Private Securities Litigation

2021 ◽  
pp. 163-210
Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg

This chapter focuses on the erratic and unacceptable private securities litigation framework that prevails in the United States. The litigation structure contained in the federal securities acts was based on a different era and is not suitable for today’s securities markets. Although federal legislation has been enacted to address perceived shortcomings on an episodic basis, significant gaps and inconsistencies exist. Likewise, the federal courts, faced with a fractured statutory regimen, frequently have construed the remedial provisions in a wooden and unduly restrictive manner. The consequence of these congressional and judicial actions is a disparate liability framework that lacks sound logic, consistency, and even-handed treatment for plaintiffs and defendants alike. This chapter provides several examples of the inconsistencies and disparate treatment that prevail under the federal securities laws. Thereafter, recommendations for corrective measures are proffered. These proposals, if adopted and effectively implemented, should instill a substantially greater degree of certainty, uniformity, and equity than currently exists.

1994 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Sherron de Hart

“ERA Won't Go Away!” The words were chanted at rallies and unfurled on banners at countless marches as the deadline—June 30, 1982—approached for ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. To include in the Constitution the principle of equality of rights for women, supporters insisted, was an essential of republican government in a democratic society. Congress had shared that perception in 1972, passing a series of measures aimed at strengthening and expanding federal legislation banning discrimination on the basis of sex. Included was a constitutional amendment simply stating that “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of sex.” Thirty-five of the thirty-eight states necessary for a three-fourths majority needed to amend the Constitution had given their approval.


2007 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie Vanneman

Basil Chapman retired from ACF Industries, a railroad-car maker, after thirty-eight years of service. In December 2003, he received an unexpected phone call at his West Virginia home from a union representative, who informed him that an ACF executive wanted to speak with him. When they spoke, the executive informed Mr. Chapman that ACF was planning on changing its retirees’ health coverage plan. The ACF plan would now have a lifetime maximum benefit cap on hospital and surgical expenses for each participant and would require retirees to make monthly contributions. According to court papers filed later, Mr. Chapman responded, “We have a contract. You can’t do that.” Then, he said that he would “file in federal court” against ACF. The next business day, ACF filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri asking the court to rule that retiree benefits were not vested and that ACF accordingly could alter benefits unilaterally. On January 26, 2004, Mr. Chapman, other named plaintiffs, and their union sued ACF in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia.


2021 ◽  
Vol 196 ◽  
pp. 678-708

678Arbitration — Arbitration award — International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) — ICSID Convention, 1965 — Article 54 — Enforcement proceedings — Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act 1966 giving ICSID Convention domestic effect in United StatesJurisdiction — Subject matter jurisdiction over enforcement of an ICSID Award — Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 — Act of State doctrine — Foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine — Whether act of State doctrine or foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine barring enforcement of an ICSID AwardState immunity — Jurisdiction — Petition to enforce arbitration award — Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 — Exceptions to sovereign immunity — Arbitration exception — Romania’s agreement to arbitrate — Whether Romania’s agreement to arbitrate nullified by Romania’s accession to European Union — Whether United States court having jurisdiction to enforce arbitration awardTreaties — ICSID Convention, 1965 — Sweden–Romania Bilateral Investment Treaty, 2002 — Romania’s agreement to arbitrate — Romania acceding to European Union in 2007 — Whether Romania’s agreement to arbitrate nullified by Romania’s accession to European Union — Whether United States court having jurisdiction to enforce arbitration awardRelationship of international law and municipal law — Treaties — ICSID Convention, 1965 — Obligations of the State under ICSID Convention — United States law — Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act 1966 — Section 3 — Jurisdiction of federal courts to enforce an ICSID award whilst award subject of review by a foreign sovereign — The law of the United States


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 934-936 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary N. McAbee

Many medical and legal commentators have expressed concern about the validity of scientific evidence that is proffered by expert witnesses at depositions and in courts of law.1,2 The sparse research that is available on the testimony of medical expert witnesses suggests that it is frequently flawed and erroneous.3 On June 28, 1993, the United States (US) Supreme Court ruled on the proper standard for admissibility of scientific evidence in the courtroom.4 Although the ruling establishes guidelines that are binding only in federal courts, it is expected that many state courts will follow the Court's ruling. This commentary reviews the Court's guidelines for admissibility of expert testimony, and expresses concern about their applicability in future cases involving scientific testimony.


Author(s):  
Julius Henry Cohen ◽  
Kenneth Dayton

This article focuses on the federal arbitration law. On February 12, 1925, President Calvin Coolidge signed the United States Arbitration Law, which became effective on January 1, 1926. This act reversed the hoary doctrine that agreements for arbitration are revocable at will and are unenforceable, and in the language of the statute itself, they are made “valid, enforceable and irrevocable” within the limits of federal jurisdiction. There are three evils which arbitration is intended to correct: (1) the long delay usually incident to a proceeding at law, in equity or in admiralty, especially in recent years in centers of commercial activity, where there has arisen great congestion of the court calendars; (2) the expense of litigation; and (3) the failure, through litigation, to reach a decision regarded as just when measured by the standards of the business world. The article then argues that the proposed law rests upon the constitutional provision by which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior federal courts. It also contends that sound public policy demands specific enforcement of arbitration agreements by the law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 55-60
Author(s):  
Martha Gershun ◽  
John D. Lantos

This chapter seeks to understand the motivations of people who offered to donate a kidney to a stranger. It explores the degree of emotional relationship that was essential to justify the claim that donation provided a psychological benefit to the donor. The chapter also mentions a law in the United Kingdom called the Unrelated Live Transplant Registry Authority which required organ donors to provide proof that they had a relationship with the recipient. In the United States, however, there is no federal legislation or public policy regulating stranger donors. The chapter then turns to discuss a study led by nephrologist Aaron Spital showing how attitudes within the transplant community gradually shifted from almost universal rejection of stranger donors to their gradual acceptance. It assesses the struggles that nephrologists went through in trying to determine whether such altruists were noble or irrational. Ultimately, the chapter offers a unique glimpse into the motivations of an altruistic donor and into the forms of skepticism that doctors and psychologists bring to evaluations of such donors.


1985 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wythe Holt

What is a ‘federal question’? Section two of article three of the Constitution grants jurisdiction to federal courts over, among other items, ‘all cases in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made … under their authority’. This has become generally known as the grant of ‘federal question’ jurisdiction. The present statute giving such jurisdiction to federal courts dates only from 1875; not only has it been restrictively construed, but existing federal schemes of benefits, rights, and regulations provide us with a familiar, pat, confining notion of the nature of federal questions. What sorts of matters might have been expected to constitute federal questions in 1787, when the Constitution was written, and when such schemes were not contemplated much less established?


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