Victory and the West

2021 ◽  
pp. 13-41
Author(s):  
Jussi M. Hanhimäki

This chapter examines the state of transatlantic relations at the end of the Cold War. It takes particular issue with the notion that the Cold War had been a golden age of transatlantic cooperation. The Cold War had witnessed the emergence of a transatlantic community. But that community had been in a perpetual state of inner conflict and disagreement. NATO had almost fallen apart in the 1960s when France exited the alliance’s unified military command. Conflicts over burden-sharing and out-of-area engagements, over national subsidies and trade rules had been frequent. Before the Berlin Wall came down, the alliance had already survived, even thrived, through many internal crises. Paradoxically, when the Cold War in Europe ended, the “West” was at the same time more diverse and more united than at any time in the past.

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Idriss Jazairy

AbstractAs part of the roundtable “Economic Sanctions and Their Consequences,” this essay examines unilateral coercive measures. These types of sanctions are applied outside the scope of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and were developed and refined in the West in the context of the Cold War. Yet the eventual collapse of the Berlin Wall did not herald the demise of unilateral sanctions; much to the contrary. While there are no incontrovertible data on the extent of these measures, one can safely say that they target in some way a full quarter of humanity. In addition to being a major attack on the principle of self-determination, unilateral measures not only adversely affect the rights to international trade and to navigation but also the basic human rights of innocent civilians. The current deterioration of the situation, with the mutation of embargoes into blockades and impositions on third parties, is a threat to peace that needs to be upgraded in strategic concern.


Author(s):  
Nelson Lichtenstein

This chapter focuses on the triumphalism of the free market that emerged in the decade that followed the end of the Cold War. The idea that capitalist markets are essential to, or even define, the democratic idea has always been present in the West, but the idea achieved a near hegemonic power after the fall of the Berlin Wall. New Dealers and old-fashioned populists once held that laissez-faire capitalism presented the gravest danger to freedom, democracy, equality, and the material well-being of most citizens. But Americans were now told to believe that democracy and the free market are identical. And in a maddening piece of ideological larceny, market triumphalists invoked that ultimate sanction—once the principal asset of the left—the stamp of historic inevitability.


2021 ◽  
pp. 262-266
Author(s):  
Fernando Casal Bértoa ◽  
Zsolt Enyedi

After comparing the different indicators (i.e. party institutionalization, fragmentation, polarization, volatility and closure) employed in the book, we show how the Cold War period (1945–1989) was exceptionally stable, especially in contrast to the inter-war and post-Berlin Wall periods. We also show how currently the West looks increasingly like the East in terms of the level of party institutionalization, while the East increasingly resembles the West in terms of closure. Actually, the West is becoming more polarized and fragmented than the East. In terms of parliamentary fragmentation, the party systems of the South and the East are converging towards each other, while the West is diverging from the rest of Europe with its increasingly high number of parties. Finally, the chapter summarizes the main findings of the book.


Author(s):  
Corrado Tornimbeni

Nationalism in Mozambique was characterized by a plurality of leaders who competed for influence both within and outside the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO). Each of them tried to gain political support at a continental and international level, and, eventually, the leadership that rose to power within FRELIMO by the end of the 1960s and early 1970s prevailed over other components of Mozambican nationalism both on the field of the liberation war and at the diplomatic level. This leadership was highly cosmopolitan and implemented a vibrant diplomacy within the mechanisms of the Cold War worldwide. FRELIMO was supported by newly independent African governments that were active in promoting the independence of African people in countries still under colonial rule (e.g., Tanzania, Algeria, Zambia), and then by governments from the Eastern bloc of the Cold War as well as by solidarity committees in the West (e.g., United States, Sweden and Nordic countries, United Kingdom, Italy). Within these contexts, FRELIMO secured a key political legitimacy as the genuine liberation movement of Mozambique, joined by other movements of the Portuguese colonies, South Africa, Namibia, and Southern Rhodesia—and opposed by a rival group of liberation movements from those countries. This status was also recognized among such important international organizations as Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (CONCP), Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO), World Peace Council (WPC), Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and, eventually, the UN. Probably, the networks of solidarity with FRELIMO that developed in the West played a key role in the defeat of the Portuguese regime and in establishing the independence of Mozambique, since a number of Western European countries were formally allied with Portugal within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance.


Author(s):  
Vladislav Zubok

This chapter examines the root motives behind the Soviet struggle against the West and the paradigm of Soviet international behavior related to the Cold War. It suggests that decolonization contributed to the Cold War because the decline of European colonial empires in the 1950s created irresistible temptations for Soviet leaders to intervene in parts of the globe previously beyond their reach. The chapter also suggests that the Soviet Cold War consensus began to crumble when the key tenets of the revolutionary-imperial paradigm became suspect in the 1960s and 1970s. These tenets held that the West was determined to destroy the Soviet Union and its “socialist empire” by force.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. p49
Author(s):  
HADI SHAKEEB KASSEM

Berlin was the location in which most of the intelligence operations in Europe have taken place in the first twenty years of the conquest and the Cold War. In November 27, 1958, Khrushchev issued a formal letter to the Allies, demanding that the western Allies evacuate Berlin and enable the establishment of an independent political unit, a free city. He threatened that if the West would not comply with this, the soviets would hand over to the East Germany’s government the control over the roads to Berlin. In the coming months Moscow conducted a war of nerves as the last date of the end of the ultimatum, May 27, 1959, came close. Finally the Soviets retreated as a result of the determination of the West. This event reconfirmed the claims of the West that “the US, Britain and France have legal rights to stay in Berlin.” According to Halle: “These rights derive from the fact that Germany surrendered as a result of our common struggle against Nazi Germany.” (Note 2) The Russians have done many attempts to change Berlin’s status. In 1961 Berlin Wall was constructed, almost without response on the part of the West, and by so doing, the Soviets perpetuated the status quo that had been since 1948. In July 25, 1961 Kennedy addressed the Americans on television, saying that “West Berlin is not as it had ever been, the location of the biggest test of the courage and the will power of the West.” (Note 3) On June 26, 1963, Kennedy went out to Berlin, which was divided by the wall, torn between east and west, in order to announce his message. In his speech outside the city council of West Berlin, Kennedy won the hearts of the Berliners as well as those of the world when he said: “Ich bin ein Berliner”, I’m a Berliner. The sixties were years of heating of the conflict with the Soviet Block. In 1961 the Berlin Wall was constructed. Then Kennedy came into power, there was the movement for human rights and the political tension between whites and blacks in America. The conflict increase as the Korean War started, and afterwards when America intervened in Vietnam. There was also the crisis in the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, which almost pushed the whole world into a nuclear war and catastrophe. During the 28 years of the Berlin Wall, 13.8.61-9.11.89, this was notorious as an example of a political border that marked the seclusion and freezing more than freedom of movement, communication and change. At the same time there was the most obvious sign of the division of Germany after WWII and the division of Europe to East and West by the Iron Curtain. The wall was the background of stories by writers from east and west. The writers of espionage thrillers were fascinated by the global conflict between east and west and the Cold War with Berlin as the setting of the divided city. Berlin presented a permanent conflict that was perceived as endless, or as Mews defined it: “Berlin is perfect, a romantic past, tragic present, secluded in the heart of East Germany.” (Note 4) The city presented the writers with a situation that demanded a reassessment of the genres and the ideological and aesthetic perceptions of this type of writing. This was the reason that the genre of espionage books blossomed in the sixties, mainly those with the wall. The wall was not just a symbol of a political failure, as East Germany could not stop the flow of people escaping from it. The city was ugly, dirty, and full of wires and lit by a yellow light, like a concentration camp. A West German policeman says: “If the Allies were not here, there would not have been a wall. He expressed the acknowledgment that the Western powers had also an interest in the wall as a tool for preventing the unification of Germany. But his colleague answers: If they were not here, the wall would not have been, but the same applies for Berlin. (Note 5) Berlin was the world capital of the Cold War. The wall threatened and created risks and was known as one of the big justifications for the mentality of the Cold War. The construction of the wall in August 1961 strengthened Berlin’s status as the frontline of the Cold War and as a political microcosmos, which reflected topographical as well as the ideological global struggle between east and west. It made Berlin a focus of interest, and this focus in turn caused an incentive for the espionage literature with the rise of neorealism with the anti-hero, as it also ended the era of romanticism. (Note 6) The works of le Carré and Deighton are the best examples of this change in literature. Both of them use the wall as the arena of events and a symbol in their works. Only at the end of the fifties, upon the final withdrawal of McCarthyism and the relative weakening of the Cold War, there started have to appear films with new images about the position and nature of the Germans and the representations of Nazism in the new history. The films of the Cold War presented the communists as enemies or saboteurs. Together with this view about the Soviets, developed the rehabilitation of the German image. Each part of the German society was rehabilitated and become a victim instead of an assistant of the Nazis. The critic Dwight MacDonald was impressed by the way in which the German population” has changed from a fearful assistant of one totalitarian regime to the hero opponent of another totalitarian regime”. (Note 7) This approach has to be examined, and how it influenced the development of the German representation, since many films I have investigated demonstrate a different approach of the German representation.  


Author(s):  
Sebastian Borchers

From the end of the 1950s, the West German publisher Moeck officially represented the state-led music publishing house PWM ‘in the West’ with the permission of the Polish Ministry of Culture. Beside the distribution of score editions and orchestral performance materials by the PWM, Moeck also represented the interests of Polish composers in the Federal Republic of Germany directly in his own catalogue. Among the first authors of the new series of editions were Kotoński, Lutosławski, Penderecki, Serocki and Szalonek. They belonged to a circle that regularly participated in West German musical life in the 1960s. Despite the spirit of optimism and advantages for the composers, this cooperation also led to problems on several levels. These included the billing of performance materials and the handling of international copyright. This made the participants aware of various limits and led to conflicts – especially on the Polish side. Translation of Polish texts in vocal works into German and English was also not as straightforward as originally planned. The article offers new insights into Polish–German cooperation in the cultural field of music, which went on despite the difficult relationship between the two states then and also beyond the borders of the Cold War.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 69-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Jürgen Puhle

Latin American studies in Germany from the 1960s on developed in two waves with (partial) crises and periods of stagnation in between. Whereas in the communist GDR they were affected by the limited scope of academic endeavors and their instrumentalization for state and party politics and policies, in the Federal Republic interdisciplinary Latin American studies had two tiers (within the universities and outside as independent research institutes) and were shaped by the particular structure of funding schemes and agencies and by “triggers” such as the Cuban Revolution, the Chilean coup, the arrival of exiles, and the presence of the Latin American revolutionary experience in the debates of the West German student movement after 1968. While many of the West German features were shared with other Western countries, significant differences emerged because of Germany’s short colonial tradition, the Cold War rivalry between the Federal Republic and the GDR, and the fact that political foundations such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation played a key role not only in designing and implementing government-financed development aid projects in Latin America but also in helping to promote and shape a new takeoff for Latin American studies (a uniquely German constellation). A partir de la década de 1960, los estudios alemanes sobre Latinoamérica se desarrollaron en dos oleadas, con crisis (parciales) y períodos de estancamiento en el proceso. En la RDA comunista, la investigación se vio afectada por el alcance limitado de los esfuerzos académicos y su instrumentalización para políticas estatales y partidarias. En la República Federal, los estudios interdisciplinarios latinoamericanos se desarrollaron en dos ámbitos (universidades además de lugares externos como institutos de investigación independientes) y obedeciendo a estructuras y agencias de financiamiento particulares, así como “factores detonantes” (por ejemplo, la Revolución Cubana, el golpe de estado en Chile, la llegada de exiliados y la presencia de la experiencia revolucionaria latinoamericana en los debates del movimiento estudiantil de Alemania Occidental después de 1968). Mientras que muchas de las características de la República Federal eran compartidas por otros países occidentales, surgieron diferencias significativas a partir de la corta tradición colonial alemana, la rivalidad entre la República Federal y la RDA durante la Guerra Fría, y el hecho de que patronatos políticos como la Fundación Konrad Adenauer y la Fundación Friedrich Ebert desempeñaron un papel clave no solo en el diseño e implementación de proyectos gubernamentales de ayuda al desarrollo en Latinoamérica, sino también en promover y encaminar los estudios latinoamericanos (en una constelación exclusivamente alemana).


Author(s):  
Joseph M. Grieco

Liberal international theory foresaw neither the end of the east–west rivalry nor the fall of the Soviet Union. However, from the 1960s up through the 1980s, several liberal international theorists put forward insightful analyses of the evolution of the cold war, its changing importance in world affairs and the problems that increasingly confronted the Soviet Union. Well before the fall of the Berlin Wall, several liberal international writers sensed that the cold war was abating, that this abatement was important for world politics and that the Soviet Union was having serious problems in maintaining its status as a superpower with an Eastern European empire.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
Coline Covington

The Berlin Wall came down on 9 November 1989 and marked the end of the Cold War. As old antagonisms thawed a new landscape emerged of unification and tolerance. Censorship was no longer the principal means of ensuring group solidarity. The crumbling bricks brought not only freedom of movement but freedom of thought. Now, nearly thirty years later, globalisation has created a new balance of power, disrupting borders and economies across the world. The groups that thought they were in power no longer have much of a say and are anxious about their future. As protest grows, we are beginning to see that the old antagonisms have not disappeared but are, in fact, resurfacing. This article will start by looking at the dissembling of a marriage in which the wall that had peacefully maintained coexistence disintegrates and leads to a psychic development that uncannily mirrors that of populism today. The individual vignette leads to a broader psychological understanding of the totalitarian dynamic that underlies populism and threatens once again to imprison us within its walls.


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