s complex account of distributive justice. Rawls’s difference principle requires that economic systems be organized so that the least advantaged members of society are better off than they would be in any alternative economic arrangement. The following questions are addressed here: What constraints are imposed by equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity on inequalities allowed by the difference principle? What are the difference principle’s broad and narrow requirements? Is maximizing the least advantaged position mandatory regardless of the inequalities created, or is it optional so that a society can choose to limit inequalities permitted by the difference principle? In what respect is the difference principle a reciprocity principle and not prioritarian? What measures are required to realize the difference principle under ideal conditions of a well-ordered society versus non-ideal conditions of an unjust society? Why should property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism satisfy Rawls’s principles of justice?


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 509
Author(s):  
Leandro Martins Zanitelli

Resumo: Ao tratar do tipo de regime institucional mais propenso à realização dos princípios da justiça como equidade, Rawls (2001) apresenta três argumentos sobre a superioridade de uma democracia de cidadãos proprietários em relação ao capitalismo de bem-estar, um argumento sobre o valor equitativo das liberdades políticas, outro sobre a equitativa igualdade de oportunidades e um terceiro acerca do princípio da diferença. Em uma crítica a esses argumentos, O’Neill (2012) conclui que apenas o último deles é convincente. Este trabalho procura demonstrar como a análise recente de Piketty (2014) sobre a tendência ao acirramento da desigualdade em sociedades com baixo crescimento dá fôlego aos argumentos de Rawls quanto à superioridade de uma democracia de cidadãos proprietários no que se refere ao valor equitativo das liberdades políticas e à igualdade de oportunidades. O trabalho de Piketty também joga luz sobre a importância, no que concerne ao princípio da diferença, da distinção entre um regime que inclui políticas para prevenir a concentração da riqueza (a democracia de cidadãos proprietários) e outro preocupado exclusivamente com a desigualdade de renda (o capitalismo de bem-estar).Palavras-chave: Democracia de cidadãos proprietários, capitalismo de bem-estar, desigualdade, rawls, piketty.READING RAWLS AFTER PIKETTY: justice, inequality and property-owning democracyAbstract: When discussing the type of institutional regime most prone to realizing the principles of justice as fairness, Rawls (2001) presents three arguments about the superiority of a property-owning democracy over welfare-state capitalism, concerning, respectively, the fair value of political liberties, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. In a critique of those arguments, O’Neill (2012) states that only the last one, the argument of the difference principle, is convincing. This paper, tries to demonstrate how Piketty’s (2014) recent analysis of the tendency of increasing inequality in low-growth societies offers support to Rawls’s arguments favoring property-owning democracy in matters regarding the fair value of political liberties and fair equality of opportunity. Piketty’s work also stresses the importance, in what refers to the difference principle, of distinguishing between a regime encompassing policies to prevent the wealth concentration (property-owning democracy) and another one whose exclusive concern is to reduce income inequality (welfare-state capitalism).Key words: Property-owning democracy, welfare-state capitalism, inequality, Rawls, Piketty.


1998 ◽  
Vol 180 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Nathanson

This article deals in depth with perhaps the most troubling education issue of the day—funding and proper distribution of educational resources. How is the money raised and how is its allocation decided? Can the ideals of both justice and equality be served? Is “extra” spending on behalf of children with special needs justified? Stephen Nathanson raises the central questions and, approaching them from a moral-philosophical standpoint, presents and evaluates the arguments of those who defend extra spending for children with disabilities and those who believe that “unequal” spending violates the principle of justice. Nathanson treats various theories of distributive justice—entitlement, utilitarianism, the “difference principle,” and the “decent level” idea. In focusing on the latter, he contends that social consensus developed around “decent level” may be the touchstone, more helpful than any rationale (or rhetoric) in satisfying the claims of justice and equality.


Mind ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol XC (359) ◽  
pp. 415-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTINE SWANTON

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

AbstractJohn Rawls says: “The main problem of distributive justice is the choice of a social system.” Property-owning democracy is the social system that Rawls thought best realized the requirements of his principles of justice. This article discusses Rawls’s conception of property-owning democracy and how it is related to his difference principle. I explain why Rawls thought that welfare-state capitalism could not fulfill his principles: it is mainly because of the connection he perceived between capitalism and utilitarianism.


1980 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Nielsen

AbstractThis is an examination of some Left critiques of Rawls. Stress is put, not on his underlying moral methodology, including his contractarianism, though surely there is need for such a critique as well, but on an examination of his principles of justice, particularly his equal liberty principle and his difference principle. This is often thought to be the heart of his theory. It is argued that Rawls’ asociological and ahistorical approach and his ignoring of questions of power and of ideology and his lack of an adequate conceptualization of liberty lead to major distortions in his account. Both principles are shown to be problematic and the equal liberty principle is shown to be in conflict with the difference principle.


John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 237-248
Author(s):  
M. Victoria Costa

Feminists disagree about whether or not Rawls’s account of free and equal citizenship is an emancipatory ideal for women, and whether or not the application of the two principles of justice would suffice to dismantle relationships of domination that affect women’s lives. This chapter argues that there is no clear and uncontroversial application of Rawls’s principles of justice that supports those feminists who give affirmative answers to these questions. Regarding the first principle, one unsettled question is whether it protects sexual and reproductive rights, including the right to abortion. Regarding the second principle, there is indeterminacy due to the need to balance the requirements of fair equality of opportunity with parental rights. Moreover, the difference principle’s focus on the maximization of income and wealth for the worst off makes room for policies that do this while still leaving some women exposed to the arbitrary power of others.


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