Beyond Duty

Author(s):  
Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

This is a collection of essays on Kantian moral theory and practical ethics with the aim of developing Kantian ethics and making it accessible and relevant to contemporary problems. With a new emphasis on ideals beyond the strictest requirements of moral duty, the book expands the core aspects of Kantian ethics and offers a broader perspective on familiar moral problems. Some essays explain Kantian concepts, others review work of leading contemporary philosophers, and still others raise challenging ethical questions for more general audiences. Having previously written on finding value in nature, Hill develops an ethical ideal of appreciation of people and their lives, distinguishing this from both respect and beneficence. Hill argues that this has important implications about how we should think about close personal relationships, such as friendships, families, and relationships with people with disabilities. The first part focuses on Kantian moral theory. Topics include the structure of Kant’s argument in the Groundwork, his idea of imperfect duties to oneself, autonomy, and human dignity. Rawls’ constructivism is defended against O’Neill’s objections, and Kantian ethics defended against the charge of utopian thinking. The second part focuses on practical ethics. Topics include the ethics of suicide, philanthropy, conscientious objection, and tragic choices when it seems that every alternative offends against human dignity. An essay on moral education contrasts Kantian and Rawlsian perspectives. Another essay traces the role of self-respect in Rawls’ theory of justice and contrasts a Kantian conception. Two final essays develop and illustrate the ideal of appreciation.

This is an edited collection devoted to the topic of the role of animals within Kant’s philosophy. It addresses key issues within both his theoretical and practical philosophy. It examines the place of Kant’s model of animal minds in the historical and contemporary contexts. It addresses the question of whether Kant’s philosophy of mind allows for animals to be capable of intentional representations of spatiotemporal objects. It explores how Kant treated the issue of animal nature as it manifests in humans and non-humans alike, and questions how Kant’s scientific theory attempted to accommodate animals within his broader Enlightenment worldview. It also addresses traditional worries about the moral status of animals within Kant’s and Kantian moral theory. Kant notoriously denied that we have direct obligations to animals, and the question persists as to whether Kantian moral theory provides the right account of the moral status of non-human animals. Several papers in this collection address the question and whether Kant’s views can be defended or ought to be rejected altogether on this basis alone. The collection considers the relevance of Kantian theory for our understanding of contemporary challenges facing human beings with regard to our relationship to animals.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

Since the publication of my last book, Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations (OUP, 2012), I have continued to write essays and reviews on fundamental issues in Kantian moral theory as well as practical ethics, but in this recent work I focus on different problems and develop new themes in these areas. For example, I explain some fundamental Kantian concepts, such as autonomy and dignity, and also address potentially influential objections from Rüdiger Bittner and Michael Rosen. Clarifying and revising earlier work, I articulate an understanding of ...


2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-473
Author(s):  
SAMUEL DUNCAN

AbstractIn this article I challenge Kantian constructivism both as an interpretation of Kant's own philosophical commitments and on its own merits as a moral theory, and argue in favour of a moral realist interpretation of Kant. I do so by focusing on Kant's own religious views and the question of whether a Kantian moral theory can be religiously neutral. I show that constructivist readings have severe problems on both fronts, while realist readings of Kant do not. This provides strong evidence that realist forms of Kantian ethics are preferable both as readings of Kant and as approaches to moral theory.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Lucy Allais ◽  
John J. Callanan

This is an edited collection devoted to the topic of the role of animals within Kant’s philosophy. It addresses key issues within both his theoretical and practical philosophy. It examines the place of Kant’s model of animal minds in the historical and contemporary contexts. It addresses the question of whether Kant’s philosophy of mind allows for animals to be capable of intentional representations of spatiotemporal objects. It explores how Kant treated the issue of animal nature as it manifests in humans and non-humans alike and questions how Kant’s scientific theory attempted to accommodate animals within his broader Enlightenment worldview. It also addresses traditional worries about the moral status of animals within Kant’s and Kantian moral theory. Kant notoriously denied that we have direct obligations to animals, and the question persists as to whether Kantian moral theory provides the right account of the moral status of non-human animals. Several papers in this collection address the question and whether Kant’s views can be defended or ought to be rejected altogether on this basis alone. The collection considers the relevance of Kantian theory for our understanding of contemporary challenges facing human beings with regard to our relationship to animals.


Sains Insani ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-14
Author(s):  
Ira Meilita Ibrahim ◽  
Taufik A. Latif ◽  
Afi Roshezry Abu Bakar ◽  
Muthualagan Thangavelu

The advancement of European dress to the rest of the world was linked to the definition of civilization as “a stage of social development considered to be more advanced” and “polite and good-mannered”. The widespread of their fashion style in the 19th and 20th centuries influenced the way the rest of the world attire. The fashion trend and dressing style thus change the purpose of dressing through time. The dressing style in campuses especially in private institutions of higher learning is under particular scrutiny, as it is often said to be inappropriate for a learning environment. This study looked at the importance of moral education, and its role in implementing the dress code for students among university students especially between two types of university i.e. public university and private university. It looked on the dressing style of students, both male and female, and the factors that lead to their dressing pattern which is common among students. This study also advocated the students’ understanding of the content of dress codes in their learning institution and the role played by moral education in regard to dress code. The overall study highlighted students’ perception towards the implementation of the dress code and punishment in their learning institution. The methodologies used to carry out this study are questionnaires and interviews. This study will therefore ascertain the important of dress code among students at higher learning institution and the role of moral education in cultivating values in order to dress properly or decently. Key Words: moral education, dress code, higher learning institution, civilization.


2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pritam Baruah

Employing moral values as justifications in judicial decisions has been controversial. At present, there is increasing controversy over the application of human dignity. Contemporary debates on the role of dignity in law and adjudication are heavily influenced by Christopher McCrudden’s account of dignity as a placeholder, and much thinking on the contested nature of values is influenced by WB Gallie’s idea of Essentially Contested Concepts. In this paper I argue that both these accounts have limited explanatory and normative potential. McCrudden’s account is illuminating in terms of the role of dignity in the UDHR, but weak in terms of explaining why employing dignity in adjudication yields diverging conclusions, and why dignity should be understood to be a placeholder. His reliance on Gallie’s idea of Essentially Contested Concepts is also misplaced. Gallie’s views often serve as a philosophical basis for understanding the contested nature of values generally. I argue that his account is an external-descriptive one, which cannot explain why persistent disagreement ensues because of the peculiar nature of some concepts. Neither does it point out any property of essential contestability that is unique to some concepts. Thinking on how values such as dignity can figure as justifications for decisions, therefore, must explore other alternatives.


Apeiron ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-95
Author(s):  
Victor Saenz

Abstract One of three basic types of desire, claims Aristotle, is thumos (‘spirit,’ ‘passion,’ ‘heart,’ ‘anger,’ ‘impulse’). The other two are epithumia (‘appetite’) and boulêsis (‘wish,’ ‘rational desire’). Yet, he never gives us an account of thumos; it has also received relatively little scholarly attention. I argue that thumos has two key features. First, it is able to cognize what I call ‘social value,’ the agent’s own perceived standing relative to others in a certain domain. In human animals, shame and honor are especially important manifestations of social value. Second, thumos provides non-rational motivation to pursue what affirms the agent’s social value and avoid what denies it. Interpretations that hold thumos just is anger, or that its object is the fine (kalon), I argue, are mistaken. My account also explains the role of thumos in moral education. In a virtuous agent thumos will be affectively attuned to the correct social rankings; it will take the practically wise, the lovers of the fine, or moral exemplars, as authorities.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document