Eidetic Variation: a Self-Correcting and Integrative Account

Edmund Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology seeks a priori knowledge of essences and eidetic laws pertaining to conscious experience and its objects. Husserl believes that such eidetic knowledge has a higher epistemic status than the inherently fallible empirical knowledge, but a closer reading of his work shows that even eidetic claims are subject to error and open to modification. In this article, I develop a self-correcting account of Husserl’s method of eidetic variation, arguing that eidetic variation plays a critical role in both challenging and improving upon the eidetic results in phenomenology. More specifically, I argue that the self-correcting account of eidetic variation 1) is consistent with Husserl’s own formulations of his eidetic methodology and epistemic principles; 2) captures the dual epistemic function of eidetic variation as means for both testing and intuitively validating eidetic claims; and 3) offers methodological support for contemporary attempts to integrate eidetic variation with non-eidetic methods and resources. To substantiate these claims, I first contrast the self-correcting account with the falsificationist interpretations of eidetic variation. Then, I turn to three applications of eidetic variation in order to examine how eidetic phenomenology could draw from real-life deviations, artificial variations, and critical–historical reflection. The goal is to lay the methodological groundwork for a self-correcting and integrative account of eidetic variation and illustrate its usefulness in research practice.

The Concept of Complexity in Philosophical Contexts: Semantic and Pragmatic Specifics

The present research featured the content of complexity in philosophical contexts in the aspects of its validity, consistency, and compliance with the pragmatics of philosophical comprehension of reality. The article considers both explicit and implicit attempts to define complexity as a philosophical concept. The author addressed the validity of using the term complexity in a philosophical context by standardizing its meaning, i.e. building a pattern in accordance with the basic linguistic denotations of this concept. A review of its ontological and epistemological use made it possible to identify some cases of redundancy, unreasonableness, and semantic shift. The article introduces some possible ways of using the concept of complexity. The limited implementation of its epistemic function makes it possible to establish the boundaries of its applicability. The concept of complexity is important for metaphysics; however, such ideas as "metaphysics of complexity", "ontology of complexity", or "epistemology of complexity" have no ground. The article also provides a comparative analysis of the concept of complexity in specific scientific and philosophical contexts. Based on the revealed discrepancies in its interpretation, the author speculates whether the so-called philosophy of complexity can act as a context for understanding the philosophical problems of complexity science with its ambiguous nature.

Capital, Ideology, and the Liberal Order

Thomas Piketty’s Capital and Ideology (2020) offers a powerful critique of ideological justifications for inequality in capitalist societies. Does this mean we should reject capitalist institutions altogether? This paper defends some aspects of capitalism by explaining the epistemic function of market economies and their ability to harness capital to meet the needs of the relatively disadvantaged. We support this classical liberal position with reference to empirical research on historical trends in inequality that challenges some of Piketty’s interpretations of the data. Then we discuss the implications of this position in terms of limits on the efficacy of participatory governance within firms and the capacity of the state to levy systematic taxes on wealth.

The Role of Information in Knowledge-How

Knowledge-how is the kind of knowledge implicated in skill employment and acquisition. Intellectualists claim that knowledge-how is a special type of propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists claim that knowledge-how is not propositional. We argue that both views face two open challenges. The first challenge pertains to the relationship between informational states and motor variability. The second pertains to the epistemic function of practice that leads to skill (and knowledge-how). The aim of this paper is to suggest a general conceptual framework based on functional information with both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist features. Our proposal, we argue, avoids the above challenges, and can further the debate on knowledge-how and skill.

Creativity and modelling the measurement process of the Higgs self-coupling at the LHC and HL-LHC

This paper provides an account of the nature of creativity in high-energy physics experiments through an integrated historical and philosophical study of the current and planned attempts to measure the self-coupling of the Higgs boson by two experimental collaborations (ATLAS and CMS) at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) and the planned High Luminosity Large Hadron Collider (HL-LHC). A notion of creativity is first identified broadly as an increase in the epistemic value of a measurement outcome from an unexpected transformation, and narrowly as a condition for knowledge of the measurement of the self-coupling of the Higgs. Drawing upon Tal’s model-based epistemology of measurement (2012) this paper shows how without change to ‘readings’ (or ‘instrument indicators’) a transformation to the model of the measurement process can increase the epistemic value of the measurement outcome. Such transformations are attributed to the creativity of the experimental collaboration. Creativity, in this context, is both a product, a creative and improved model, and the distributed collaborative process of transformation to the model of the measurement process. For the case of the planned measurements at the HL-LHC, where models of the measurement process perform the epistemic function of prediction, creativity is included in the models of the measurement process, both as projected quantified creativity and as an assumed property of the future collaborations.

Exploring Scientific Inquiry via Agent-Based Modelling

In this paper I examine the epistemic function of agent-based models (ABMs) of scientific inquiry, proposed in the recent philosophical literature. In view of Boero and Squazzoni’s (2005) classification of ABMs into case-based models, typifications and theoretical abstractions, I argue that proposed ABMs of scientific inquiry largely belong to the last category. While this means that their function is primarily exploratory, I suggest that they are epistemically valuable not only as a temporary stage in the development of ABMs of science, but by providing insights into theoretical aspects of scientific rationality. I illustrate my point with two examples of highly idealized ABMs of science, which perform two exploratory functions: Zollman’s (2010) ABM which provides a proof-of-possibility in the realm of theoretical discussions on scientific rationality, and an argumentation-based ABM (Borg et al. 2019, 2017b, 2018), which provides insights into potential mechanisms underlying the efficiency of scientific inquiry.

Knowledge and reasoning

This paper develops a novel, functionalist, unified account of the epistemic normativity of reasoning. On this view, epistemic norms drop out of epistemic functions. I argue that practical reasoning serves a prudential function of generating prudentially permissible action, and the epistemic function of generating knowledge of what one ought to do. This picture, if right, goes a long way towards normatively divorcing action and practical reasoning. At the same time, it unifies reasoning epistemically: practical and theoretical reasoning will turn out to be governed by the same epistemic norm—knowledge—in virtue of serving the same epistemic function: generating knowledge of the conclusion.

The Problem of Political Ignorance

This chapter turns to the problem that political ignorance poses for democratic public discourse. It is often held (1) that ordinary citizens know too little to engage competently in public debates about politics and (2) that, because of the influence of group identity on political beliefs (or ‘group cognition’), this problematic ignorance is here to stay. The chapter argues that this influential worry fails, because it misunderstands the epistemic function of social group identities. The experiences involved in being a member of a particular social group are epistemically useful for deciding whose political judgment and what political information to trust. This is true even when it comes to scientific questions that bear on political issues, and even when people are dogmatically committed to their group perspectives. So, group cognition constitutes a useful tool for managing and overcoming political ignorance—and, by extension, for defusing the threat it raises for public discourse.

Voicing Anger

Chapter 1 recommends that emotionally charged discourse play an important role in the public speech of divided democracies. The present chapter builds on this recommendation by examining public expressions of anger. It is commonly held that publicly voicing anger is counterproductive. The chapter resists this challenge by articulating a crucial sense in which voicing anger can be epistemically productive. Because of anger’s distinctive felt quality, conveying anger to one’s listeners can play an indispensable role in alerting them to previously overlooked injustices, and in enhancing their understanding of these injustices. This epistemic function is vital in divided societies. Because such societies typically involve significant social segregation and epistemically detrimental ideologies, the injustices endured by some groups are often invisible to, or misunderstood by, other groups. Finally, the chapter defuses the most powerful objections to this defence, partly by exposing how they overlook the systemic character of public discourse.

Ibn Taymiyya on theistic signs and knowledge of God

This article aims to draw on the ‘Qur'anic Rationalism’ of Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) in elucidating an Islamic epistemology of theistic natural signs, in the lens of contemporary philosophy of religion. In articulating what Ibn Taymiyya coins ‘God's method of proof through signs (istidlāluhu taʿālā bi'l-āyāt)’, it seeks aid in particular from the work of C. Stephen Evans and other contemporary philosophers of religion, in an attempt to understand the relevance and force of this alternative to natural theology within the Islamic tradition. In doing so, it aims to respond to existing criticisms of Ibn Taymiyya's perspective in the literature, and to consider the implications of a Taymiyyan reading of theistic natural signs, on the epistemic function of Qur'anic āyāt as theistic evidence.