Territorial Ideology and Interstate Conflict : Comparative Considerations

Author(s):  
Alexander B. Murphy

We live in profoundly unsettling times. The daily newspapers are filled with stories about terrorist threats, stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and the efforts of ever more states to acquire nuclear weapons. At the same time, longstanding interstate and intrastate conflicts continue to dominate the lives of people in such diverse settings as Israel-Palestine, southern Sudan, the India-Pakistan border, and the interior of Colombia. The issues that underlie these conflicts are as diverse as their geographic settings, but they share one commonality: they are all framed by the territorial logic of the modern state system. The foregoing statement might seem self-evident for intrastate struggles between ethnic groups or for boundary conflicts between states because these conflicts are clearly tied to the territorial reach of the modern state. Yet even the international terrorist activities associated with movements such as al-Qaeda cannot be understood without reference to prevailing international territorial norms. This is because the existing political-geographic order is a fundamental catalyst for such movements and because responses to international terrorism are often channeled in and through states. Consider, for example, the circumstances of the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001. Chief among the articulated reasons for the attack was a sense of eroding political and cultural sovereignty in the Islamic world, as symbolized, for example, by the presence of U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia and by the existence of a number of secular, Westernoriented regimes in the region. On the response side of the equation, a major focus of attention for the U.S. administration in the wake of September 11 was “regime change,” first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. Against this backdrop, it is clearly important that we seek to understand the territorial logic of the modern state system and its role in different types of conflicts. A great deal of work has been done along these lines in recent decades. Scholars who have focused on the concept of the nation-state have devoted considerable attention to the gap between perception and reality that underlies the concept and have highlighted its pernicious influence in culturally diverse states.

2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neta C. Crawford

The Bush administration's arguments in favor of a preemptive doctrine rest on the view that warfare has been transformed. As Colin Powell argues, “It's a different world … it's a new kind of threat.” And in several important respects, war has changed along the lines the administration suggests, although that transformation has been under way for at least the last ten to fifteen years. Unconventional adversaries prepared to wage unconventional war can conceal their movements, weapons, and immediate intentions and conduct devastating surprise attacks. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, though not widely dispersed, are more readily available than they were in the recent past. And the everyday infrastructure of the United States can be turned against it as were the planes the terrorists hijacked on September 11, 2001. Further, the administration argues that we face enemies who “reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.” Although vulnerability could certainly be reduced in many ways, it is impossible to achieve complete invulnerability.


2002 ◽  
Vol 736 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremiah Slade ◽  
Patricia Wilson ◽  
Brian Farrell ◽  
Justyna Teverovsky ◽  
Douglas Thomson ◽  
...  

ABSTRACTToday's complex geo-political climate has forced the U.S. armed services into new operational strategies. The prevalence of international terrorism, the threat from chemical and biological weapons, and the pressure to “do more with less” has placed increasing demands on the military. This new operational environment requires highly mobile troops having enhanced decision-making capability provided through the rapid transfer and dissemination of information to each member of the squad. What is missing is the ability to process and use this information via an Intranet at the level of the individual soldier. The purpose of our work has been to develop, evaluate and implement such a wearable conductive network for the dismounted soldier.


2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsten Schmalenbach

The destruction of the World Trade Center and a wing of the Pentagon by three highjacked civilian airliners and the crash of a fourth in Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001 constitute without a doubt the high point of terrorist attacks on the United States to date. The terrorists’ methods, their destructive force and the attacks’ economic and political effects are all without precedent. After September 11, the organisation responsible was quickly identified, namely a terrorist group based in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, headed by a Saudi expatriate, Osama bin Laden. After a request for his extradition was denied by the ruling Taliban, the United States and the United Kingdom conducted airstrikes against targets in Afghanistan beginning on October 7. As soon as late November 2001, the Taliban's fate was sealed. The uninterrupted bombardment of the US Air Force helped the Northern Alliance gain decisive ground in its campaign against the regime. On December 15, 2001, the various Afghan opposition groups signed a treaty on the Petersberg near Bonn, Germany, that established an interim government. The government's establishment put an end to the Taliban's rule, but it did not put an end to international terrorism with its various goals and interwoven structures.


2007 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stewart Harris

This paper deals with a serious question that is largely unaddressed by the U.S. or international legal systems: how should society deal with inherently, catastrophically dangerous information—information that, in the wrong hands, could lead to the destruction of a city, a continent, or, conceivably, the entire planet? Such information includes, but is not limited to, blueprints for nuclear weapons, as well as specific formulae for chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. The paper is not a critique of the existing statutes and regulations that various governments use to keep their secrets secret. Rather, it is a discussion of what to do when some such secrets are inevitably disclosed, or, more generally, how to deal with catastrophically dangerous information that is generated outside of governmental control. Addressing these issues is primarily a matter of policy, but policy with significant constitutional dimensions. Perhaps the most fundamental of thosedimensions is the question of whether a governmental restriction on receipt, dissemination, and even mere possession of information can be reconciled with the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment. Although existing authorities do not directly address the subject, what little authority there is suggests that reasonable restrictions upon the possession and dissemination of catastrophically dangerous information—even when that information is already within the public domain—can be implemented in a way that is consistent with the First Amendment. Given the growing urgency of the subject and the need for a comprehensive approach, I advocate a statutory solution in the United States that defines and limits access to catastrophically dangerous information, but which also limits governmental seizures and restrictions to only the most dangerous types of information, and which provides for a pre-seizure warrant requirement and expedited post-seizure judicial review. Given the global dimensions of the problem, I also advocate a corresponding international regime patterned upon the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968.


Author(s):  
Mary S. Barton

In May 1925, the League of Nations convened a Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War in Geneva, Switzerland. Six weeks of negotiations resulted in a new Arms Traffic Convention (as well as the Geneva Protocol against the usage of chemical and biological weapons), which representatives from eighteen countries—including the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan—signed on June 17. The United States led the way to that moment yet did not follow through on it afterward. The treaty, which lacked robust enforcement mechanisms, languished in national legislatures and never entered into force. Even so, it had a constructive legacy: the compilation and publication of statistics on gun-running. Intelligence based on open and closed sources collected for, and resulting from, the Arms Traffic Conference, indicated systematic violations of the European peace settlements and revealed a world awash in guns.


Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith

Chemical and biological weapons represent two distinct types of munitions that share some common policy implications. While chemical weapons and biological weapons are different in terms of their development, manufacture, use, and the methods necessary to defend against them, they are commonly united in matters of policy as “weapons of mass destruction,” along with nuclear and radiological weapons. Both chemical and biological weapons have the potential to cause mass casualties, require some technical expertise to produce, and can be employed effectively by both nation states and non-state actors. U.S. policies in the early 20th century were informed by preexisting taboos against poison weapons and the American Expeditionary Forces’ experiences during World War I. The United States promoted restrictions in the use of chemical and biological weapons through World War II, but increased research and development work at the outset of the Cold War. In response to domestic and international pressures during the Vietnam War, the United States drastically curtailed its chemical and biological weapons programs and began supporting international arms control efforts such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. U.S. chemical and biological weapons policies significantly influence U.S. policies in the Middle East and the fight against terrorism.


Author(s):  
Paul C. Avey

Why would countries without nuclear weapons even think about fighting nuclear-armed opponents? A simple answer is that no one believes nuclear weapons will be used. But that answer fails to consider why nonnuclear state leaders would believe that in the first place. This book argues that the costs and benefits of using nuclear weapons create openings that weak nonnuclear actors can exploit. It uses four case studies to show the key strategies available to nonnuclear states: Iraqi decision-making under Saddam Hussein in confrontations with the United States; Egyptian leaders' thinking about the Israeli nuclear arsenal during wars in 1969–70 and 1973; Chinese confrontations with the United States in 1950, 1954, and 1958; and a dispute that never escalated to war, the Soviet–United States tensions between 1946 and 1948 that culminated in the Berlin Blockade. Those strategies include limiting the scope of the conflict, holding chemical and biological weapons in reserve, seeking outside support, and leveraging international non-use norms. Counterintuitively, conventionally weak nonnuclear states are better positioned to pursue these strategies than strong ones, so that wars are unlikely when the nonnuclear state is powerful relative to its nuclear opponent. The book demonstrates clearly that nuclear weapons cast a definite but limited shadow, and while the world continues to face various nuclear challenges, understanding conflict in nuclear monopoly will remain a pressing concern for analysts and policymakers.


2003 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 179-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masaaki Sugishima

AbstractBefore the sarin incidents in Tokyo and Matsumoto, the Aum Shinrikyo (now Aleph) had tried to conduct bioterrorism with botulinum toxin and Bacillus anthracis. Followers of the Aum could not overcome technical difficulties inherent in developing biological weapons, and the perpetrators had not been prosecuted for their failed attempts of bioterrorism. But the Aum's biological attack revealed several shortcomings in the Japanese law that regulated biological weapons. Since the missile experiment of North Korea conducted in 1998, the Japanese government has come to consider the threat posed by biological weapons more seriously. In 2001, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the series of anthrax letter scares in the United States of America, the Japanese government established its Five Basic Principles for Chemical and Biological Weapons Terrorism and several measures were taken at the central and local levels. Activities of the Aum have been monitored by the Public Security Investigation Agency and the National Police Agency under the Anti-Aum Law since 2000.


2006 ◽  
Vol 05 (03) ◽  
pp. A02
Author(s):  
Maria Chiara Montani

The attacks of September 11 2001 and in particular, the sending of letters containing anthrax spores the following October had a profound effect on society, and at the same time on science and its communicative mechanisms. Through a quanto-qualitative analysis of articles taken from four publications: two daily newspapers, the Corriere della Sera from Italy and the New York Times from the United States and two science magazines, Science and Nature, we have shown how the aforementioned events provoked the emergence of media attention regarding bioterrorism. A closer reading of the articles shows that today, science – including that found in science magazines – is closely related to politics, economics and the debate over the freedom to practice communicate. The very mechanisms of communication between scientists were changed as a result of this debate, as can be seen from the signing of the Denver Declaration in February 2003, which brought about the preventative self-censorship of publication of biomedical research findings.


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