Trustee Exemption Clauses

Author(s):  
Paolo Panico

The personal liability of trustees in the event of a breach of trust may be limited or excluded under a clause in the trust instrument. The validity of such a clause was confirmed by the House of Lords in Wilkins v Hogg of 1861, where Lord Westbury LC observed that ‘[a]‌ testator could define the duty of his trustees, and point out the extent of their liability, and the court could not extend their responsibility’.

1998 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-471
Author(s):  
Jennifer Payne

THE decision of the House of Lords in Williams v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd. [1998] 1 W.L.R. 830, reversing the Court of Appeal's decision ([1997] 1 B.C.L.C. 131), examines the issue of an agent's liability for negligent misstatement. Of course, agents will be personally responsible for their own negligence, even if that tort is committed while on the principal's business, but what is their responsibility for the negligence of their principal? Logically the answer is “none”, and certainly in a company context statements made by directors on behalf of their companies have traditionally led to liability for the principal alone: “a company director is only to be held personally liable for the company's negligent misstatements if the plaintiffs can establish some special circumstances setting the case apart from the ordinary . . .” ([1997] 1 B.C.L.C. 131, 152 per Hirst L.J.). The Court of Appeal's decision in Williams, however, threatened to expand this category of “special circumstances” to such an extent as to make personal liability the norm for directors, at least in the context of small companies.


Author(s):  
Geoffrey Morse

This chapter discusses the liabilities of members of limited liability partnerships (LLP) to third parties. Aside from its debts, an LLP may be liable either in its own right as the contracting party or tortfeasor by way of attribution or vicariously for the acts of its agents and employees as any other principal or employee. Under the Limited Liability Partnerships Act (2000), an individual member's personal liability for his or her own negligence whilst acting on behalf of the LLP will be a matter for the courts to determine, by analogy with the direct liability of a director as set out by the House of Lords. The chapter describes the different liabilities that emerge based on the agreed contributions by members, the contributions by court order, and by shadow members. It concludes by examining the liabilities for contracts, torts, and other wrongs.


2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
J K Mason

The article analyses the series of cases that have evolved following the House of Lords dicta in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board1 and which seek to circumvent the limitations imposed by that decision on recovery for the birth of an “uncovenanted” addition to the family. The majority of relevant actions have relied on the possible distinction of cases involving the birth of a disabled child which McFarlane admits. Claims for compensation for the upkeep of the child in such circumstances have been successful, but the author contends that the two types of action are, in fact, distinct. He concludes that the only true comparator to date is Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust2 and that the reasoning in this case may provide an opening for the House of Lords to reconsider its position.


Author(s):  
Allan Metcalf

This book is about the name “Guy” and its slow, mostly unnoticed development over four centuries since it began on November 5, 1605, with the suddenly famous Guy Fawkes, who was arrested just in time just before he could light the fuse on 36 barrels of gunpowder to blow up the House of Lords. During those four centuries, “Guy” became “guy,” the name for an effigy of Guy Fawkes burned at bonfires every November 5 since. The effigy was called a “guy,” so that more than one effigy would be “guys,” Then, slowly, “guy” extended its signification into a name for a ragged, lower-class male, then any strangely dressed male, then a neutral everyday word for just any male, a “guy.” To top it off, the 20th century extended the plural “guys” or “you guys” to include all human beings, even women speaking to groups of women. None of these developments were made deliberately; the word just quietly slipped by, except for opposition from some Southerners and feminists who objected to it on the grounds that it wasn’t “y’all” and it wasn’t gender neutral. It has become all the more entrenched because now it’s the standard second-person plural pronoun for most of us who speak English.


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