Environmental Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 147-168
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Metz
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Consideration ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Communal Relationship

This chapter begins Part III, which argues that the relational moral theory of rightness as friendliness is a strong competitor to Western principles in many applied ethical contexts. Chapter 8 articulates and defends a novel, relational account of moral status, according to which an entity is owed moral consideration roughly to the degree that it is capable of being party to a communal relationship. One of its implications is that many animals have a moral status but not one as high as ours, which many readers will find attractive, but which utilitarianism and Kantianism cannot easily accommodate. Relational moral status also grounds a promising response to the ‘argument from marginal cases’ that animals have the same moral status as incapacitated humans: even if two beings have identical intrinsic properties, they can differ in the extent to which they can relate and hence differ in their degree of moral status.

Ratiocentrism, Intrinsic Value, and the Moral Status of the Nonhuman Natural World

2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 363-370
Author(s):  
Edward Uzoma Ezedike ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Moral Consideration ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Agents

Kant’s doctrine of the “categorical imperative” with respect to ratiocentrism needs to be examined for its implications for environmental ethics. Kant’s argument is that moral actions must be categorical or unqualified imperatives that reflect the sovereignty of moral obligations that all rational moral agents could figure out by virtue of their rationality. For Kant, humans have no direct moral obligations to non-rational, nonhuman nature: only rational beings, i.e., humans, are worthy of moral consideration. I argue that this position is excessively anthropocentric and ratiocentric in excluding the nonhuman natural world from moral consideration. While conceding that nonhuman nature is instrumentally valuable owing to some inevitable existential, ontological considerations, moral obligation should be extended to the natural world in order to achieve environmental wholeness.

Future Generations in Environmental Ethics

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Nolt
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Human Population ◽  
Fossil Fuels ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Temporal Perspective ◽  
Future People ◽  
Intergenerational Ethics

Intergenerational ethics is the study of our responsibilities to future individuals—individuals (human or not) who are not now alive but will be. The term “future” characterizes, not the kind of a thing, but rather the temporal perspective from which it is being described. Future people, as such, therefore differ from us neither intrinsically nor in moral status. Our responsibilities to them are best understood by attempts to see things from their perspective, not from ours. Though intergenerational ethics takes various forms, the credible forms in conjunction with known facts yield two great practical conclusions: we must reduce human population, and we must keep most fossil fuels in the ground. The demandingness of these conclusions is no objection against them, but rather an accurate measure of the moral burdens of our godlike knowledge and power.

scholarly journals Under Darwin’s Cosh? Neo-Aristotelian Thinking in Environmental Ethics

2005 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 22-23
Author(s):  
Michael Wheeler
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Natural Environment ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
General Position ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
Individual Human

As a first shot, one might say that environmental ethics is concerned distinctively with the moral relations that exist between, on the one hand, human beings and, on the other, the non-human natural environment. But this really is only a first shot. For example, one might be inclined to think that at least some components of the non-human natural environment (non-human animals, plants, species, forests, rivers, ecosystems, or whatever) have independent moral status, that is, are morally considerable in their own right, rather than being of moral interest only to the extent that they contribute to human well-being. If so, then one might be moved to claim that ethical matters involving the environment are best cashed out in terms of the dutes and responsibilities that human beings have to such components. If, however, one is inclined to deny independent moral status to the non-human natural environment or to any of its components, then one might be moved to claim that the ethical matters in question are exhaustively delineated by those moral relations existing between individual human beings, or between groups of human beings, in which the non-human natural environment figures. One key task for the environmental ethicist is to sort out which, if either, of these perspectives is the right one to adopt—as a general position or within particular contexts. I guess I don’t need to tell you that things get pretty complicated pretty quickly.

The Moral Status and Rights of Artificial Intelligence

2020 ◽  
pp. 480-504
Author(s):  
S. Matthew Liao
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Physical Basis ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Intrinsic Properties

As AIs acquire greater capacities, the issue of whether AIs would acquire greater moral status becomes salient. This chapter sketches a theory of moral status and considers what kind of moral status an AI could have. Among other things, the chapter argues that AIs that are alive, conscious, or sentient, or those that can feel pain, have desires, and have rational or moral agency should have the same kind of moral status as entities that have the same kind of intrinsic properties. It also proposes that a sufficient condition for an AI to have human-level moral status and be a rightsholder is when an AI has the physical basis for moral agency. This chapter also considers what kind of rights a rightsholding AI could have and how AIs could have greater than human-level moral status.

ANIMALS, MORAL STATUS, AND THE OBJECTIVES OF MORALITY

Think ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (47) ◽  
pp. 33-43
Author(s):  
Ronald A. Lindsay
Keyword(s):  
Animal Rights ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Consideration

Many philosophers maintain that a being's moral status depends on its capacities, for example, whether the being is rational or sentient. In the notorious ‘argument from marginal cases’, animal rights advocates make use of this received view by arguing that because infants and the severely cognitively disabled have no more capacities than many animals, animals have status equivalent to humans and are entitled to equal moral consideration. But although capacities may be relevant to moral status, they do not determine it. Ultimately, we need to consider the objectives of morality in determining what obligations we have towards any group of beings, whether they are aliens, humans, or animals.

scholarly journals Should We Ascribe Capabilities to Sentient Animals? A Critical Analysis of the Extension of Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Melin ◽  
David Kronlid
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Life Forms ◽  
Capabilities Approach ◽  
Normal Adult ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Adult Humans ◽  
Moral Relationship

Originally, the Capabilities Approach had a strong anthropocentric orientation because of its focus on the entitlements of individual humans. However, as a part of the interest to employ it within animal and environmental ethics, it has been discussed whether the Capabilities Approach should consider also non-human life forms for their own sake. The most influential and elaborated contribution to this debate is Martha Nussbaum’s extension of the Capabilities Approach to include sentient animals. In this article, we argue that Nussbaum’s ascription of capabilities to animals is problematic, since the concept of a capability normally denotes an opportunity to choose between different functionings. When Nussbaum ascribes capabilities to animals, the concept seems to simply denote specific abilities. Such a use is problematic since it waters down the concept and makes it less meaningful, and it may obscure the fact that normal, adult humans, in contrast to sentient animals, can act as conscious moral agents. The aim of granting moral status to sentient animals can be achieved more convincingly by describing our moral relationship to animals in terms of the functionings we should promote, instead of ascribing capabilities to them. Originally, the Capabilities Approach had a strong anthropocentric orientation because of its focus on the entitlements of individual humans. However, as a part of the interest to employ it within animal and environmental ethics, it has been discussed whether the Capabilities Approach should consider also non-human life forms for their own sake. The most influential and elaborated contribution to this debate is Martha Nussbaum’s extension of the Capabilities Approach to include sentient animals. In this article, we argue that Nussbaum’s ascription of capabilities to animals is problematic, since the concept of a capability normally denotes an opportunity to choose between different functionings. When Nussbaum ascribes capabilities to animals, the concept seems to simply denote specific abilities. Such a use is problematic since it waters down the concept and makes it less meaningful, and it may obscure the fact that normal, adult humans, in contrast to sentient animals, can act as conscious moral agents. The aim of granting moral status to sentient animals can be achieved more convincingly by describing our moral relationship to animals in terms of the functionings we should promote, instead of ascribing capabilities to them.

Moral Recognition and the Limits of Impartialist Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Udo Schuklenk
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Human Brain ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Consideration ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Conceptual Frameworks ◽  
Species Membership ◽  
New Challenges ◽  
Self Learning ◽  
As If

‘Moral status’ is simply a convenient label for ‘is owed moral consideration of a kind’. This chapter argues that we should abandon it and instead focus on the question of what kinds of dispositional capabilities, species memberships, relationships etc., constitute ethically defensible criteria that justifiably trigger particular kinds of moral obligations. Chimeras, human brain organoids, and artificial intelligence do not pose new challenges. Existing conceptual frameworks, and the criteria for moral consideration that they trigger (species membership, sentientism, personhood) are still defensible and applicable. The challenge at hand is arguably an empirical challenge that philosophers and ethicists qua philosophers and ethicists are ill equipped to handle. The challenge that needs addressing is essentially whether a self-learning AI machine, that responds exactly in the same way to a particular event as a person or sentient being would, should be treated as if it was such a person or sentient being, despite doubts about its de facto lack of dispositional capabilities that would normally give rise to such responses.

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Metz
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Issue ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Common Part ◽  
Communal Relationship ◽  
Respect For Autonomy ◽  
Sub Saharan ◽  
Better Than

Chapter 1 explains and motivates the project of advancing an African moral theory, after which it provides an overview of the book. An African moral theory is a basic, comprehensive principle distinguishing right from wrong actions that is informed by mores salient particularly in the sub-Saharan region. It is advanced as a rival to the principles of utility and of respect for autonomy, the primary Western answers to the important question of what all right actions have in common. Part I of the book discusses the meta-ethical issue of how to justify an African moral theory. Part II identifies three major candidates for a moral theory in the African tradition, and argues that one, grounded on communal relationship, is most promising. Part III argues that the relational moral theory does better than the principles of utility and of respect for autonomy at accounting for a wide array of applied controversies.

Kant and Animals

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Animal Minds ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Moral Status Of Animals ◽  
The Right ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

This is an edited collection devoted to the topic of the role of animals within Kant’s philosophy. It addresses key issues within both his theoretical and practical philosophy. It examines the place of Kant’s model of animal minds in the historical and contemporary contexts. It addresses the question of whether Kant’s philosophy of mind allows for animals to be capable of intentional representations of spatiotemporal objects. It explores how Kant treated the issue of animal nature as it manifests in humans and non-humans alike, and questions how Kant’s scientific theory attempted to accommodate animals within his broader Enlightenment worldview. It also addresses traditional worries about the moral status of animals within Kant’s and Kantian moral theory. Kant notoriously denied that we have direct obligations to animals, and the question persists as to whether Kantian moral theory provides the right account of the moral status of non-human animals. Several papers in this collection address the question and whether Kant’s views can be defended or ought to be rejected altogether on this basis alone. The collection considers the relevance of Kantian theory for our understanding of contemporary challenges facing human beings with regard to our relationship to animals.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document