Military Professionalism and Humanitarian Law

Author(s):  
Yishai Beer

This book seeks to revitalize the humanitarian mission of the international law governing armed conflict, which is being frustrated due to states’ actual practice. In order to achieve its two aims—creating an environment in which full abidance by the law becomes an attainable norm, thus facilitating the second and more important aim of reducing human suffering—it calls for the acknowledgment of realpolitik considerations that dictate states’ and militaries’ behavior. This requires recognition of the core interests of law-abiding states, fighting in their own self-defense—those that, from their militaries’ professional perspective, are essential in order to exercise their defense. Internalizing the importance of existential security interests, when drawing the contours of the law, should not automatically come at the expense of the core values of the humanitarian agenda—for example, the distinction rule. Rather, it allows more room for the humanitarian arena. The suggested tool to allow for such an improved dialogue is the standards and principles of military professionalism. Militaries function in a professional manner; they respect their respective doctrines, operational principles, fighting techniques, and values. Their performances are not random or incidental. The suggested paradigm surfaces and leverages the constraining elements hidden in military professionalism. It suggests a new paradigm in balancing the principles of military necessity and humanity, it deals with the legality of a preemptive strike and the leveraging of military strategy as a constraining tool, and it offers a normative framework for introducing deterrence within the current contours of the law.

Author(s):  
Carla Ferstman

This chapter considers the consequences of breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law for the responsible international organizations. It concentrates on the obligations owed to injured individuals. The obligation to make reparation arises automatically from a finding of responsibility and is an obligation of result. I analyse who has this obligation, to whom it is owed, and what it entails. I also consider the right of individuals to procedures by which they may vindicate their right to a remedy and the right of access to a court that may be implied from certain human rights treaties. In tandem, I consider the relationship between those obligations and individuals’ rights under international law. An overarching issue is how the law of responsibility intersects with the specialized regimes of human rights and international humanitarian law and particularly, their application to individuals.


2022 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-126
Author(s):  
Virajati Adhazar ◽  
Suhaidi Suhaidi ◽  
Sutiarnoto Sutiarnoto ◽  
Jelly Leviza

Self-defense as an inherent right owned by a country is regulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter and due to the use of Space-Based Missile Interceptor (SBMI) weapons in space, the 1967 outer space treaty must also be guided. Because Article 4 of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the use of weapons in space, the legality of using SBMI weapons is questionable. Therefore, this study was conducted to determine the legal provisions, forms of state accountability and the process of prosecuting compensation for countries using these weapons according to international law. The results of the study indicate that the use of SBMI weapons does not conflict with international law, because it is based on Article 103 of the UN Charter which states that if there are provisions in other legal rules that are contrary to the UN Charter, the UN Charter must be guided. So that self-defense actions based on Article 51 of the UN Charter do not violate the law. The party that must be absolutely responsible is the country that started the conflict, because it has violated the rules of international law in Article 2 paragraph (4) of the UN Charter and international humanitarian law. The compensation process is carried out according to the rules of the space liability convention 1972 and if in practice the party who is responsible does not show good faith in providing compensation, then it can be continued by referring to the dispute resolution process in the UN Charter.


1948 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 783-796 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Kelsen

Collective security is the main purpose of the United Nations, just as it was the main purpose of its predecessor, the League of Nations. What does collective security mean? Under general international law the principle of self-help prevails. The protection of the legal interests of the states against violations on the part of other states is left to the individual state whose right has been violated. General international law authorizes the state, i.e., the individual member of the international community, to resort, in case of a violation of its rights, to reprisals or war against that state which is responsible for the violation. Reprisals and war are enforcement actions. Insofar as they are reactions against violations of the law, and authorized by it, they have the character of sanctions. We speak of collective security when the protection of the rights of the states, the reaction against the violation of the law, assumes the character of a collective enforcement action.


Author(s):  
Carla Ferstman

This book is concerned with reparation for human rights and international humanitarian law breaches committed by or attributed to international organizations. These breaches constitute internationally wrongful acts which, according to the International Law Commission’s Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, give rise to an obligation on the offending organization to afford reparation. However, in practice, the obligation to afford reparation is unimplemented. The book explores why this is. It considers how the law of responsibility intersects with the specialized regimes of human rights and international humanitarian law and, particularly, their application to remedies and reparation owed to individuals. It reviews the various gaps in the law and the limitations of existing redress mechanisms. The book analyses the cogency of the arguments and rationales that have been used by international organizations to limit their liability and the scope and functioning of redress mechanisms, included by the resort to lex specialis principles. It is postulated that the standards of reparation must be drawn from the nature of the breach and the resulting harms and not by who is responsible for the breach. In this respect the book is an exercise in the progressive development of the law. Having determined that existing redress mechanisms cannot afford adequate or effective remedies and reparation, the book explores how to move towards a model that achieves greater compliance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-467
Author(s):  
Yoshifumi Tanaka

Abstract The existence of a sense of common or community interests is a prerequisite to establishing an order in a society, national or international. In this connection, it is notable that the protection of community interests is increasingly important in international law and the law of the sea is no exception. The increasing need for protecting community interests necessitates a new paradigm in the law of the sea. The legal issues regarding the marine Arctic should also be considered in the context of changing paradigms in the law of the sea. Thus this article seeks to overview principal issues of the international law governing the marine Arctic from the viewpoints of a dual paradigm, that is, the law of divided oceans (paradigm I) and the law of our common ocean (paradigm II).


Author(s):  
Yishai Beer

This chapter deals with the application of the suggested professionalism criterion in the other segment of the law, the ad bellum sphere. An unresolved legal issue in the self-defense context concerns its timing: When can a self-defendant state be proactive in its defense and strike preemptively? On the assumption that a self-defendant is not obliged to remain a sitting duck when confronted by an imminent threat against it, this chapter suggests that the criterion to be used in defining the legal-timing threshold, vindicating the right of self-defense, be taken from the toolbox of military professionalism. It should be the last reasonable point, according to the self-defendant’s military circumstances, at which it can, according to its military doctrine, successfully face the aggressor’s threat and still operationally defend itself—including, when necessary, by taking the initiative in its own self-defense.


Necessity and proportionality hold a place in the international law governing the use of force by states and in the law of armed conflict (LOAC). However, the precise contours of these two requirements are uncertain and controversial. This book explores in 5 parts how necessity and proportionality manifest under the law governing the use of force and the LOAC. First, the book introduces the reader to how necessity and proportionality factor in the debate about the interaction between morality and law in the use of military force. Second, the book addresses the issue of how proportionality in the law governing the use of force relates to proportionality in the LOAC. Third, the book addresses a number of pressing legal issues including: how proportionality and necessity are linked under international law, the controversial “unwilling and unable” test, drones and targeted killing, their application during civil war, and the need for further transparency in states’ justification for the use of force in self-defense. Fourth, the book analyzes the role of military necessity within the LOAC on the battlefield. This includes discussions about the history and nature of the principle of military necessity, the proper application of the principle of proportionality, how commanders should account for mental harm in calculating proportionality, and the role artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons systems may play in a proportionality analysis. Finally, the book concludes with a discussion on the potential role of proportionality in the law governing post-conflict contexts.


1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Franck ◽  
Nigel S. Rodley

In the Bangladesh crisis, two important objectives of international law appeared to be in conflict: that of peace and that of justice. The former objective is set out in the rules of the U.N. Charter against the use of force by states except in self-defense against an armed attack. The second is found in the provisions of the Charter and in various resolutions, declarations, and covenants pertaining to fundamental human rights and self determination.


2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 24-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amichai Cohen

This article seeks to evaluate Israel's implementation of the international law of occupation in the territories which it came to control after the Six-Day War, from a new perspective. Many scholars have criticized or justified specific Israeli policies by comparing them to specific norms of international law. Contrary to this scholarship, this article addresses the questions at the core of current debates over the implementation of international law: Why has Israel chosen to implement some specific rules of international law and to ignore others? And what caused the changes in Israel's implementation of international law?Some of the answers to these questions can be found by examining the interests of various institutions involved in the implementation of International law, and the interplay between them. I suggest that in order to understand Israel's initial behavior one must look at the interests, goals and culture of the Israeli army, the IDF, the institution initially responsible for administering the territories. I shall further argue that subsequent changes in policies are a result of the struggle between the IDF and other Israeli institutions attempting to gain influence over the way the territories were controlled.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Finke

This analysis takes all relevant violent non-state actors into consideration instead of restricting the examination to just one. It takes a comparative angle to discuss whether terrorists, pirates, private security companies and civil war parties are treated coherently under public international law. Are civil war parties and private security companies treated similarly under international humanitarian law? How is the state’s right of self-defense affected if the aggressors are terrorists? What is the rationale behind the criminalisation of piracy? It concludes that all non-state actors should be subject to the same rules and regulations whenever they are engaged in military action with states. Whenever the objective is to vanquish a group of actors completely, a different treatment is warranted.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document