A Special Case

2021 ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Mona Simion
Keyword(s):  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Testimony ◽  
Functionalist Account ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Special Case

This chapter is concerned with moral assertion. In recent years, much attention has been given to the epistemic credentials of belief based on moral testimony. Some people think pure moral deference is wrong, others disagree. It comes as a surprise, however, that while the epistemic responsibilities of the receiver of moral testimony have been closely scrutinized, little discussion has focused on the epistemic duties of the speaker. This chapter defends a functionalist account of the normativity of moral assertion. According to this view, in virtue of its function of reliably generating moral understanding in the audience, a moral assertion that p needs be knowledgeable and accompanied by a contextually appropriate explanation why p.

scholarly journals Moral Advice and Joint Agency

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Wiland
Keyword(s):  
Moral Worth ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Testimony ◽  
Joint Agency ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do The Right Thing ◽  
Moral Advice

There are many alleged problems with trusting another person’s moral testimony, perhaps the most prominent of which is that it fails to deliver moral understanding. Without moral understanding, one cannot do the right thing for the right reason, and so acting on trusted moral testimony lacks moral worth. This chapter, however, argues that moral advice differs from moral testimony, differs from it in a way that enables a defender of moral advice to parry this worry about moral worth. The basic idea is that an advisor and an advisee can together constitute a joint agent, and that this joint agent’s action can indeed have moral worth. So while the advisee himself might not do the right thing for the right reason (this because all alone he lacks the right reason), and while the advisor herself might not do the right thing for the right reason (this because all alone she does not do the right thing), they together do the right thing for the right reason.

scholarly journals Moral Understanding and Cooperative Testimony

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Boyd
Keyword(s):  
Moral Worth ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Testimony

AbstractIt is has been argued that there is a problem with moral testimony: testimony is deferential, and basing judgments and actions on deferentially acquired knowledge prevents them from having moral worth. What morality perhaps requires of us, then, is that we understand why a proposition is true, but this is something that cannot be acquired through testimony. I argue here that testimony can be both deferential as well as cooperative, and that one can acquire moral understanding through cooperative testimony. The problem of moral testimony is thus not a problem with testimony generally, but a problem of deferential testimony specifically.

Moral Testimony and the Value of Moral Understanding

2021 ◽  
pp. 48-72
Author(s):  
Eric Wiland
Keyword(s):  
Complete Understanding ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Testimony ◽  
Epistemic Gap

This chapter addresses a distinct worry about accepting moral testimony: if you cannot gain moral understanding by means of moral testimony, it is better to believe moral truths for nontestimonial reasons than for testimonial reasons. There are two distinct sorts of reasons trusting moral testimony might be unable to deliver moral understanding. The first turns on the thought that it is intrinsically bad to lack moral understanding, and so if moral testimony cannot deliver moral understanding, then forming one’s moral views on the basis of testimony is problematic. The second reason for concern relies on the thought that a lack of moral understanding is fundamentally a practical worry: those who lack moral understanding cannot act as well as those who do understand. This chapter addresses the worry about moral understanding on multiple fronts. It argues that one can indeed get moral understanding from moral testimony: when you are unsure whether some action would be wrong, but are aware of the relevant considerations, testimony whether the action would be wrong can fill this epistemic gap, putting you in a position to have quite a bit of moral understanding. Next, this chapter questions whether any residual unavailable moral understanding is as important as pessimists about moral testimony typically make it out to be. The partial understanding that moral testimony affords is nearly as valuable as complete understanding is. Moreover, even if there is something virtuous about understanding morality entirely on one’s own, there might also be something virtuous about being epistemically dependent upon the moral testimony of others, a topic explored in the next two chapters.

Assertion Functionalism and Context

2021 ◽  
pp. 68-86
Author(s):  
Mona Simion
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Testimonial Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Requirements ◽  
Functionalist Account ◽  
Epistemic Function ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Classical Invariantism

This chapter shows how to reconcile Classical Invariantism with the Knowledge Norm of Assertion. My basic proposal is that we can combine invariantism with a functionalist account of assertion: according to the account I favour, assertion is governed by a knowledge norm in virtue of its epistemic function of generating testimonial knowledge. Requirements generated by other functions of assertion, though, such as its prudential function, can override the constraints imposed by the epistemic function, and render the knowledge requirement either too strong or too weak for all-things-considered permissible assertion. All-things-considered permissible assertion can vary with practical stakes; epistemically permissible assertion does not.

Moral Testimony and Moral Understanding

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
McShane Paddy Jane
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Testimony ◽  
The Ideal

In this paper I argue against the charge that dependence on moral testimony is at odds with good moral agency, and moral specifically with the ideal of having moral understanding and using it to make moral judgments. My argument has four main strands. First, I contend that one of the grounds that is often adduced for the value of moral understanding—namely, that it is important for justifying ourselves to others—does not offer an adequate basis for criticizing dependence on moral testimony. Second, I show how dependence on moral testimony is not incompatible with moral understanding. Third, I argue that, in fact, dependence on moral testimony can be an important avenue for achieving moral understanding. Fourth, and finally, I contend that moral understanding is not always an ideal we have sufficient reason to seek. If my arguments are successful, they provide new resources for a defense of dependence on moral testimony.

Extreme self-sacrifice beyond fusion: Moral expansiveness and the special case of allyship

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Crimston ◽  
Matthew J. Hornsey
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Biological Markers ◽  
Natural Environment ◽  
Relevant Dimension ◽  
Special Case

AbstractAs a general theory of extreme self-sacrifice, Whitehouse's article misses one relevant dimension: people's willingness to fight and die in support of entities not bound by biological markers or ancestral kinship (allyship). We discuss research on moral expansiveness, which highlights individuals’ capacity to self-sacrifice for targets that lie outside traditional in-group markers, including racial out-groups, animals, and the natural environment.

Determination of the phase structure of polymerblends by electron microscopy

1978 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 492-493
Author(s):  
Dr. G. Kaemof
Keyword(s):  
Screw Extruder ◽  
Electron Microscopic ◽  
Thin Sections ◽  
Single Screw Extruder ◽  
Transmission Electron ◽  
The Matrix ◽  
Twin Screw ◽  
Special Case ◽  
Microscopic Investigations

A mixture of polycarbonate (PC) and styrene-acrylonitrile-copolymer (SAN) represents a very good example for the efficiency of electron microscopic investigations concerning the determination of optimum production procedures for high grade product properties.The following parameters have been varied:components of charge (PC : SAN 50 : 50, 60 : 40, 70 : 30), kind of compounding machine (single screw extruder, twin screw extruder, discontinuous kneader), mass-temperature (lowest and highest possible temperature).The transmission electron microscopic investigations (TEM) were carried out on ultra thin sections, the PC-phase of which was selectively etched by triethylamine.The phase transition (matrix to disperse phase) does not occur - as might be expected - at a PC to SAN ratio of 50 : 50, but at a ratio of 65 : 35. Our results show that the matrix is preferably formed by the components with the lower melting viscosity (in this special case SAN), even at concentrations of less than 50 %.

Test Validation Without Measurement

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 204-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilie Lacot ◽  
Mohammad H. Afzali ◽  
Stéphane Vautier
Keyword(s):  
Test Data ◽  
Test Scores ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Test Validation ◽  
Clinical Tests ◽  
Ethical Perspective ◽  
Power Of Test ◽  
Memory Accuracy ◽  
Social Uses ◽  
Special Case

Abstract. Test validation based on usual statistical analyses is paradoxical, as, from a falsificationist perspective, they do not test that test data are ordinal measurements, and, from the ethical perspective, they do not justify the use of test scores. This paper (i) proposes some basic definitions, where measurement is a special case of scientific explanation; starting from the examples of memory accuracy and suicidality as scored by two widely used clinical tests/questionnaires. Moreover, it shows (ii) how to elicit the logic of the observable test events underlying the test scores, and (iii) how the measurability of the target theoretical quantities – memory accuracy and suicidality – can and should be tested at the respondent scale as opposed to the scale of aggregates of respondents. (iv) Criterion-related validity is revisited to stress that invoking the explanative power of test data should draw attention on counterexamples instead of statistical summarization. (v) Finally, it is argued that the justification of the use of test scores in specific settings should be part of the test validation task, because, as tests specialists, psychologists are responsible for proposing their tests for social uses.

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