Ius In Bello IV

2021 ◽  
pp. 171-186
Author(s):  
Arthur Ripstein

Contemporary armed conflict no longer consists of wars with designated armed forces confronting each other to gain or hold political control of territory. This short chapter explains why the Kantian account of the in bello norms still applies, in particular, clarifying the way in which they reflect the distinctive moral problem of war. Misconceived instrumentalist accounts of the normative basis of the in bello rules create the impression that changed circumstances should generate different rules. Three issues are considered: war between enemies that deny each other’s legitimacy; combatants with uniforms; and wars against adversaries who reject the laws and customs of war. In each case, the Kantian account is shown to apply.

Author(s):  
Anita Isaacs ◽  
Rachel A. Schwartz

Since the mid-20th century, the Guatemalan military has played a prominent role in the country’s political life. Yet, this was not always the case. During Guatemala’s first century of independence, the armed forces operated largely as the pawn of personalist rulers and oligarchic elites, utilizing coercion to quell labor unrest and impose order in the countryside. Developments during the Cold War era, however, transformed the Guatemalan military into a centralized source of political and economic power and the key protagonist in domestic politics. Following World War II and on the heels of popular uprising, nationalist junior army officers ushered in a series of popular reforms, which included land redistribution. A 1954 CIA-orchestrated coup supported by the Guatemalan oligarchy and reactionary military factions toppled Guatemala’s “Democratic Spring,” reversed the reforms, and paved the way for four decades of hardline military rule. The subsequent rise of a leftist insurgent movement and the outbreak of armed conflict (1960–1996) gave the armed forces a pretext to dramatically expand their power. They consolidated formal political control over the Guatemalan state and pursued a counterinsurgent campaign, which escalated into genocidal violence in the predominantly Mayan indigenous highlands. Pulled between the political protagonism of civil war and the subordination to civilian rule required in liberal democracy, the Guatemalan military struggled to redefine its institutional identity with the end of armed conflict. It lurched reluctantly toward peace and democracy following a split in its ranks between a moderate institutionalist faction and right-wing groups wary of ceding political control. Despite peace accord provisions to reduce the military’s size and budget and to confine its institutional activities to external defense, military officials, particularly those from intelligence, continued to wield extraordinary control in the postwar era. Challenging the strictures of peace and democracy, they have fought to maintain key interests, notably impunity for war crimes, political decision-making influence, and wartime sources of illicit enrichment.


Author(s):  
Ian Park

The introduction sets out the broad questions to be addressed, namely: do states have right to life obligations during armed conflict; if so, what are these obligations; when do they apply, and in respect of whom; and how can states best ensure compliance with these obligations? The introduction also provides a précis of each chapter and the themes explored therein. Additionally, it makes reference to the fact that UK armed forces doctrine and procedures in respect of recent armed conflicts will be used as examples to explore the issues under consideration in the book. The aim is also to proffer a view on where the current UK procedures do not comply with the state’s right to life obligations and how this can be rectified.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oscar V. Bautista-Cespedes ◽  
Louise Willemen ◽  
Augusto Castro-Nunez ◽  
Thomas A. Groen

AbstractThe Amazon rainforest covers roughly 40% of Colombia’s territory and has important global ecological functions. For more than 50 years, an internal war in the country has shaped this region. Peace negotiations between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) initiated in 2012 resulted in a progressive de-escalation of violence and a complete ceasefire in 2016. This study explores the role of different deforestation drivers including armed conflict variables, in explaining deforestation for three periods between 2001 and 2015. Iterative regression analyses were carried out for two spatial extents: the entire Colombian Amazon and a subset area which was most affected by deforestation. The results show that conflict variables have positive relationships with deforestation; yet, they are not among the main variables explaining deforestation. Accessibility and biophysical variables explain more variation. Nevertheless, conflict variables show divergent influence on deforestation depending on the period and scale of analysis. Based on these results, we develop deforestation risk maps to inform the design of forest conservation efforts in the post-conflict period.


Author(s):  
Joseph Soeters

Organizational cultures in military organizations consist of symbols, practices, habits, hidden assumptions, and beliefs about what needs to be done, and what is appropriate and what is not, before, during, and after operations. Generally speaking, organizational cultures in military institutions are similar to those in any other work organization. Upon closer examination, however, it appears that the military’s 24/7, communal life outside society, its emphasis on hierarchy and discipline, and in particular its license to use large-scale force make it different. Relatedly, the way in which the military’s organizational cultures are created and recreated has aspects and emphases that are less common in conventional work organizations. Recruiting and socialization patterns of new organizational members in the military have been studied frequently because they are so distinctive in the armed forces. Military organizational cultures are not identical worldwide. Military organizations differ internationally, as military organizations are still strongly connected to their national backgrounds, including the languages, legal regimes, political atmospheres, and general ways of living in the many nations across the globe. National societies and their histories shape military organizational cultures in multiple ways. Dramatic experiences at the national level, for instance during World War II, may lead to a continuation or, just the opposite, the disruption of armed forces’ organizational cultures. Yet despite the differences, something of a world culture impacting on the use of force seems to emerge as well. In an era when international alliances carry out most missions, different national backgrounds influence strategic decision making and the way operations are conducted. Most of the time, national armed forces operate separately, in their own area (or time) of operations, sometimes guiding troops from smaller and less wealthy partnering nations. The coordination of actions between the various areas of operation is generally not very well elaborated. This applies not only to combat operations but also to peace missions. A full integration of national armed forces, such as in a United Nations security force or a European army, is an ideal that some may dream of, but it is still far from reality. The greatest degree of integration is likely to be found in international headquarters.


1991 ◽  
Vol 31 (284) ◽  
pp. 483-490
Author(s):  
Rémi Russbach ◽  
Robin Charles Gray ◽  
Robin Michael Coupland

The surgical activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross stem from the institution's general mandate to protect and assist the victims of armed conflict.The war wounded are thus only one category of the victims included in the ICRC's terms of reference.The ICRC's main role in relation to the war wounded is not to treat them, for this is primarily the responsibility of the governments involved in the conflict and hence their army medical services. The task of the ICRC is first and foremost to ensure that the belligerents are familiar with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and apply them, that is, care for members of the enemy armed forces as well as their own and afford medical establishments and personnel the protection to which they are entitled.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Dunkley

PurposeThis paper examines the implications, for States Parties, of the 1954 Convention safeguarding regime in the context of contemporary non-international armed conflict and ANSAs, with a general focus on the Middle East and in situ cultural property.Design/methodology/approachAs the nature of conflict changes and armed forces become further engaged in supporting peacekeeping operations and deliver training to host nation security forces, and human security becomes an increasingly important function of military operations, the protection of cultural heritage (as an expression of a people's identity) becomes a significant contribution to individual operations.FindingsInternational obligations to States Parties for the in situ protection of cultural heritage, under both International Humanitarian Law and HC54, become an ever increasing important responsibility for armed forces to help deliver.Research limitations/implicationsWhile NATO is increasingly focussed on the defence of western states parties from threats posed by the Russian Federation, and observing a commercially and military assertive China, a recent report issued by the Pentagon noted that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is regrouping in Iraq faster than in Syria and could regain territory in six to twelve months in the absence of sustained military pressure.Practical implicationsPreservation in situ is used by heritage professionals to refer to the protection of a cultural heritage asset in its original location while the in situ protection of cultural property is a cornerstone topic of the 1954 Hague Convention Special Protection category. The Convention was drafted with international armed conflict in mind but the initial signatories to the Convention had sufficient foresight to consider non-international armed conflict and its potential effect on in situ cultural property by parties to the conflict, including Armed Non-State Actors (ANSA)Social implicationsUN Security Council Resolution 2449 (December 2018) recognized the negative impact of the presence, violent extremist ideology and actions on stability in Syria and the region of both Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Al-Nusrah Front (ANF). This includes not only the devastating humanitarian impact on civilian populations but also the unlawful destruction of cultural heritage.Originality/valueANSAs comprise individuals and groups that are wholly or partly independent of State governments and which threaten or use violence to achieve their goals, such as Islamic State. As such, the military operating environment has changed since 1954.


This volume asks a question that is deceptive in its simplicity: Could international law have been otherwise? In other words, what were the past possibilities, if any, for a different law? The search for contingency in international law is often motivated, including in the present volume, by the refusal to accept the present state of affairs and by the hope that recovering possibilities of the past will facilitate a different future. The volume situates the search for contingency theoretically and within many fields of international law, such as human rights and armed conflict, migrants and refugees, the sea and natural resources, and foreign investment and trade. Today there is hardly a serious account that would consider the path of international law to be necessary and that would deny the possibility of a different law altogether. At the same time, however, behind every possibility of the past stands a reason – or reasons – why the law developed as it did. Those who embark in search of contingency soon encounter tensions when they want to recover past possibilities without downplaying patterns of determination and domination. Nevertheless, while warring critical sensibilities may point in different directions, only a keen sense of why things turned out the way they did makes it possible to argue about how they could plausibly have turned out differently.


2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (886) ◽  
pp. 533-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cordula Droege

AbstractCyber warfare figures prominently on the agenda of policymakers and military leaders around the world. New units to ensure cyber security are created at various levels of government, including in the armed forces. But cyber operations in armed conflict situations could have potentially very serious consequences, in particular when their effect is not limited to the data of the targeted computer system or computer. Indeed, cyber operations are usually intended to have an effect in the ‘real world’. For instance, by tampering with the supporting computer systems, one can manipulate an enemy's air traffic control systems, oil pipeline flow systems, or nuclear plants. The potential humanitarian impact of some cyber operations on the civilian population is enormous. It is therefore important to discuss the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) that govern such operations because one of the main objectives of this body of law is to protect the civilian population from the effects of warfare. This article seeks to address some of the questions that arise when applying IHL – a body of law that was drafted with traditional kinetic warfare in mind – to cyber technology. The first question is: when is cyber war really war in the sense of ‘armed conflict’? After discussing this question, the article goes on to look at some of the most important rules of IHL governing the conduct of hostilities and the interpretation in the cyber realm of those rules, namely the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. With respect to all of these rules, the cyber realm poses a number of questions that are still open. In particular, the interconnectedness of cyber space poses a challenge to the most fundamental premise of the rules on the conduct of hostilities, namely that civilian and military objects can and must be distinguished at all times. Thus, whether the traditional rules of IHL will provide sufficient protection to civilians from the effects of cyber warfare remains to be seen. Their interpretation will certainly need to take the specificities of cyber space into account. In the absence of better knowledge of the potential effects of cyber warfare, it cannot be excluded that more stringent rules might be necessary.


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