Introduction

Author(s):  
Robert M. Alexander

This chapter examines common arguments surrounding the Electoral College. Many of these arguments were present with the 2016 presidential election. The election marked the sixth time the popular vote winner did not win the Electoral College vote. It also witnessed the largest number of faithless votes for president in history. Lastly, it marked the second time in the last three elections that a state split its electoral vote total. Each represents a common criticism of the institution. Proponents of the body suggested the institution worked as it should—especially in regard to protecting the interests of less populated states and supporting the two-party system. All arguments over the Electoral College ultimately relate to issues over representation. The chapter concludes by examining historical controversies relating to the Electoral College and several reform efforts aimed at the body.

2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (45) ◽  
pp. 27940-27944 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert S. Erikson ◽  
Karl Sigman ◽  
Linan Yao

Donald Trump’s 2016 win despite failing to carry the popular vote has raised concern that 2020 would also see a mismatch between the winner of the popular vote and the winner of the Electoral College. This paper shows how to forecast the electoral vote in 2020 taking into account the unknown popular vote and the configuration of state voting in 2016. We note that 2016 was a statistical outlier. The potential Electoral College bias was slimmer in the past and not always favoring the Republican candidate. We show that in past presidential elections, difference among states in their presidential voting is solely a function of the states’ most recent presidential voting (plus new shocks); earlier history does not matter. Based on thousands of simulations, our research suggests that the bias in 2020 probably will favor Trump again but to a lesser degree than in 2016. The range of possible outcomes is sufficiently wide, however, to even include some possibility that Joseph Biden could win in the Electoral College while barely losing the popular vote.


2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (02) ◽  
pp. 353-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack E. Riggs ◽  
Gerald R. Hobbs ◽  
Todd H. Riggs

Compared to the popular vote, the Electoral College magnifies the perception of the winner's margin of victory. In this analysis, a method of quantifying the magnitude of the advantage given to the winner due to the Electoral College's two electoral vote add-on and winner-take-all methodologies is presented. Using the electoral vote distribution that was present in the 2000 U.S. presidential election, we analyzed one million random two-candidate simulated elections. The results show that the net effect of the Electoral College is to give the winning candidate an average 29.45 electoral vote advantage per election due to the winner-take-all methodology. This winner's advantage includes an average 0.42 electoral vote advantage given to the winner per election due to the two electoral vote add-on.


Author(s):  
Robert M. Alexander

This chapter examines the 2016 election through the lens of the Electoral College. The election represents the sixth time the popular vote winner did not win the Electoral College vote. It also represents the most faithless votes cast for president in any presidential election, and it is the second time in the past three elections that a state split its electoral vote between presidential candidates. Particular attention is devoted to the so-called Hamilton elector movement that aimed to have electors select an alternative candidate to Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton. A survey of the 2016 Electoral College reveals that a record number of electors considered voting contrary to expectations, and most all electors were lobbied to do so. Electoral College lobbyists consisted of citizens throughout the country and members of the body itself. Reservations over elector discretion draws attention to the differences between the original Electoral College and the evolved body.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrice Barthélémy ◽  
Mathieu Martin ◽  
Ashley Piggins

ABSTRACTDonald J. Trump won the 2016 US presidential election with fewer popular votes than Hillary R. Clinton. This is the fourth time this has happened, the others being 1876, 1888, and 2000. In earlier work, we analyzed these elections (and others) and showed how the electoral winner can often depend on the size of the US House of Representatives. This work was inspired by Neubauer and Zeitlin (2003, 721–5) in their paper, “Outcomes of Presidential Elections and the House Size.” A sufficiently larger House would have given electoral victories to the popular vote winner in both 1876 and 2000. An exception is the election of 1888. We show that Trump’s victory in 2016 is like Harrison’s in 1888 and unlike Hayes’s in 1876 and Bush’s in 2000. This article updates our previous work to include the 2016 election. It also draws attention to some of the anomalous behavior that can arise under the Electoral College.


1986 ◽  
Vol 79 (8) ◽  
pp. 605-608
Author(s):  
David R. Duncan ◽  
Bonnie H. Litwiller

The 1980 U.S. presidential election is widely perceived to have been a landslide. If one considers the electoral-vote totals (489 for Reagan; 49 for Carter), “landslide” seems an apt description. Popular-vote totals (43 899 248 for Reagan; 35 481 435 for Carter) depict a more competitive contest. The plurality (8 417 813) is still, however, substantial.


Author(s):  
Robert M. Alexander

This chapter evaluates how the Electoral College performs relative to norms associated with representation. While Electoral College practices have changed considerably, many arguments applied to the body rely on original expectations of the institution. This study reveals that the Electoral College performs poorly along many dimensions associated with norms of representation. Not surprisingly, many reforms have been proposed to the body. These include making electoral votes automatic, adopting some form of proportional representation to award electoral votes, and abolishing the Electoral College in favor of a national popular vote. These reforms are discussed and evaluated relative to the criteria associated with norms of representation. Although the institution often fails to perform in many of the ways its proponents suggest, it has been resistant to change. Absent pressure from large numbers of citizens from across the political spectrum, wholesale change to the institution is unlikely to occur in the near future.


Author(s):  
Robert M. Alexander

This chapter examines the relationship among the electoral vote, the popular vote, and legitimacy in presidential elections. The Framers sought a process that preserved federalism and yielded candidates with broad appeal across the country. Forty percent of all presidential contests can be classified as hairbreadth elections (decided by less than 75,000 votes). Twenty percent of all elections have been decided by just 10,000 votes. On six occasions, the candidate winning the popular vote failed to win the Electoral College vote. These so-called misfire elections have occurred in two of the last five campaigns and have the potential to occur with greater frequency given changing demographics. The divergence between the Electoral College vote and the popular vote represents a potential challenge to legitimacy for incoming presidents. Specific attention is devoted to how misfire elections may have affected the agenda of incoming presidents.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (12) ◽  
pp. e0253560
Author(s):  
Keng-Chi Chang ◽  
Chun-Fang Chiang ◽  
Ming-Jen Lin

We use 19 billion likes on the posts of top 2000 U.S. fan pages on Facebook from 2015 to 2016 to measure the dynamic ideological positions for politicians, news outlets, and users at the national and state levels. We then use these measures to derive support rates for 2016 presidential candidates in all 50 states, to predict the election, and to compare them with state-level polls and actual vote shares. We find that: (1) Assuming that users vote for candidates closer to their own ideological positions, support rates calculated using Facebook predict that Trump will win the electoral college vote while Clinton will win the popular vote. (2) State-level Facebook support rates track state-level polling averages and pass the cointegration test, showing two time series share similar trends. (3) Compared with actual vote shares, polls generally have smaller margin of errors, but polls also often overestimate Clinton’s support in right-leaning states. Overall, we provide a method to forecast elections at low cost, in real time, and based on passively revealed preference and little researcher discretion.


The Forum ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-201
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Devine ◽  
Kyle C. Kopko

Abstract Hillary Clinton won the national popular vote for president in 2016, but lost to Donald Trump in the Electoral College. Trump’s margin of victory in several decisive battleground states was smaller than the combined vote for the two leading minor party candidates: Gary Johnson, of the Libertarian Party, and Jill Stein, of the Green Party. The perception that Johnson and Stein “stole” the 2016 presidential election from Clinton is widespread, and potentially consequential for future minor party candidacies, but it has not yet been rigorously tested. In this article, we extend the analysis of minor party voting in the 1992 election from Lacy, D., and B. C. Burden. 1999. “The Vote-Stealing and Turnout Effects of Ross Perot in the 1992 U.S. Presidential Election.” American Journal of Political Science 43 (1): 233–55, by using data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study to estimate a multinomial probit model of voting behavior—including outcomes for vote choice and abstention—and calculate the predicted probabilities that Johnson and Stein voters would have voted for another candidate or abstained from voting, had one or both of these candidates been excluded from the ballot. We then reallocate Johnson’s and Stein’s votes accordingly, to estimate Clinton’s and Trump’s counterfactual vote shares nationally and within key battleground states. Our analysis indicates that Johnson and Stein did not deprive Clinton of an Electoral College majority, nor Trump the legitimacy of winning the national popular vote. We estimate that most Johnson and Stein voters would have abstained from voting if denied the choice to vote for their preferred candidate, and that most of Johnson’s remaining voters would have supported Trump.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard F. Potthoff

The 1968, 2000, and (future) 2024 U.S. presidential elections provide settings for deliberately provocative, offbeat scenarios that might have happened or could happen. Throughout, the Electoral College and plurality voting both receive blame. Scenario 1 exposes a quirk previously unnoticed: Under (albeit special) conditions, certain 1968 Humphrey voters could have made Humphrey rather than Nixon the election victor had they voted strategically for Wallace instead of Humphrey. In Scenario 2, overlooked nonidentifiability of undervotes would have plagued the 2000 Florida recount had the U.S. Supreme Court not halted it, thus raising questions about the foresightfulness of almost everyone involved; but, in addition, Gore missed an opportunity that, through use of proper statistical sampling, could have propelled him to victory. In Scenario 3, National Popular Vote Interstate Compact supporters fail to foresee that even one state, by changing its method for presidential voting, can wreck this innovative and widely promoted compact.


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