scholarly journals RELENDO RAWLS APÓS PIKETTY: justiça, desigualdade e democracia de cidadãos proprietários

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 509
Author(s):  
Leandro Martins Zanitelli
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Recent Analysis ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Wealth Concentration ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Resumo: Ao tratar do tipo de regime institucional mais propenso à realização dos princípios da justiça como equidade, Rawls (2001) apresenta três argumentos sobre a superioridade de uma democracia de cidadãos proprietários em relação ao capitalismo de bem-estar, um argumento sobre o valor equitativo das liberdades políticas, outro sobre a equitativa igualdade de oportunidades e um terceiro acerca do princípio da diferença. Em uma crítica a esses argumentos, O’Neill (2012) conclui que apenas o último deles é convincente. Este trabalho procura demonstrar como a análise recente de Piketty (2014) sobre a tendência ao acirramento da desigualdade em sociedades com baixo crescimento dá fôlego aos argumentos de Rawls quanto à superioridade de uma democracia de cidadãos proprietários no que se refere ao valor equitativo das liberdades políticas e à igualdade de oportunidades. O trabalho de Piketty também joga luz sobre a importância, no que concerne ao princípio da diferença, da distinção entre um regime que inclui políticas para prevenir a concentração da riqueza (a democracia de cidadãos proprietários) e outro preocupado exclusivamente com a desigualdade de renda (o capitalismo de bem-estar).Palavras-chave: Democracia de cidadãos proprietários, capitalismo de bem-estar, desigualdade, rawls, piketty.READING RAWLS AFTER PIKETTY: justice, inequality and property-owning democracyAbstract: When discussing the type of institutional regime most prone to realizing the principles of justice as fairness, Rawls (2001) presents three arguments about the superiority of a property-owning democracy over welfare-state capitalism, concerning, respectively, the fair value of political liberties, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. In a critique of those arguments, O’Neill (2012) states that only the last one, the argument of the difference principle, is convincing. This paper, tries to demonstrate how Piketty’s (2014) recent analysis of the tendency of increasing inequality in low-growth societies offers support to Rawls’s arguments favoring property-owning democracy in matters regarding the fair value of political liberties and fair equality of opportunity. Piketty’s work also stresses the importance, in what refers to the difference principle, of distinguishing between a regime encompassing policies to prevent the wealth concentration (property-owning democracy) and another one whose exclusive concern is to reduce income inequality (welfare-state capitalism).Key words: Property-owning democracy, welfare-state capitalism, inequality, Rawls, Piketty.

Rawls on Distributive Justice and the Difference Principle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Economic Systems ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Reciprocity Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

This chapter analyzes Rawls’s complex account of distributive justice. Rawls’s difference principle requires that economic systems be organized so that the least advantaged members of society are better off than they would be in any alternative economic arrangement. The following questions are addressed here: What constraints are imposed by equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity on inequalities allowed by the difference principle? What are the difference principle’s broad and narrow requirements? Is maximizing the least advantaged position mandatory regardless of the inequalities created, or is it optional so that a society can choose to limit inequalities permitted by the difference principle? In what respect is the difference principle a reciprocity principle and not prioritarian? What measures are required to realize the difference principle under ideal conditions of a well-ordered society versus non-ideal conditions of an unjust society? Why should property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism satisfy Rawls’s principles of justice?

Rawls on Distributive Justice and the Difference Principle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Economic Systems ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Reciprocity Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

This chapter analyzes Rawls’s complex account of distributive justice. Rawls’s difference principle requires that economic systems be organized so that the least advantaged members of society are better off than they would be in any alternative economic arrangement. The following questions are addressed here: What constraints are imposed by equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity on inequalities allowed by the difference principle? What are the difference principle’s broad and narrow requirements? Is maximizing the least advantaged position mandatory regardless of the inequalities created, or is it optional so that a society can choose to limit inequalities permitted by the difference principle? In what respect is the difference principle a reciprocity principle and not prioritarian? What measures are required to realize the difference principle under ideal conditions of a well-ordered society versus non-ideal conditions of an unjust society? Why should property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism satisfy Rawls’s principles of justice?

Justice in a Market Economy

2006 ◽  
pp. 60-76
Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.

Property-Owning Democracy and the Difference

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Social System ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
System Property ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

AbstractJohn Rawls says: “The main problem of distributive justice is the choice of a social system.” Property-owning democracy is the social system that Rawls thought best realized the requirements of his principles of justice. This article discusses Rawls’s conception of property-owning democracy and how it is related to his difference principle. I explain why Rawls thought that welfare-state capitalism could not fulfill his principles: it is mainly because of the connection he perceived between capitalism and utilitarianism.

Property-Owning Democracy and the Difference Principle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Social System ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Bases ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

This chapter discusses John Rawls’s conception of property-owning democracy and how it is related to his difference principle. Rawls says that the main problem of distributive justice is the choice of a social system. Property-owning democracy is the social system that Rawls thought best realizes the requirements of his principles of justice. This chapter explains why Rawls thought that welfare-state capitalism could not fulfill his principles and discusses the connection between welfare-state capitalism and utilitarianism. It also clarifies the crucial role of democratic reciprocity and the social bases of self-respect in Rawls’s argument for both the difference principle and property-owning democracy.

The Difference Principle, Capitalism, and Property-Owning Democracy

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-172
Author(s):  
Andrew Lister
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Main Idea ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Income Growth ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Difference

Abstract Jason Brennan and John Tomasi have argued that if we focus on income alone, the Difference Principle supports welfare-state capitalism over property-owning democracy, because capitalism maximizes long run income growth for the worst off. If so, the defense of property-owning democracy rests on the priority of equal opportunity for political influence and social advancement over raising the income of the worst off, or on integrating workplace control into the Difference Principle’s index of advantage. The thesis of this paper is that even based on income alone, the Difference Principle is not as hostile to property-owning democracy as it may seem, because the Difference Principle should not be interpreted to require maximizing long run income growth. The main idea is that it is unfair to make the present worst off accept inequality that doesn’t benefit them, for the sake of benefitting the future worst off, if the future worst off will be better off than they are anyway.

The Difference Principle, Equality of Opportunity, and Cosmopolitan Justice

2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gillian Brock
Keyword(s):  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Ideal

AbstractWhat kinds of principles of justice should a cosmopolitan support? In recent years some have argued that a cosmopolitan should endorse a Global Difference Principle. It has also been suggested that a cosmopolitan should support a Principle of Global Equality of Opportunity. In this paper I examine how compelling these two suggestions are. I argue against a Global Difference Principle, but for an alternative Needs-Based Minimum Floor Principle (where these are not co-extensive, as I explain). Though I support a negative version of the Global Equality of Opportunity Principle, I argue that a more positive version of the ideal remains elusive.

Private Law and Rawls’s Principles of Justice

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Economic Cooperation ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Productive Activity ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

This chapter discusses the application of Rawls’s principles of justice to private law, or the law of legal relationships between individuals, including the law of property, contracts, and torts. Some have argued that Rawls’s principles of justice apply only to public law—legislation affecting government’s relationships to individuals. This chapter contends that the first principle plays a crucial role in assessing and determining private law; moreover, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle are to be applied to the assessment of many rules of private law. The difference principle addresses the question of how a society is to fairly design and efficiently organize the institutions that make economic cooperation possible among free and equal persons actively engaged in productive activity. Certain core legal institutions, including property and economic contract, are necessary for economic cooperation and are among the institutions covered by the second principle of justice.

Decisions Behind the Veil

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin P. Bruner
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Design ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

This chapter explores the behavior of individuals placed in circumstances approximating the ‘veil of ignorance.’ Unlike previous experiments of Rawls’ veil, it considers Rawls’ fair equality of opportunity principle in addition to the so-called difference principle. The chapter author’s experimental design can register whether behavior is consistent with a lexicographic ranking of principles of justice. The chapter observes wide support for utilitarianism as well as fair equality of opportunity and, moreover, finds the former is lexically prior to the latter.

Fair Difference of Opportunity

2020 ◽  
pp. 260-278
Author(s):  
Adam Cureton ◽  
Alexander Kaufman
Keyword(s):  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Family Background ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Other ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Disabled People ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Default Position ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Alternative Principle

According to Rawls, Fair Equality of Opportunity requires that those who have the same native abilities and motivations have the same chance of securing offices and positions, regardless of their social class of origin, family background or other social circumstances. Despite its name, this principle does not guarantee equal opportunity for everyone because it allows people with various kinds of physical and psychological impairments and diseases to have lower chances at securing those positions once the adverse influences of their social circumstances have been corrected for. Our alternative principle is partially inspired by Rawls’ Difference Principle. What we call Fair Difference of Opportunity says that the default position should be true equality of opportunity, but if there are ways to improve the opportunities of all by allowing more and better opportunities to some, without violating the other principles of justice, then such arrangements would be just. Fair Difference of Opportunity, we argue, is more faithful to Rawls’s basic framework and more friendly to disabled people than Fair Equality of Opportunity.

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