Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Western World ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Party Membership ◽  
Liberal Democratic

Since its publication in 1993, John Rawls’s Political Liberalism (2005a) has been central to contemporary debates in normative political theory. Rawls’s main goal in this book was to explain how citizens endorsing diverse conceptions of the good (ethical, religious, and philosophical) could live together under liberal democratic institutions. For this reason, his theory has strongly influenced contemporary debates concerning political legitimacy, democratic theory, toleration, and multiculturalism. Yet, despite the immense body of literature which has been produced since Rawls’s book was published, very little has been said or written regarding the place of political parties and partisanship (by which I mean participation in politics through political parties) within political liberalism. This is surprising. In spite of the ongoing decline of party membership across the western world, parties still remain central players in the democratic game of liberal democratic polities, and still play an important role in articulating diverse social demands. One would have therefore expected political theorists who, like Rawls, are concerned with issues of pluralism and diversity, to take an interest in the role of parties. Yet Rawls’s references to parties are brief and scattered, and it is not clear from his work (or from the work of those scholars who have examined his theory in detail) what role (if any) parties can play within political liberalism....

Partisanship and Political Liberalism in Diverse Societies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
The Stability

Since its publication in 1993, John Rawls’s Political Liberalism has been central to debates concerning political legitimacy, democratic theory, toleration, and multiculturalism in contemporary political theory. Yet, despite the immense body of literature which has been produced since Rawls’s work was published, very little has been said or written regarding the place of political parties and partisanship within political liberalism. This book aims to fill this gap in the literature. Its central argument is that political liberalism needs and nourishes political parties, and that political parties are therefore not hostile but vital to it. First, partisanship generates its own distinctive kind of political obligations, additional to any political obligations people may have qua ordinary citizens. Second, contrary to what many critics argue, and despite its admittedly restrictive features, Rawls’s conception of public reason allows significant scope for partisan advocacy and partisan pluralism, and in fact the very normative demands of partisanship are in syntony with those of public reason. Third, parties contribute to the overlapping consensus that for Rawls guarantees stability in diverse societies. Fourth, political liberalism nourishes political parties, by leaving many issues, including religious and socio-economic ones, open to democratic contestation. In summary, parties contribute both to the legitimacy and to the stability of political liberalism.

The Legitimizing Role of Political Parties: the Second Austrian Republic

1969 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 324-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Pulzer
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Third World ◽  
Party System ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Colonial Power ◽  
The Third ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Capitol Hill ◽  
The Third World

CAN PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS THRIVE IN COUNTRIES WITH little or no tradition in the habits of self-government? Is multiparty competition viable in states where compromise is not accepted as a political virtue? The questions are familiar and are asked whenever the advisability of exporting the Westminster model (or the Capitol Hill or Palais Bourbon model) is raised.The proposition to be examined is that a parliamentary and party system was transplanted into an initially unfavourable environment and eventually acclimatized itself. The ecological difficulties are familiar; indeed, they form the substance of the debate about the export of systems. In the Third World, at the point of decolonization it involves the former colonial power bequeathing liberal-democratic institutions as a device for legitimizing the new native regime.

Coda: Non-Consensual Democracy as a Political Form of Critical Community

2015 ◽  
pp. 146-170
Author(s):  
Leszek Koczanowicz
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Social Understanding ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Ethical Commitment ◽  
Regulative Principle ◽  
Political Form

In this closing chapter, the concept of non-consensual democracy is discussed against the background of the notions of democracy endorsed in contemporary political theory. Two main strands in democratic theory are examined: that of consensus and that of disagreement. The role of disagreement is particularly stressed as this facet of democracy has been underestimated so far. The point is that disagreement does not necessarily have to lead to social chaos and, ultimately, to the hegemony of one group involved in struggle. The project of non-consensual democracy aims at overcoming this contradiction. Non-consensual democracy is a democracy in which disagreement is combined with better understanding among all the parties to a dispute. For non-consensual democracy to be possible, certain conditions must be met. First, it demands an ethical commitment to dialogue. Second, it requires solidarity as a regulative principle. Third, the system of democratic institutions has to be organized to facilitate social understanding.

The reasons of the unreasonable: Is political liberalism still an option?

2021 ◽  
pp. 019145372110405
Author(s):  
Benedetta Giovanola ◽  
Roberta Sala
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Harsh Criticism ◽  
Sense Of Justice

In this study, we claim that political liberalism, despite harsh criticism, is still the best option available for providing a just and stable society. However, we maintain that political liberalism needs to be revised so as to be justifiable from the perspective of not only the “reasonable” in a Rawlsian sense (that we define as “fully” reasonable) but also the ones whom Rawls labels as “unreasonable.” To support our claim, going beyond Rawls’s original account, we unpack the concept of unreasonableness and identify three different subsets that we label as the “partially reasonable,” the “non-reasonable,” and the “unreasonable.” We argue that both the “fully” reasonable and the “partially reasonable” would be included into the constituency of public justification; more specifically, we claim that the latter would support liberal institutions out of their reasons: we define these reasons as mutually intelligible reasons and claim that they allow to acknowledge the importance of a convergence approach to public justification. As for the “non-reasonable” and “unreasonable,” we claim that they cannot be included in the constituency of public justification, but they nonetheless could be compliant with liberal institutions if political liberalism offers them some reasons to comply: here, we claim that political liberalism should include them through engagement and propose reasoning from conjecture as an effecting way of offering reasons for compliance. In particular, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, the “non-reasonable” could find conciliatory reasons to comply with liberal institutions on a stable base. With regard to the “unreasonable” in the strict sense, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, their unreasonableness could be contained and they could find reasons—even if just self-interested—for complying with liberal institutions rather than defying them. In our discussion, we consider the different subsets not as “frozen” but as dynamic and open to change, and we aim to propose a more complex and multilayered approach to inclusion that would be able to include a wider set of people. To strengthen our argument, we show that the need for a wider public justification and for broader inclusion in liberal societies is grounded in respect for persons both as equal persons and as particular individuals. In particular, we claim that individuals’ values, ends, commitments, and affiliations activate demands of respect and can strengthen the commitment to the liberal–democratic order. Through a reformulation of the role of respect in liberal societies, we also show a kind of social and communitarian dimension that, we claim, is fully compatible with political liberalism and opens it up to “civic friendship” and “social solidarity,” which are constitutive elements for the development of a sense of justice and for the realization of a just and stable society.

James Madison's Political Theory: Hostage to Democratic Fortune

2005 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard K. Matthews
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
James Madison

Professor Alan Gibson's insightful article contains much that is admirable. He is, in my view, correct in calling scholars' attention—particularly political scientists—to James Madison's often neglected views in his National Gazette essays and the foundational role of public opinion on all governments. In addition, Gibson asserts several claims hoping to establish Madison's credentials as a democratic theorist that should be of interest as well. Specifically, he seeks to accomplish four tasks: (1) “to clarify the enduring debate over the credibility of Madison's democratic credentials”; (2) to “examine Madison's role in justifying, popularizing, and understanding… public opinion”; (3) to “highlight some of Madison's neglected insights into democratic theory, especially his understanding of the problem of collective action, and thereby establish him as a prescient democratic theorist”; and (4) to argue the case that Madison “contributed to a developing tradition of political thought in America upon a broad-based conception of freedom of speech and on the belief that political truths best emerge from the full flow of ideas.”While I concur with much of Gibson's position—especially his fourth, indisputable point—I also disagree with him on at least one significant position: James Madison was not a democrat.

Does Liberal Democracy Require a Gandhian Approach to Religion?

Acorn ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-129
Author(s):  
Sanjay Lal ◽  
Jeff Shawn Jose ◽  
Douglas Allen ◽  
Michael Allen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Religious Values ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Absolute Truth ◽  
Democratic Socialism ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Unity In Diversity

In this author-meets-critics dialogue, Sanjay Lal, author of , argues that Gandhian values of nonviolence raise aspirations of liberal democracy to a higher level. Since Gandhian values of nonviolence are closely associated with religious values, liberal democracy should make public commitments to religions on a non-sectarian basis, except for unreasonable religions. Critic Jeff Shawn Jose agrees that Gandhian values can strengthen liberal democracy. However, Jose finds a contradiction in Lal’s proposal that a liberal state should support reasonable religions only. A more consistent Gandhian approach would focus on everyday interactions between citizens and groups rather than state-directed preferences. Critic Douglas Allen also welcomes Lal’s project that brings Gandhian philosophy into relation with liberal democratic theory; however, he argues that universalizing the Absolute Truth of genuine religion is more complicated than Lal acknowledges. D. Allen argues for a Gandhian approach of relative truths, which cannot be evaluated apart from contingency or context, and he offers autobiographical evidence in support of his critical suspicion of genuine religion. Critic Michael Allen argues that Lal’s metaphysical approach to public justification violates a central commitment of political liberalism not to take sides on any metaphysical basis. M. Allen argues that democratic socialism is closer to Gandhi’s approach than is liberalism. Lal responds to critics by arguing that Gandhi’s evaluation of unreasonable religions depends upon an assessment of violence, which is not as problematic as critics charge, either from a Gandhian perspective or a liberal one. Furthermore, by excluding unreasonable or violent religions from state promotion, Lal argues that he is not advocating state suppression. Finally, Lal argues that Gandhian or Kingian metaphysics are worthy of support by liberal, democratic states seeking to educate individuals regarding peaceful unity in diversity.

Jacques Rancière

In the Street ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 121-150
Author(s):  
Çiğdem Çidam
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Theory Of Education ◽  
Democratic Action ◽  
Action Taking ◽  
As If

This chapter demonstrates that Rancière’s journey to democratic theory started in the aftermath of May 1968 with his efforts to overcome the problematic transformation of political theory into “a theory of education.” For Rancière, unpredictability is integral to democratic politics. Thus, in an anti-Rousseauian move, he emphasizes the theatrical aspect of democratic action: taking on a role other than who they are, acting as if they are a part in a given social order in which they have no part, political actors stage their equality, disrupting the existing distribution of the sensible. Rancière’s focus on the moments of disruption, however, opens him to the charge of reducing democratic politics to immediate acts of negation. Insofar as he erases the role of intermediating practices in the stagings of equality, Rancière imposes on his accounts a kind of purity that his own work, with its emphasis on broken, polemical voices, cautions against.

scholarly journals The Political Theory of Parties and Partisanship: Catching Up

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-110
Author(s):  
Russell Muirhead ◽  
Nancy L. Rosenblum
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Special Role ◽  
Modern Democracy ◽  
Popular Participation ◽  
The Past ◽  
Catching Up ◽  
Political Rivalry

Despite their centrality to modern democracy, until recently political parties were relegated to the margins of normative democratic theory, taking a back seat to social movements, civil society associations, deliberative experiments, spaces for local participatory government, and direct popular participation. Yet, in the past 15 years, a burgeoning literature has emerged in democratic theory focused directly on parties and partisanship; that is our focus in this review. We locate three main normative defenses of parties: one centered in the special role parties can play in political justification as agents of public reason, a second that looks to the way parties contribute to deliberation, and a third that focuses on the partisan commitment to regulated political rivalry and peaceful rotation in office. In this last connection, we survey work on the constitutional status of parties and reasons for banning parties. We then consider the relation of partisanship to citizenship, and in a fourth section we turn to the ethics of partisanship. Parties and partisanship are interwoven but separable: If partisans are necessary to realize the value of parties, the reverse holds as well, and parties are necessary to realize the value of partisanship.

Political parties and think tanks: policy analysis oriented toward office-seeking

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Camilo Argibay ◽  
Rafaël Cos ◽  
Anne-Cécile Douillet
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Policy Analysis ◽  
Marked Effect ◽  
Think Tanks ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Party Membership ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
Internal Production

This chapter examines the role played by political parties and think tanks in the development of policy analysis in France. It shows how party-based policy analysis is interwoven with inter and intra-party competition related to the objective of seeking office. Indeed, even though policy seeking activities do not look central in the functioning of French political parties, developments in party rationales, like those in the profile of governing parties’ elites, are favourable to intensifying interest in policy issues. Political parties’ professionalization nonetheless appears to have a marked effect on their internal production of public policy expertise: party membership is marginalised while the electoral issues and internal competition have a structuring impact. Lastly, analysis of public policy expertise production shows that it is mainly done in the vicinity of party organisations, due to the significant recourse to experts outside of parties and the role of think tanks.

Unis and Bna: the rôle of ‘Traditionalist’ parties in Niger, 1948–60

1975 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Finn Fuglestad
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Traditional Culture ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Modern State ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Party Leaders

The institutional framework imposed upon Niger in 1946, tended to function according to traditional political concepts, norms, notions and values. Hence the distinction established in this paper between ‘traditionalist’ (UNIS/BNA) and ‘modern’ political parties, refers to the degree of reliance upon this traditional culture and also to the degree to which party-leaders were able to manipulate the norms, notions, etc., of the traditional political systems, in order to gain influence within the new institutional framework. The French Administration, functioning largely as an indigenous chieftaincy, was to a certain extent forced to interfere in politics, since an electoral victory for a ‘modern’ political party (i.e. the évolués) would have to be interpreted—according to the logic of traditional political theory—as a loss of the ‘force’, ‘power’ or ‘luck’, without which the French could no longer be regarded as the legitimate rulers of Niger.If the French finally decided to collaborate with the évolués (and in the process disentangled themselves from the ‘chieftaincy-model’), it was because the évolués constituted the only group capable of grasping the intricate problems of economic development and of running a modern state.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document