The Castle of Lead

2021 ◽  
pp. 199-208
Author(s):  
William Klinger ◽  
Denis Kuljiš

This chapter mentions Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied commander of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, who was sent by Winston Churchill to find out Marshal Tito's intentions in Italy. It details how Tito showed Alexander the dispositions on the stationary Stem Front while concealing his far-reaching initiative on both sides of the Adriatic. It also explains Alexander's requirement for a land corridor for advancing from Trieste to Vienna, suggesting Anglo-American occupation of all the areas west of the Italian–Yugoslav prewar border. The chapter analyzes Tito's offer that Churchill's army may use the Ljubljana Gate passing across Yugoslav territory, but in return he wanted his own occupation zone in Austria. It describes Tito as someone who was hard to out-bluff as he was never impressed with force unless an imminent threat was involved.

Balcanica ◽  
2015 ◽  
pp. 273-314
Author(s):  
Slobodan Markovich

The paper deals with Western (Anglo-American) views on the Sarajevo assassination/attentat and Gavrilo Princip. Articles on the assassination and Princip in two leading quality dailies (The Times and The New York Times) have particularly been analysed as well as the views of leading historians and journalists who covered the subject including: R. G. D. Laffan, R. W. Seton-Watson, Winston Churchill, Sidney Fay, Bernadotte Schmitt, Rebecca West, A. J. P. Taylor, Vladimir Dedijer, Christopher Clark and Tim Butcher. In the West, the original general condemnation of the assassination and its main culprits was challenged when Rebecca West published her famous travelogue on Yugoslavia in 1941. Another Brit, the remarkable historian A. J. P. Taylor, had a much more positive view on the Sarajevo conspirators and blamed Germany and Austria-Hungary for the outbreak of the Great War. A turning point in Anglo-American perceptions was the publication of Vladimir Dedijer?s monumental book The Road to Sarajevo (1966), which humanised the main conspirators, a process initiated by R. West. Dedijer?s book was translated from English into all major Western languages and had an immediate impact on the understanding of the Sarajevo assassination. The rise of national antagonisms in Bosnia gradually alienated Princip from Bosnian Muslims and Croats, a process that began in the 1980s and was completed during the wars of the Yugoslav succession. Although all available sources clearly show that Princip, an ethnic Serb, gradually developed a broader Serbo-Croat and Yugoslav identity, he was ethnified and seen exclusively as a Serb by Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks and Western journalists in the 1990s. In the past century imagining Princip in Serbia and the West involved a whole spectrum of views. In interwar Anglo-American perceptions he was a fanatic and lunatic. He became humanised by Rebecca West (1941), A. J. P. Taylor showed understanding for his act (1956), he was fully explained by Dedijer (1966), challenged and then exonerated by Cristopher Clark (2012-13), and cordially embraced by Tim Butcher (2014).


Author(s):  
Charlie Laderman

The destruction of the Armenian community in the Ottoman Empire was an unprecedented tragedy. Theodore Roosevelt was adamant that it was the “greatest crime” of the First World War. The mass killing of approximately one million Armenian Christians was the culmination of a series of massacres that Winston Churchill would recall had roused publics on both sides of the Atlantic and inspired fervent appeals to see the Armenians “righted.” This book explains why the Armenian struggle for survival became so entangled with the debate over the United States’ international role as it rose to world power at the turn of the twentieth century. In doing so, it provides a fresh perspective on the role of humanitarian intervention in US foreign policy, Anglo-American relations and the emergence of a new international order after World War One. The clash over the US responsibility to protect the Armenians encapsulated the nation’s conflict over its global position and was a central preoccupation of both Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. For American and British leaders, a US intervention in the Near East to secure an independent Armenia was key to establishing a revised international system and to their visions for the new League of Nations. The debate over safeguarding the Armenians reveals the values that animated American society during a pivotal period in its history. In forcing US politicians to grapple for the first time with atrocities on this scale, it also demonstrates dilemmas in humanitarian politics that continue to bedevil policymakers today.


1967 ◽  
Vol 15 (59) ◽  
pp. 256-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan J. Ward

In the literature of the Irish independence movement the question of a federal settlement involving the United Kingdom, and possibly the whole empire, in a grand scheme of ‘devolution’ has received relatively little attention. However, the papers of Moreton Frewen (1853–1924), now lodged in the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., should add a great deal to any assessment of this aspect of the Irish Problem.Frewen was a member of the Anglo-Irish gentry with business interests in America. He married a daughter of Leonard Jerome of New York, and was therefore an uncle of both Winston Churchill and Shane Leslie, both of whom had mothers who were Jeromes. Furthermore, his brother’s daughter became the second wife of Sir Edward Carson, and in addition to these family associations he was acquainted with the most prominent men of his generation on both sides of the Atlantic. His life was actually a series of business and political failures, but his papers hold the key to a fascinating chapter in the search for a federal solution to Ireland’s political problems, and most of what follows is based upon those papers.


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