Conceptual Toolkit

Author(s):  
Christina Eckes

Chapter 1 sets out the conceptual framework for the rest of the book. It first and foremost develops the meaning and relevance of structures of bonding that formally legally connect the Union and its citizens. One prominent example is the European Parliament’s legal mandate to represent EU citizens. The chapter further identifies the autonomy and effectiveness of the EU legal order as the unique features that set it apart from international organizations and international law. The potential of structures of bonding depends on these features. Chapter 1 also develops the mutually dependant relationships of autonomy, effectiveness, structures of bonding, and the legitimacy of the Union and its actions. It identifies different dimensions of legitimacy and emphasizes, drawing on Jürgen Habermas, justifiability or, even more precisely, worthiness of recognition (Annerkennungswürdigkeit) as the core of legitimacy. Justification to individuals, as EU citizens and national citizens, returns in all the following chapters as a necessary precondition for legitimacy and as the core potential of bonding structures.

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 308-340
Author(s):  
Gloria Fernández Arribas

The Kimberley Process represents a new method of international cooperation between subjects of international law. It was named by its creators as a process, setting it apart from international organizations, and leading too to its consideration as informal international law-making or soft law. In this study we shall analyze the extent to which the Kimberley Process falls into these categories. Our main task, however, is to compare it to formal international organizations, with a view to establishing whether what really has been created is an institutionalization process that is like an international organization, but with a different name. To do this, we will analyze with reference to the Kimberley Process the various respective fields of international organizations, such as founding agreement, membership, structure, decision-making process and legal order.


2021 ◽  
pp. 116-138
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter discusses the international law of responsibility as primarily reflected in the 2001 International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. It opens in Section 7.2 with an overview of some of the core principles and elements of state responsibility for wrongful acts. Section 7.3 discusses the issue of state attribution before Section 7.4 examines joint and collective responsibility. Section 7.5 discusses the various circumstances that may preclude the wrongfulness of conduct otherwise in violation of a (primary) legal obligation. Section 7.6 looks into the consequences of state responsibility while Section 7.7 discusses who may be entitled to invoke state responsibility. Section 7.8 examines the rules on diplomatic protection and Section 7.9 provides a brief overview of the responsibility of international organizations.


Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter discusses the international law of responsibility as primarily reflected in the 2001 International Law Commission's (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. It opens in Section 7.2 with an overview of some of the core principles and elements of state responsibility for wrongful acts. Section 7.3 discusses the issue of state attribution before Section 7.4 examines the various circumstances that may preclude the wrongfulness of conduct otherwise in violation of a (primary) legal obligation. Section 7.5 looks into the consequences of state responsibility while Section 7.6 discusses who may be entitled to invoke state responsibility. Section 7.7 provides a brief overview of the responsibility of international organizations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 158-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Kuner

The importance of personal data processing for international organizations (‘IOs’) demonstrates the need for them to implement data protection in their work. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’) will be influential around the world, and will impact IOs as well. Its application to them should be determined under relevant principles of EU law and public international law, and it should be interpreted consistently with the international obligations of the EU and its Member States. However, IOs should implement data protection measures regardless of whether the GDPR applies to them in a legal sense. There is a need for EU law and international law to take each other better into account, so that IOs can enjoy their privileges and immunities also with regard to EU law and avoid conflicts with international law, while still providing a high level of data protection in their operations.


2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Esa Paasivirta

AbstractThe paper addresses the issue of possible responsibility of a member state for acts of an international organization of which it is a member. This particular issue forms part of the on-going work of the International Law Commission of establishing rules for the responsibility of international organizations. The particular challenge is posed by possible “responsibility gaps”, i.e. situations where a state might avoid compliance with its own obligations by prompting the organization of which it is a member to act instead. The paper compares the ILC approach, approaching the issue by way of trying to establish general rules of responsibility (“secondary rules”) and the practice of the EU, which has addressed the issue by tailor-made solutions in the context of specific treaties (“primary rules”). The latter approach is more flexible as it allows individual solutions pertinent to particular circumstances and treaty regimes so as to ensure that either the organization itself or its member state is responsible, depending whichever is genuinely responsible. The paper concludes that the ILC work is progressing in the right direction as it narrows down the possibilities where a member state can be held responsible to cover only situations bordering abuse, rather than more open-ended standards for individual member state responsibility, which can open the door for unpredictable results.


2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-89
Author(s):  
Jan Klabbers

AbstractTreaty conflict is one of the more significant practical issues in international law these days, in particular as the law of treaties is unable to solve the most difficult emanations. With international organizations, there is the added consideration that the organization may wish to preserve its internal legal order. The present paper investigates the practice of the EC/EU plus its member states, trying to chart the techniques used by them in order to solve or prevent treaty conflicts. It presents a taxonomy of this practice as well as an interpretation.


Author(s):  
Christina Eckes

The European Union (EU) cannot make a plausible claim to sovereignty under international law. However, what the EU can do and what it also does is, is to act as if it were sovereign and claim certain rights that are considered core elements of state sovereignty. This article argues that the Court of Justice’s (ECJ) conception of the EU legal order as autonomous provides the EU with a core element of state sovereignty: jurisdictional sovereignty. Autonomy construed by the ECJ is best understood in conceptual legal and absolute terms. It is meant to shield the ECJ’s conceptual legal claims from interference. Legal autonomy as construed by the ECJ is not relative as many authors have claimed. It cannot come about in an incremental or relative manner. It cannot be based on arguments relating to the status of a self-contained regime of international law that gradually distances itself from the general rules of international law. It is a conceptual claim giving birth to the assumption of apriority that can only be made in categorical terms. In this way it is similar to sovereignty. The article first sets out how the autonomy of the EU legal order is best understood. It examines the ECJ’s case law in light of legal theoretical considerations and relates it to the separation thesis of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. It then explains that autonomy is of such relevance to the EU legal order because the aprioristic character of EU law remains essentially contested. This relevance indirectly explains why the Court so cautiously protects the autonomy of the EU legal order. Finally, the article examines the Court’s reasoning in Opinion 1/17 in light of the identified absolute conception of autonomy.


Author(s):  
Christian J. Tams

Treaties are a central building block of the United Nations legal order. They have particular significance for the objectives set out in the UN Charter: these need to be implemented and effectuated, and treaties concretizing the Charter’s broad objectives can help achieve that aim. The Charter text, perhaps surprisingly, does not reflect this adequately. Unlike constituent documents of other international organizations, the Charter formulates no master plan for the UN’s use of treaties, and only occasionally mentions treaties explicitly. Its guidance is primarily indirect: some Charter objectives are formulated in such vague terms that without follow-up action, including follow-up action that takes the form of treaties, they would be meaningless. The drafter’s surprising caution means that the role of treaties in pursuing UN objectives is primarily shaped by practice rather than the Charter text. In the seven decades since the UN’s establishment, treaties—prepared in highly diverse processes, including by the International Law Commission (ILC) and within specialized agencies—have sprawled. In the absence of a Charter master plan, they have grown to cover large parts of the continent of international law. A sole focus on the gigantic network of treaties, however, risks overlooking the fact that more often than not, member states and UN organs prefer other means of pursuing Charter objectives (resolutions, statements, and other non-binding mechanisms). The landscape of treaties is as uneven as it is diverse.


Author(s):  
Geert De Baere

The present chapter considers the position of the European Union in other international organizations. It is based on the premise that the Union, while arguably also a federal or quasi-federal structure, is legally still itself an international organization. From the perspective of international law, that explains at least partly the complexities involved in an international organization such as the EU acquiring a status in—let alone membership of—another international organization. The term ‘status’ or ‘position’ is understood here as the influence the Union can exercise, either formally or informally, in decision-making processes in other international organizations. As an ever-increasing number of decisions having an impact on the Union’s policies originate in international organizations, its position in such fora matters.


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