End of the Surge

Author(s):  
Carter Malkasian

Chapter Fourteen, “End of the Surge,” describes how the United States decided to end the surge, covering the death of Osama bin Laden, debates in Washington, and relations with Pakistan. It also describes the peace negotiations of 2010–2013.

2008 ◽  
Vol 36 (105) ◽  
pp. 40-51
Author(s):  
Osama Bin Laden

To the Americans:In this letter from 2002 Osama Bin Laden replies to unidentified American writers explaining why al-Qaeda is justified in attacking North American targets. The letter poses two questions: What are we fighting for? and What are we calling you to do, and what do we want from you? According to Bin Laden al-Qaeda is engaged in a fight responding to decades of Western aggression. Bin Laden presents a detailed account of the misdeeds that the United States are responsible for in the Middle East and in Afghanistan. The letter also denounces North American society as characterised by usury, debauchery, gambling, prostitution and environmental destruction. Finally Bin Laden provides the reader with a series of examples connected to the ‘war on terror’ where the United States does not live up to its own rhetoric: the detention of prisoners at Guantanamo, the suspension of civil liberties in the Patriot Act and the rejection of the Kyoto Accords.


Author(s):  
Hans G. Kippenberg

An instruction manual consisting of four sheets in Arabic was found with three of the four teams that performed the terror attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. The writing conceived of the action as a raid (ghazwa), as we know it from early Islamic history. It instructed the teams how to perform the ghazwa correctly. Purifying their intentions by recitals, rituals, and bodily cleaning, they turn their attack into an act of worship. A part called the “second stage” anticipates the issue of assuring divine protection at the airport. Finally “a third stage” urges the teams to act in the plane according the practice of the Prophet and to achieve martyrdom. To understand the manual and its framing of the violence, six dimensions will be analyzed: (1) Arguments for and against the authenticity of the document are discussed. (2) The attack happened in the wake of a declaration of war by the “World Islamic Front for the Jihad against Jews and Crusaders” in 1998, signed by Osama bin Laden and leaders of other jihadist groups. (3) The message spread across the Internet and was accepted by various groups that regarded the situation of Islam as threatened, among them a group of young Muslim men in Hamburg. A network called al-Qaeda emerged. (4) The present world is dominated by the power of ignorance and hubris (jahiliyya). The manual prescribed an attack in terms of the raids (ghazwa) of the Prophet in Medina. (5) The manual presumes a particular communal form of organizing militant Muslims. (6) It celebrated militancy of Muslims and presupposed a fighter’s ethos in the diaspora. An argument is made that the American concept of terrorism as a manifestation of evil and immorality destined to be eradicated militarily by the United States and their allies ignores the secular character of conflict and accelerates the cycle of violence.


2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 518-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arvid Bell

Resistance to negotiation and the continuation of violence dictate the course of events in the Afghanistan conflict. However, several studies have thoroughly explored the interests of the main parties to the conflict and a settlement that respects their key demands is possible. The current military situation resembles a “hurting stalemate,” which according to rationalist assumptions should compel the parties to move toward negotiations. This article argues that the main obstacle to negotiation is an underlying and unaddressed conflict of recognition between the United States, the Afghan government, and the Taliban. While each party believes it is driven by justice claims, they perceive their opponents to be driven by a hostile strategy informed by incompatible interests. Relying on the Cultural Theory of International Relations, this article explores the parties’ motives in the conflict, focusing on the need to strive for esteem and honor. It suggests that the reciprocal acknowledgement of legitimate identity-related justice claims could remove a key obstacle to formal negotiation.


Author(s):  
Daniel Byman

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the entire world was introduced to Al Qaeda and its enigmatic leader, Osama bin Laden. But the organization that changed the face of terrorism forever and unleashed a whirlwind of counterterrorism activity and two major wars had been on the scene long before that eventful morning. In Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know, Daniel L. Byman, an eminent scholar of Middle East terrorism and international security who served on the 9/11 Commission, provides a sharp and concise overview of Al Qaeda, from its humble origins in the mountains of Afghanistan to the present, explaining its perseverance and adaptation since 9/11 and the limits of U.S. and allied counterterrorism efforts. The organization that would come to be known as Al Qaeda traces its roots to the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Founded as the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Al Qaeda achieved a degree of international notoriety with a series of spectacular attacks in the 1990s; however, it was the dramatic assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11 that truly launched Al Qaeda onto the global stage. The attacks endowed the organization with world-historical importance and provoked an overwhelming counterattack by the United States and other western countries. Within a year of 9/11, the core of Al Qaeda had been chased out of Afghanistan and into a variety of refuges across the Muslim world. Splinter groups and franchised offshoots were active in the 2000s in countries like Pakistan, Iraq, and Yemen, but by early 2011, after more than a decade of relentless counterterrorism efforts by the United States and other Western military and intelligence services, most felt that Al Qaeda's moment had passed. With the death of Osama bin Laden in May of that year, many predicted that Al Qaeda was in its death throes. Shockingly, Al Qaeda has staged a remarkable comeback in the last few years. In almost every conflict in the Muslim world, from portions of the Xanjing region in northwest China to the African subcontinent, Al Qaeda franchises or like-minded groups have played a role. Al Qaeda's extreme Salafist ideology continues to appeal to radicalized Sunni Muslims throughout the world, and it has successfully altered its organizational structure so that it can both weather America's enduring full-spectrum assault and tailor its message to specific audiences. Authoritative and highly readable, Byman's account offers readers insightful and penetrating answers to the fundamental questions about Al Qaeda: who they are, where they came from, where they're going-and, perhaps most critically-what we can do about it.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-145
Author(s):  
Siti Fatimah ◽  
Yanuardi Syukur

After the death of Osama Bin Laden and the declaration of the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Al-Qaeda movement changed from being aggressive to being passive. The aggressiveness of the Al-Qaeda movement, for instance, was seen during the spectacular terror of 9/11, which was then followed by various actions carried out by followers in various parts of the world. However, Bin Laden's death and the rise of the ISIS group made Al-Qaeda look passive. This paper seeks to see the history of the Al-Qaeda movement to the dynamics that influence the movement’s choices. The author found that changing Al-Qaeda's orientation from aggressive to passive did not deny the existence of a consolidated movement that deliberately distanced itself from the anti-terrorism campaign carried out by the United States.


2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsten Schmalenbach

The destruction of the World Trade Center and a wing of the Pentagon by three highjacked civilian airliners and the crash of a fourth in Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001 constitute without a doubt the high point of terrorist attacks on the United States to date. The terrorists’ methods, their destructive force and the attacks’ economic and political effects are all without precedent. After September 11, the organisation responsible was quickly identified, namely a terrorist group based in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, headed by a Saudi expatriate, Osama bin Laden. After a request for his extradition was denied by the ruling Taliban, the United States and the United Kingdom conducted airstrikes against targets in Afghanistan beginning on October 7. As soon as late November 2001, the Taliban's fate was sealed. The uninterrupted bombardment of the US Air Force helped the Northern Alliance gain decisive ground in its campaign against the regime. On December 15, 2001, the various Afghan opposition groups signed a treaty on the Petersberg near Bonn, Germany, that established an interim government. The government's establishment put an end to the Taliban's rule, but it did not put an end to international terrorism with its various goals and interwoven structures.


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 47-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Cerone

In assessing the legality of the killing of Osama bin Laden one is reminded of a saying about the situation in Lebanon. If you think you understand it, it has not been properly explained to you.Of course, one major obstacle is that we do not have all the facts. However, we also do not have all the law.The complexity of analyzing the legality of the killing begins with the threshold issue of applicable law. Is the conduct to be analyzed according to domestic law or international law? If domestic law, then which country’s domestic laws are applicable? Certainly that of the United States and Pakistan would be applicable. Saudi law might also apply (e.g., on the basis of nationality), in addition to the laws of those countries that have another basis under their domestic law for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction (e.g., on the universality principle).


2020 ◽  
pp. 99-109
Author(s):  
Farid Shafiyev ◽  
Vasif Huseynov

The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict resolution process had experienced insurmountable deadlock due to the failure of the peace negotiations brokered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, co-chaired by Russia, France, and the United States since the mid-1990s. The so-called Velvet Revolution of Armenia in 2018 was unable to deliver any progress, although a breakthrough was expected of, and promised by, the new leadership of the country. This, coupled with the constant provocations of the military and political leaders of Armenia, aggravated the conflict and led to the outbreak of an almost full-scale war on September 27, 2020. The war changed the status quo and created an environment for the negotiated resolution of the conflict following the establishment of a humanitarian ceasefire in Moscow. Armenia’s subsequent violations of the ceasefire regime by targeting Azerbaijani civilians have, however, demonstrated that peace is likely to remain an inaccessible dream of the region’s people in the short to medium term.


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