scholarly journals Perception and Intuition of Evaluative Properties

Author(s):  
Jack C. Lyons

Outside of philosophy, ‘intuition’ means something like ‘knowing without knowing how you know’. Intuition in this broad sense is an important epistemological category. This chapter distinguishes intuition from perception and perception from perceptual experience, in order to discuss the distinctive psychological and epistemological status of evaluative property attributions. Although it is doubtful that we perceptually experience many evaluative properties and also somewhat unlikely that we perceive many evaluative properties, it is highly plausible that we intuit many instances of evaluative properties as such. The resulting epistemological status of evaluative property attributions is very much like it would be if we literally perceived such properties.

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daphne Leong

To counter the view that types of musical analysis not immediately relevant to performers are irrelevant to “music as performance,” this essay suggests that music exists in various states, and that changes between such states constitute transformations. Score-based analysis of musical structure and study of musical performance contribute to the understanding of music in this broad sense; analysis and performance dialogue productively when their distinctions as well as their correspondences are valued and interrogated. Analysis and performance exhibit multiple ways of knowing:wissen(knowing that),können(knowing how), andkennen(knowing, as in knowing a person). These ways of knowing are shown at play in a rehearsal of Shende’sThrow Down or Shut Up!.


2020 ◽  
pp. 210-212
Author(s):  
Robert Audi

Perception is central in our engagement with the world. It is experiential, representational, and causally connected with its objects. It is a discriminative sensory response to multifarious phenomena in our experience of the world. Perceptual experience embodies phenomenally distinctive states. Those states, as phenomenally representational and discriminatively responsive to our environment, have a kind of content by which they guide us as agents in the physical realm. In these ways, and most prominently in its phenomenal elements, perception is mental, in the broad sense that entails some engagement of the mind. But I have distinguished the mental from the intellectual and argued that perception is neither fundamentally intellectual nor, in its simplest forms, belief-entailing....


Author(s):  
Barry C. Smith

Perceptual experience enables us to know features of objects in our environment. But what does the experience of tasting enable us to know? By tasting we discover the tastes of foods or liquids; but what are tastes? An objectivist sees tastes as properties of foods and drinks, which are there anyway, independent of how we experience them. On this view, tasting provides us with perceptual knowledge of real features of foods and liquids. By contrast, a subjectivist sees tastes as just features of our own experience: sensations on the tongue answerable to nothing other than themselves. Tastes, on this view, are not in the foods; rather foods give rise to tastes in us. A metaphysics of tastes that sees them not as properties of foods but as parts of our experience makes the epistemology of tasting an aspect of self-knowledge. Knowing how something tastes is being immediately aware of a certain sort of experience that occurs when we are eating or drinking. On this view, we can know all about tastes so long as we know all about our experience. However, this simple subjectivist story fails to do justice to the epistemology of tasting. The experiences generated when tasting are not unisensory but multisensory, though unified. They are perceptions of flavor and due to touch, taste, and smell. A satisfactory metaphysics and epistemology of flavor leaves room for flavors as configurations of sapid, odorous, and tactile properties of the food and liquids we consume.


2015 ◽  
pp. 123-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. Koshovets ◽  
T. Varkhotov

The paper considers the analogy of theoretical modeling and thought experiment in economics. The authors provide historical and epistemological analysis of thought experiments and their relations to the material experiments in natural science. They conclude that thought experiments as instruments are used both in physics and in economics, but in radically different ways. In the natural science, a thought experiment is tightly connected to the material experimentation, while in economics it is used in isolation. Material experiments serve as a means to demonstrate the reality, while thought experiments cannot be a full-fledged instrument of studying the reality. Rather, they constitute the instrument of structuring the field of inquiry.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 10-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Ocheretna

The Cryptophagidae collection (Coleoptera: Cucujoidea) deposited at the Zoological Museum of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (ZMKU) is described. The main authors of the collection are well-known researchers from the 1910–1930s, Orest Marcu and Karl Penecke. This is the largest collection of cryptophagids among the natural museums of Ukraine containing 304 specimens belonging to 85 species of 13 genera. In addition, 15 specimens of 5 species belonging to the families Erotylidae, Biphyllidae and Languriidae were among Cryptophagidae specimens. The collection, according to information available in the ZMKU, came to the museum not earlier than 1947 as the indemnity for the results of the II World War, most likely from Chernivtsi, where Marcu and Penecke worked. The vast majority of specimens is collected in the territory of modern Romania and Ukraine, and many specimens came from Chernivtsi. A table with an overview of all key details of the specimens is given, in which there are 6 fields: the name of the species on the label, details on the species identification, number of specimens, collection locality with the name of collector and remarks on the specimen, in particular, the instructions for decoding collection sites from the original labels. Annotations are made on the amount of the collection and the most important specimens and re-identification for each of the 13 genera. Some specimens are lost, probably during numerous collection migrations. In particular, some species (Cryptophagus simplex, C. lapidicola, C. nitidulus, Caenoscelis subdeplanata, Atomaria grandicollis, A. peltata, etc.) are represented in the collection only by the labels. The collection is important for the analysis of the composition of the fauna of the Carpathian region in the broad sense, since some species are encountered in the collection rarely; therefore it is important to clarify their locations to form the most comprehensive list of species of the Cryptophagids in the region. Several species of the family were included on the actual list of the fauna of the region on the basis of the study of this collection, in particular: Atomaria linearis, A. analis, A. apicalis, A. gravidula, Cryptophagus fasciatus, C. setulosus, etc.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-415
Author(s):  
Jonathan Klawans

The Letter of Aristeas can best be understood when interpreters attend to the full range of postures toward Hellenism and Judaism exhibited by the various characters in the work. These stances range from the translators’ public, universalist philosophizing before the king in Alexandria to the High Priest Eleazar’s more particularistic defense of Jewish ritual law articulated in Jerusalem. Yet when the translators work on the Island of Pharos, or when the High Priest writes to the King, these characters display other sides of themselves. For the author of Aristeas – himself a Jew parading rather successfully as a Greek – knowing how much to conceal or reveal, when and where, is a fundamental skill, the secret to success for Jews in the Hellenistic diaspora.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Barner

Why did humans develop precise systems for measuring experience, like numbers, clocks, andcalendars? I argue that precise representational systems were constructed by earlier generationsof humans because they recognized that their noisy perceptual systems were not capturingdistinctions that existed in the world. Abstract symbolic systems did not arise from perceptualrepresentations, but instead were constructed to describe and explain perceptual experience. Byanalogy, I argue that when children learn number words, they do not rely on noisy perceptualsystems, but instead acquire these words as units in a broader system of procedures, whosemeanings are ultimately defined by logical relations to one another, not perception.


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