Empirical Cases

2021 ◽  
pp. 81-93
Author(s):  
Stephen E. Gent ◽  
Mark J. C. Crescenzi
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Rare Earth ◽  
Rare Earth Elements ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Commodity Markets ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Territorial Expansion ◽  
Significant Control ◽  
Gas Market ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter discusses the selection of the case studies for the book: Iraq and the oil market, Russia and the natural gas market, and China and the rare earth elements market. These cases provide useful plausibility probes for the authors’ theory of market power politics. First, these cases involve competition in key commodity markets in which states could potentially have the opportunity and willingness to pursue a market power opportunity though territorial expansion. Second, since these states have had significant control over their firms in these commodity markets, one can isolate the mechanism by which market power motivations influence foreign policy decisions. Finally, these cases include incidents of both violence and strategic delay, which provides variation on the dependent variable.

Market Power Politics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen E. Gent ◽  
Mark J.C. Crescenzi
Keyword(s):  
Natural Gas ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Global Market ◽  
Export Market ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Territorial Aggression ◽  
Oil Export ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
Gas Market ◽  
Political Leverage

This book explores how market power competition between states can create disruptions in the global political economy and potentially lead to territorial aggression and war. When a state’s firms have the ability to set prices in a key commodity market like oil or natural gas, state leaders can benefit from increased revenue, stability, and political leverage. Given these potential benefits, states may be motivated to expand their territorial reach in order to gain or maintain such market power. This market power motivation can sometimes lead to war. However, when states are economically interdependent, they may be constrained from using force to achieve their market power goals. This can open up an opportunity for institutional settlements. However, in some cases, institutional rules and procedures can preclude states from reaching a settlement in line with their market power ambitions. When this happens, states may opt for strategic delay and try to gradually accumulate market power over time through salami tactics. To explore how these dynamics play out empirically, the authors examine three cases of market power competition in hard commodity markets: Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait to seize market power in the oil export market, Russia’s territorial encroachment into Georgia and Ukraine to preserve and expand its market power in the natural gas market, and China’s ongoing use of strategic delay and gray zone tactics in the South and East China Seas to maintain its dominant position in the global market for rare earth elements.

Screening and selection of technologically applicable microorganisms for recovery of rare earth elements from fluorescent powder

2018 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 554-563 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefanie Hopfe ◽  
Silke Konsulke ◽  
Robert Barthen ◽  
Falk Lehmann ◽  
Sabine Kutschke ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Rare Earth ◽  
Rare Earth Elements ◽  
Fluorescent Powder ◽  
Selection Of

Use of X-ray Fluorescence Analysis for the Determination of Rare Earth Elements

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rainer Schramm
Keyword(s):  
Rare Earth ◽  
Rare Earth Elements ◽  
Fluorescence Analysis ◽  
Solid Material ◽  
Spectral Lines ◽  
Energy Dispersive ◽  
X Ray ◽  
Reference Samples ◽  
Selection Of

AbstractX-ray fluorescence spectrometry (XRF) is a powerful tool for the analysis of solid material. That is the reason why the technique was applied for the determination of rare earth elements (REEs) since about 1970. At present, energy-dispersive XRF and wavelength-dispersive XRF are used for the analysis of pressed powder pellets or fused Li-borate beads containing REEs. The production of reliable results can only be achieved by careful optimization of the parameter, in particular the selection of spectral lines. The quantification is based on a calibration realized by using reference samples.

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Stephen E. Gent ◽  
Mark J. C. Crescenzi
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Economic Interdependence ◽  
Gray Zone ◽  
Research Project ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Territorial Expansion ◽  
Territorial Integrity ◽  
The Face

This introductory chapter provides an overview of this study of market power politics. Two main puzzles drive this research. First, why do some states continue to pursue policies of territorial expansion in the face of widely accepted norms of territorial integrity and increased interconnectedness in the global economy? Second, why do these states sometimes turn to strategic delay and gray zone tactics, rather than war or institutional settlements, to achieve their expansionist goals? To answer these puzzles, the chapter introduces a theory of market power politics. According to this theory, the desire to gain market power motivates states to expand their territorial reach, while the presence of economic interdependence and international instructions can constrain states from taking aggressive steps in pursuit of these goals. After discussing some contributions of the research project, the chapter concludes with an outline of the book.

Russia

2021 ◽  
pp. 125-169
Author(s):  
Stephen E. Gent ◽  
Mark J. C. Crescenzi
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Price Setting ◽  
Gray Zone ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Territorial Expansion ◽  
Russian State ◽  
Gas Market ◽  
High Level ◽  
Political Leverage

This chapter examines how Russia’s pursuit of territorial expansion and gray zone tactics in Georgia and Ukraine can be seen as part of its overall strategy to preserve and expand its market power in the natural gas market. As the predominant gas supplier to many European countries, Russia’s state-owned gas company, Gazprom, has price-setting capabilities that the Russian state can exploit to extract rents and exert political leverage internationally. As part of its overall strategy to block potential competitors and secure its control over the transit of gas to European consumers, Russia has perpetuated territorial disputes with neighboring Georgia and Ukraine. Given its high level of economic interdependence with the European Union, Russia has largely refrained from escalating these disputes militarily and has instead relied upon strategic delay to achieve its market power goals.

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