Restrictions on Remedies

2021 ◽  
pp. 174-199
Author(s):  
Paul Daly
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Law ◽  
Alternative Remedies

Whereas the discussion of remedial discretion in Chapter 5 was of individualised reasons for refusing to grant a remedy, in this chapter the issues discussed are general principles restricting the granting of judicial review remedies. These are systemic in nature and not specific to the circumstances presented by individual applicants and the decisions they wish to challenge. Some overlap is, of course, to be expected, but the procedural requirements of promptness and permission; the principle that an applicant must exhaust alternative remedies before seeking judicial review; the bar on collateral attack; privative clauses; the principles relating to ripeness and prematurity and the obligation to demonstrate standing to seek judicial review are all general, in that they apply to each and every application for judicial review regardless of the particular factual and legal matrix. This chapter argues that the law in relation to this wide range of restrictions on remedies can be understood in terms of administrative law values.

10. Administrative Law:

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Clements
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Natural Justice ◽  
Locus Standi ◽  
Public Body ◽  
Chapter Deal ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right

The Q&A series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each chapter includes typical questions; diagram problem and essay answer plans, suggested answers, notes of caution, tips on obtaining extra marks, the key debates on each topic and suggestions on further reading. This chapter is about judicial review. This is the means by which the citizen can use the courts to ensure that a public body obeys the law. The questions in the chapter deal with issues such as the erratic development of administrative law; the procedure to apply for judicial review; the right to apply (locus standi), procedural ultra vires; natural justice; and substantive ultra vires.

scholarly journals Administrative Law, Judicial Deference, and the Charter

2014 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Lewans
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Legitimate Authority ◽  
The Law

The doctrine of judicial deference has been a touchstone in Canadian administrative law for thirty-five years. Put simply, the doctrine recognizes that administrative officials have legitimate authority to interpret the law, which means that judicial review is warranted only if an administrative decision is demonstrably unfair or unreasonable. While the tide of deference has ebbed and flowed over this period, most administrative decisions these days are assessed according to a standard of reasonableness instead of correctness.

Legalism and English Administrative Law: Comment on Sterett

1992 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 89-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Feldman ◽  
Mark Gould
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Recent Issue ◽  
Review Procedure ◽  
The Law ◽  
1960S And 1970S ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Law Commission ◽  
The Way

In a recent issue of this journal (Volume 15, Number 4, Fall 1990), Susan Sterett examined the role of the Law Commission in the development of English administrative law. She suggested that the Commission mimicked a “peak association” and adopted an “idiom of legalism” in order to justify its reform proposals. This comment disagrees with Sterett on three grounds. First, the role and constitutional position of the Commission is far more complex than Sterett suggests, and this affects the way in which the Commission works. Second, judges and academic lawyers were central to the reform of substantive principles of judicial review in the 1960s and 1970s, making it unnecessary for the Law Commission to act in this field. Finally, it is wrong to ignore the fact that much administrative law occurs outside the judicial review procedure.

scholarly journals The Unmeritorious ‘Legality’/‘Merits’ Distinction in Singapore Administrative Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Benjamin Joshua Ong
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
General Principle ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Rough Approximation ◽  
Executive Decision Making ◽  
The Law

Abstract The Singapore courts often state that judicial review of executive decision-making ought only to involve an inquiry into the ‘legality’ of a decision or the ‘decision-making process’, and not the ‘decision itself’ or its ‘merits’ – let us call this the ‘Distinction’. This article argues that the Distinction should be expunged from Singapore law. The Distinction has its roots in English case law which aimed to prevent the courts from arbitrarily substituting their decision for the executive's by reason of mere disagreement. But Singapore case law has gone further and treated the Distinction as a general principle applicable to all of administrative law. However, the Distinction is too vague for this purpose (as seen from Singapore cases which have interpreted the distinction inconsistently). It is conceptually problematic, incompatible with the practicalities of judicial review (particularly substantive review as recognised in Singapore law), and has occasionally been paid lip service but not followed in substance. The Distinction cannot form a coherent principle to guide the courts and ought to be replaced by a more nuanced application of constitutional principles relevant to determining the appropriate scope of review. Whatever these principles may be, and however they are to be balanced, the Distinction can be but an over-inclusive rough approximation of them which hampers the development of the law.

Understanding Administrative Law in the Common Law World

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Daly
Keyword(s):  
Future Development ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Pluralist Approach ◽  
Core Features

This book has three goals: to enhance understanding of administrative law; to guide future development of the law; and to justify the core features of the contemporary law of judicial review of administrative action. Around the common law world, the law of judicial review of administrative action has changed dramatically in recent decades, accelerating a centuries-long process of incremental evolution. This book offers a fresh framework for understanding the core features of contemporary administrative law. Through comparative analysis of case law from Australia, Canada, England, Ireland and New Zealand, Dr Daly develops an interpretive approach by reference to four values: individual self-realisation, good administration, electoral legitimacy and decisional autonomy. The interaction of this plurality of values explains the structure of the vast field of judicial review of administrative action: institutional structures, procedural fairness, substantive review, remedies, restrictions on remedies and the scope of judicial review, everything from the rule against bias to jurisdictional error to the application of judicial review principles to non-statutory bodies. Addressing this wide array of subjects in detail, Dr Daly demonstrates how his pluralist approach, with the values being employed in a complementary and balanced fashion, can enhance academics’, students’, practitioners’ and judges’ understanding of administrative law. Furthermore, this pluralist approach is capable of guiding the future development of the law of judicial review of administrative action, a point illustrated by a careful analysis of the unsettled doctrinal area of legitimate expectation. Dr Daly closes by arguing that his values-based, pluralist framework supports the legitimacy of contemporary administrative law which although sometimes called into question in fact facilitates the flourishing of individuals, of public administration and of the liberal democratic system.

Jurisdictional Error as Conceptual Totem

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leighton McDonald
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Executive Action ◽  
Error Recognition ◽  
The Law ◽  
Obvious Relation

Jurisdictional error is pivotal but not, in any substantive sense, ‘central’. It is pivotal because it marks important boundaries (drawn by reference to other ideas) in the law of judicial review of executive action. This pivotal but not central role has enabled jurisdictional error to function as a ‘conceptual totem’, emblematic of a determinedly ‘statutory approach’ to the articulation and elaboration of administrative law norms. After elaborating these claims, the article goes on to doubt the constitutional case for the retention of the statutory approach that, in recent years, has come to characterise the Australian approach to jurisdictional error. Recognition of the totemic function of jurisdictional error, it is concluded, is a helpful first step in better understanding and analysing administrative law norms which bear no obvious relation to statute.

The Normative Structure of Australian Administrative Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Will Bateman ◽  
Leighton McDonald
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Normative Structure ◽  
The Law

This article analyses the normative structure of Australian administrative law through the prism of two distinct intellectual approaches to the law of judicial review: the ‘grounds approach’ and the ‘statutory approach’. We explore the development of both approaches and track the contemporary ascendance of the statutory approach in light of the political and constitutional context within which the practice of judicial review is situated. We then reflect on the ways that each responds to two central legitimacy problems which must be confronted by modern administrative law: the democratic legitimacy of judicial review and the legitimacy of the forms of law associated with contemporary administrative government.

scholarly journals The Foundations of the Duty to Give Reasons and a Normative Reconstruction

2020 ◽  
pp. 299-322
Author(s):  
Joana Mendes
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Critical Assessment ◽  
The Law ◽  
Normative Reconstruction

Despite operating in highly constrained legal environments, executive actors may act in a constitutive capacity. This observation prompts a critical assessment of the role of procedural principles in EU administrative law. As norms of conduct deployed by executive bodies during the process of implementing norms, procedural principles may have legal dimensions that, while constitutionally relevant, may not come to the fore in judicial review. The chapter develops this argument with regard to the multifaceted character of the duty to give reasons. It argues that the duty to give reasons ought to ensure the constitutional embeddedness of the constitutive action of EU executive bodies. Such role is consistent both with the original relevance of the duty to give reasons to the law of integration (in the context of the European Coal and Steel Community) and with the current EU constitutional framework. The latter justifies reinstituting the original constitutional function of the duty to give reasons, irrespective of its current scope in the context of judicial review.

14. Procedural Grounds of Judicial Review

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Loveland
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Procedural Fairness ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Partial Picture ◽  
The Law ◽  
Modern Era ◽  
Do So

This chapter examines the procedural grounds of judicial review. It discusses how the courts have used the procedural fairness doctrine by reviewing a number of leading cases to identify the values that appear to be shaping the content of the law. The analysis focuses on case law drawn from the ‘modern’ (ie post-1960) era, but several seminal decisions from earlier periods are also considered. The concept of procedural fairness has generated a vast body of case law in the modern era and will continue to do so in future. But the law on this point, even when seen in conjunction with the law relating to the traditional substantive grounds on which government action can be held unlawful, offers only a partial picture of the way in which administrative law fits into the broader constitutional principles of the rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament.

scholarly journals Re-evaluating the Collateral Challenge in the Era of Statutory Interpretation

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-91
Author(s):  
Jules O’Donnell
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Current State ◽  
The Law

A collateral challenge impugns the validity of an administrative decision in a proceeding that is not specifically designed for the modification or setting aside of that decision. On the current state of the law, there is a presumption in favour of collateral challenge in an inferior court, which can be displaced by a contrary legislative intention. I argue, however, that the current presumption lacks a clear doctrinal basis, and that it places too much emphasis on statutory interpretation as a useful tool for rebutting, or indeed vindicating, the starting presumption (let alone determining what administrative law ‘grounds’ a collateral challenge might encompass). I suggest a rearticulation of the presumption as an expression of a defendant’s entitlement to vindicate legal rights. I point out, however, that contemporary norms of administrative law may otherwise demand a stricter approach to permitting collateral challenges. On this alternative view, a challenger must identify clear legislative authorisation for what is essentially a judicial review function.

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