Selection of Justices and Judges

The Oklahoma State Constitution ◽

10.1093/oso/9780197514818.003.0012 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 141-146

Author(s):

Danny M. Adkison ◽

Lisa McNair Palmer

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

The State ◽

Chief Justice ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

Selection Of

This chapter highlights Article VII-B of the Oklahoma constitution, which concerns the selection of justices and judges. Section 1 states that “the provisions of this Article shall govern the selection and tenure of all Justices of the Supreme Court and Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma.” Section 2 sets forth the procedure for a judicial officer to run for unlimited additional terms of office. The provision in Section 3 creates a Judicial Nominating Commission, which possesses jurisdiction to determine whether the nominees for judicial office meet applicable requirements, and to determine the existence of vacancies on the commission. In the event of a judicial vacancy, Section 4 instructs the Judicial Nominating Commission to submit the names of three nominees to the governor and the chief justice of the supreme court. Section 5 sets forth the specific parameters of judicial terms of office. In an attempt to prohibit political partiality by judges, Section 6 prohibits judges from making contributions to, or holding office in, a political entity. Lastly, Section 7 concerns the effective date of Article VII-B.

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Swineherds and Hogs on Ice: Leadership Impacts for State Chief Judges

American Politics Research ◽

10.1177/1532673x21989019 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1532673X2198901

Author(s):

Thomas Gray ◽

Banks Miller

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

Political Leadership ◽

State Level ◽

The State ◽

Random Chance ◽

Chief Justice ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

Better Than

Chief judges stand as visible leaders of their courts. Analyses of the Supreme Court focus on the role of the chief justice as an institution-builder seeking out public-facing consensus to protect Court legitimacy. Studying the powers of chief judges and political leadership in general is difficult. Analyzing all 50 states over 16 years we find no evidence that the identity of chief judges explains consensus behavior any better than random chance. This is true even among the subset of chief judges with additional institutional powers like opinion assignment. We show that court structures explain consensus, while leader features do not. Being chief judge correlates with an elevated likelihood of being in the majority, particularly in cases decided by one vote. These results add to our understanding of leadership on courts and imply that the office of chief judge at the state level is more symbolic than uniquely powerful.

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Explaining the Selection and Rejection of Harriet Miers: George W. Bush, Political Symbolism, and the Highpoint of Conservatism

American Review of Politics ◽

10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2008.29.0.253-270 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 29 ◽

pp. 253-270 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Kevin J. McMahon

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

The Other ◽

White House ◽

Chief Justice ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

Political Symbolism ◽

The Right ◽

President Bush ◽

Selection Of

Following the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist in the summer of 2005, President George W. Bush appeared to be in alliance with conservatives in his desire to fill the two vacancies with strong ideologues who would push the Supreme Court to the right. However, after pleasing conservatives with his selection of John Roberts for one of the vacancies, President Bush angered many of his ideological brethren by choosing White House counsel Harriet Miers for the other. This article considers why the president decided on Miers and why her selection upset so many conservatives. It concludes by suggesting that Miers’s forced withdrawal represented a highpoint in the conservative effort to transform the Court.

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Judicial Elections and Partisan Endorsement of Judicial Candidates in Minnesota

American Political Science Review ◽

10.2307/1947855 ◽

1941 ◽

Vol 35 (1) ◽

pp. 69-75 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Malcolm C. Moos

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

The State ◽

Good Chance ◽

District Court ◽

District Courts ◽

Election Law ◽

Judicial Elections ◽

Chief Justice ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

Federal Judges

All judicial officers in the state of Minnesota, including the chief justice and six associate justices of the supreme court and fifty judges in the district courts, are required to be nominated and elected without partisan designation. Judicial nominations and elections were made nonpartisan by the election law of 1912. During a quarter of a century, the nonpartisan ballot has given Minnesota the services of an exceptionally well qualified bench, and sentiment is practically unanimous in favor of continuing this method of selecting judges.Once elevated to the bench, a Minnesota judge has a good chance of continuing in that capacity as long as he wishes to serve. Supreme court justices have been regularly reelected; so that their tenure has been, for all practical purposes, the same as that of federal judges. Three of the present members of the supreme court have been elected once, two have been elected twice, one three times, and one four times. With one exception, the supreme court justices since 1912 have retired from office by resignation or death.Of the eighty-four district court judges who have served since 1912, only four have been defeated at the polls when seeking reelection. At the present time, thirty-six of the state's fifty district court judges have been elected two or more times, and twenty-three have been elected three or more times.

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A Note on Mandela v Executors, Estate Nelson Mandela 2018 (4) SA 86 (SCA) and the Conundrum around the Customary Marriage between Nelson and Winnie Mandela

Southern African Public Law ◽

10.25159/2522-6800/4027 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 34 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Sipho Stephen Nkosi

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

The State ◽

The Other ◽

Customary Law ◽

Eastern Cape ◽

High Court ◽

Nelson Mandela ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

Court Of Appeal

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.

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The Right to Housing: Challenges Associated with the ‘Waiting List System’ Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality V Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 5 2014 3 SA 23 (SCA)

Southern African Public Law ◽

10.25159/2522-6800/3531 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 30 (1) ◽

pp. 112-121

Author(s):

Shamier Ebrahim

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

Waiting Lists ◽

The State ◽

Waiting List ◽

Allocation Process ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

The Right ◽

The Impact ◽

Court Of Appeal

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.

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PERSINGGUNGAN KEWENANGAN MENGADILI PENYALAHGUNAAN DISKRESI ANTARA PENGADILAN TUN DAN PENGADILAN TIPIKOR / INTERCEPTION OF JUSTICE AUTHORITY OF DISCRETION ABUSE BETWEEN ADMINISTRATION COURT AND CORRUPTION COURTS

JURNAL HUKUM DAN PERADILAN ◽

10.25216/jhp.7.2.2018.213-236 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 7 (2) ◽

pp. 213

Author(s):

Budi Suhariyanto

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

Criminal Law ◽

Administrative Law ◽

The State ◽

Government Officials ◽

Criminal Process ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

State Finance ◽

The Law ◽

To Receive

Diskresi sebagai wewenang bebas, keberadaannya rentan akan disalahgunakan. Penyalahgunaan diskresi yang berimplikasi merugikan keuangan negara dapat dituntutkan pertanggungjawabannya secara hukum administrasi maupun hukum pidana. Mengingat selama ini peraturan perundang-undangan tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi tidak merumuskan secara rinci yang dimaksudkan unsur menyalahgunakan kewenangan maka para hakim menggunakan konsep penyalahgunaan wewenang dari hukum administrasi. Problema muncul saat diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014 dimana telah memicu persinggungan dalam hal kewenangan mengadili penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) antara Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dengan Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Pada perkembangannya, persinggungan kewenangan mengadili tersebut ditegaskan oleh Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 4 Tahun 2015 bahwa PTUN berwenang menerima, memeriksa, dan memutus permohonan penilaian ada atau tidak ada penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) dalam Keputusan dan/atau Tindakan Pejabat Pemerintahan sebelum adanya proses pidana. Sehubungan tidak dijelaskan tentang definisi dan batasan proses pidana yang dimaksud, maka timbul penafsiran yang berbeda. Perlu diadakan kesepakatan bersama dan dituangkan dalam regulasi tentang tapal batas persinggungan yang jelas tanpa meniadakan kewenangan pengujian penyalahgunaan wewenang diskresi pada Pengadilan TUN.Discretion as free authority is vulnerable to being misused. The abuse of discretion implicating the state finance may be prosecuted by both administrative and criminal law. In view of the fact that the law on corruption eradication does not formulate in detail the intended element of authority abuse, the judges use the concept of authority abuse from administrative law. Problems arise when the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 triggered an interception in terms of justice/ adjudicate authority on authority abuse (including discretion) between the Administrative Court and Corruption Court. In its development, the interception of justice authority is affirmed by Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2015 that the Administrative Court has the authority to receive, examine and decide upon the appeal there is or there is no misuse of authority in the Decision and / or Action of Government Officials prior to the criminal process. That is, shortly before the commencement of the criminal process then that's when the authority of PTUN decides to judge the misuse of authority over the case. In this context, Perma No. 4 of 2015 has imposed restrictions on the authority of the TUN Court in prosecuting the abuse of discretionary authority.

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