Philosophical Background

Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

This chapter provides a brief overview of certain elements of Kant’s metaphysics and epistemology that are essential background for understanding certain features of his ethical theory. In particular, it presents Kant’s distinction between the ‘world of sense’ or ‘phenomenal world’ and the ‘world of understanding’ or ‘noumenal world’ as a basis for explaining the limits of theoretical cognition which rules out theoretical cognition and knowledge of God, immortality of the soul, and freedom of the will, yet allows Kant to affirm their reality on moral grounds, needed to explain how the highest good is possible. Of importance for understanding certain claims in his work on virtue is the distinction between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world as it applies to human beings. The chapter concludes with reflections on the relation between Kant’s ethics and his metaphysical and epistemological commitments.

Author(s):  
Sandra Shapshay

Most contemporary ethical theorists do not look to Schopenhauer as a resource for contemporary normative ethics. Chapters 1 and 2 dispel one of the main reasons for this—namely, that Schopenhauer’s pessimism leads only to the recommendation of resignation. But there is another reason why Schopenhauer has been neglected as an ethical theorist that this chapter addresses. It is widely held that Schopenhauer espouses hard determinism, the view that human beings (in addition to non-human animals) are determined to act as they do on the basis of physical and psychological laws. Yet, without the presumption of freedom it makes little sense to offer a normative ethical theory. Accordingly, before reconstructing Schopenhauer’s normative ethical theory, one needs to get clearer on his views on freedom. This chapter begins with Schopenhauer’s grappling with the problem of how freedom is possible in his dissertation (1813) and traces the development of his theory of freedom through The World as Will and Representation (1818) and his essay “On the Freedom of the Will” (1839). Next, it offers an interpretation of Schopenhauer’s mature compatibilist view that shows how it aims to depart from, but remains highly indebted to Kant’s theory of freedom. This under-acknowledged debt is the “ghost of Kantian freedom” in Schopenhauer’s thought. Ultimately, for Schopenhauer, though we are each born with an innate character and are shaped largely by our empirical circumstances, a rational being is nonetheless responsible for her character, which she can shape and even, albeit rarely, transform.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (51) ◽  
pp. 67-86
Author(s):  
Schulze Manfred

Marsilius of Inghen develops his concept of Christian ethics in his Commentary on the Sentences. He bases his teaching on the fundament of Aristotle’s philosophy: all human beings are able to act rationally, and therefore they are able to act morally. Against contemporary philosophical rationalisms Marsilius contends that criterion of what is good was settled by God in such an infallible way that any competitive concepts of the good and evil would be vane speculations of no real value for theology. God wants virtues so decisively that they are obligatory and natural for all humans. In accordance with the spirit of his times Marsilius distinguishes common virtues from the theological ones. Faith, hope and love differ from common virtues as they refer directly to God but they cooperate with them in that they direct man’s natural life. Marsilius focuses on the question of how love to God determines the true goodness of virtues as contrasted to the goodness of the natural virtues that can be seen in actions of Pagans; those were perceived by St Augustine as seeming virtues. Marsilius choses the middle way and he acknowledges that virtues of men who do not know and love God, are virtues with God’s aid. All that can be classified as moral depends on God. Nonetheless, those and only those natural actions that provide us with authentic knowledge of God and love to Him, can be called salutary. Marsilius was a disciple of John Buridan and knew his thesis that the will and reason, without God’s influence, can produce moral actions. Marsilius did not mention Buridan but he, though evaluating his thoughts as profound and acceptable, rejected his principal thesis: nature is not able to self-realization because sins have not left it untouched. True morality requires relation to God and it becomes actual by the love of God. The space, in which this realization takes place, is natural human life. Marsilius upholds St Augustine’s notion of ordo caritatis – its direct source is probably Peter Lombard. The love of God develops in society. Marsilius defends his concept of God’s love acting within the world against the variety of objections. Christian ethics realizes within particular social structures and necessary compromises. Ordo caritatis does not pass by the world, by contrast it establishes its order. Marsilius is not a monk like theologian, instead he is a secular theologian; and this can be perceived above all in his concept of Christian ethics that is worldly biased.


1948 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Perry Miller

The reputation of Jonathan Edwards, impressive though it is, rests upon only a fragmentary representation of the range or profundity of his thinking. Harassed by events and controversies, he was forced repeatedly to put aside his real work and to expend his energies in turning out sermons, defenses of the Great Awakening, or theological polemics. Only two of his published books (and those the shortest), The Nature of True Virtue and The End for which God Created the World, were not ad hoc productions. Even The Freedom of the Will is primarily a dispute, aimed at silencing the enemy rather than expounding a philosophy. He died with his Summa still a mass of notes in a bundle of home-made folios, the handwriting barely legible. The conventional estimate that Edwards was America's greatest metaphysical genius is a tribute to his youthful Notes on the Mind — which were a crude forecast of the system at which he labored for the rest of his days — and to a few incidental flashes that illumine his forensic argumentations. The American mind is immeasurably the poorer that he was not permitted to bring into order his accumulated meditations.


Author(s):  
George I. Mavrodes

Predestination appears to be a religious or theological version of universal determinism, a version in which the final determining factor is the will or action of God. It is most often associated with the theological tradition of Calvinism, although some theologians outside the Calvinist tradition, or prior to it (for example, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas), profess similar doctrines. The idea of predestination also plays a role in some religions other than Christianity, perhaps most notably in Islam. Sometimes the idea of predestination is formulated in a comparatively restricted way, being applied only to the manner in which the divine grace of salvation is said to be extended to some human beings and not to others. John Calvin, for example, writes: We call predestination God’s eternal decree, by which he compacted with himself what he willed to become of each man. For all are not created in equal condition; rather, eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others. Therefore, as any man has been created to one or the other of these ends, we speak of him as predestined to life or to death. (Institutes, bk 3, ch. 21, sec. 5) At other times, however, the idea is applied more generally to the whole course of events in the world; whatever happens in the world is determined by the will of God. Philosophically, the most interesting aspects of the doctrine are not essentially linked with salvation. For instance, if God is the first cause of all that happens, how can people be said to have free will? One answer may be that people are free in so far as they act in accordance with their own motives and desires, even if these are determined by God. Another problem is that the doctrine seems to make God ultimately responsible for sin. A possible response here is to distinguish between actively causing something and passively allowing it to happen, and to say that God merely allows people to sin; it is then human agents who actively choose to sin and God is therefore not responsible.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
James H. Fetzer

Although distinctions can be drawn between relations of simulation, replication, and emulation, basic differences between digital machines and human beings render the strong forms of anticipation that are impossible in principle. Because the use of signs in affecting behavior is dependent on a context of preexisting motives, beliefs, ethics, abilities and capabilities, ontic and epistemic difficulties relative to the complex interaction of distinct variables and relevant conditions to which each person has been subjected in his or her unique life, makes non-trivial explanations and predictions—ones not involving stereotyped or scripted behavior—theoretically impossible, including for the weakest forms of simulation. Indeed, even stereotypical behavior may not be predicable on similar grounds for real, historical human beings, not only in general but even for each single case. This study may even be viewed as an essay about freedom of the will.


2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexei N. Krouglov

The sources of Kant’s term Gesinnung and a review of the problems of its translation into English were presented in the first part of this article; the second part examines the novel features that Kant brings to the interpretation of this concept in the critical period. In the Critique of Practical Reason these include the questions of manifestation of Gesinnung in the world, apprehended through the senses, the method of establishing and the culture of truly moral Gesinnung, as well as the problem of the immutability of Gesinnung in the progress towards the good. The new theses that appear in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason are Gesinnung as the internal subjective principle of maxims, on virtue as evidence of the presence of Gesinnung, on act as a manifestation of Gesinnung, on the unintelligibility of Gesinnung in its noumenal, suprasensible character, on the innateness of Gesinnung in the sense that it exists not in time, but in the form of its acceptance by free expression of the will, on the singleness of Gesinnung and its indivisibility into periods, on revolution in Gesinnung as distinct from empirical reform, on the creation of the new human being as distinct from the ancient one as a result of the revolution of Gesinnung, on the link between the revolution in Gesinnung and “conversion” or second birth. After discussing the problem of distinguishing the terms Gesinnung and Denkungsart in translation as well as a review of all the existing variants of translating Kant’s concept of Gesinnung into Russian (aspiration, inclination, intention, virtue, virtuousness, conviction, attitude, mode of thinking, thoughts, mood, disposition and umonastroenie), the author comes to the conclusion that the uniform variant umonastroenie is best suited for Russian translations of Kant’s works.


Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Denis

The ethical theory of Immanuel Kant (b. 1724–d. 1804) exerted a powerful influence on the subsequent history of philosophy and continues to be a dominant approach to ethics, rivaling consequentialism and virtue ethics. Kant’s ethical thought continues to be studied in itself, as a part of his critical system of philosophy, in its historical context, and in relation to particular practical questions. Kant’s writings and lectures display the influence of the Stoics, Rousseau, Crusius, Wolff, Hutcheson, Hume, and others; Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Bradley, Greene, Habermas, and Rawls are among the many philosophers whose moral philosophies can be read (in part) as responses to Kant. Salient foundational features of Kant’s ethics include: its a priori method, its conception of the will as autonomous, its categorical imperative, its theory of freedom, and its account of moral motivation. Kant maintained that foundational moral principles must be a priori, not based on observation or experience. Kant takes the moral law to be legislated by the will to itself. Unlike holy beings, human beings experience morality as a constraint upon our wills. For us, the moral law is a categorical imperative. All ethical duties are ultimately grounded in this supreme moral principle. If we are bound to obey the moral law, we must be capable of doing so; Kant holds that, even assuming causal determinism in the phenomenal world, morality reveals our (noumenal) freedom to us. Kant attributes moral worth only to action done from duty (i.e., from respect for the law), not from inclination. Significant aspects of Kant’s fully developed ethical theory include its rich theory of virtue and the virtues, its taxonomy of duties (which include duties to oneself as well as to others), its distinctive conceptions of the highest good and human evil, and its connections with Kant’s philosophies of history, religion, and human nature. Many of Kant’s own discussions of particular duties, virtues, and vices are controversial. For example, Kant appears to condemn all lies as violations of a duty to oneself. This entry focuses on Kant’s ethics rather than Kantian ethics more broadly. Despite that, it includes a number of pieces that apply, extend, or revise Kant’s ethics in some ways, as well as interpretations of Kant’s ethics that some commentators may object stray too far from Kant’s own stated views. Kant’s political philosophy is discussed only peripherally here, save for the section on the Doctrine of Right of the Metaphysics of Morals.


Author(s):  
Christopher Janaway

It is sometimes assumed that Schopenhauer regards existence as meaningless, and it seems that pessimism should be associated with meaninglessness. However, Schopenhauer insists that there must a “moral meaning” to the world because human beings have a metaphysical need: we must see the world as pointing to a higher purpose beyond itself. Schopenhauer rejects theism and any optimistic higher purpose, but regards Christianity, which he views as pessimistic, as correctly identifying the higher purpose: negation of the will, which will bring “salvation.” There is, however, a difficulty in construing this meaning as “moral.” Schopenhauer regards morality as a case of willing the well-being of others, but also as a step toward will-lessness, so there is a question whether the “meaning” is coherently characterized. Nietzsche’s analysis of Schopenhauer seems correct: after abandoning any theistic or optimistic meaning, Schopenhauer raises the question whether existence has any meaning at all, but his positive answer retains the commitment to self-negation that he found in Christianity.


Philosophy ◽  
1959 ◽  
Vol 34 (130) ◽  
pp. 193-203
Author(s):  
E. P. Papanoutsos

The strongest argument which convinced adherents of determinism put forward is that the admission of freedom of the will does away with the principle of causality within the sphere of personal existence, and makes human activity incomprehensible. “I understand” and “I explain” mean: I apprehend the presentations of experience in terms of the basic forms of thought, and in this way I assimilate them, I register them in the system of knowledge which makes up my intellectual capital. One of these forms of thought, and one of the very highest importance, is the concept of causality: without it the mind would remain perpetually bemused before an orderless world of phenomena, displaying no rhyme or reason, like the world of magic or that of dreams. If, therefore, freedom of the will excludes a principle on which our intellectual well-being depends so “much, it must be rejected by the philosophical mind and given no place amongst the truths which that mind recognizes. There is a lasting validity in Immanuel Kant's observation:“If we grant that morality necessarily presupposes freedom (in the strictest sense) and if at the same time we grant that speculative reason has proved that such freedom does not allow of being thought, then the former supposition— that made on behalf of morality—would have to give way to this other contention, the opposite of which involves a palpable contradiction.”.


1982 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 127-140
Author(s):  
D. W. Hamlyn

There are certain metaphysical theories which present a view of the world and of the position of human-beings within it which have seemed attractive or at least impressive to many irrespective of the arguments that are marshalled in their favour. That is certainly true of Schopenhauer. His identification of the inner nature of reality with the will, and the conclusions which he drew from this as regards the nature of human-beings and their place in the world, have seemed striking and perhaps even illuminating to many thinkers, not all of whom have been philosophers in the most obvious sense and not all of whom have had much concern for the underlying argument that led Schopenhauer to his conclusions. It is in this way too, perhaps, that certain of Schopenhauer's ideas have become well known—his emphasis on the will to live, his pessimism and his views on suicide, and his thoughts about human nature and about sex that have been seen as something of an anticipation of Freud. In recent times attention has also been directed to his influence on Wittgenstein. In all these respects, however, it is Schopenhauer's ideas that have been influential, rather than the argument that underlies them. Indeed it is sometimes said that Schopenhauer was not a very systematic thinker at all. If that seems true it is so in the sense that Kant too has seemed to some unsystematic in the details of his argument. That does not mean that the main structure of the argument is not clear. So it is with Schopenhauer.


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