Aesthetic Value, Inversion, and the Ethical Properties of Artworks

2019 ◽  
pp. 71-80
Author(s):  
Robert Stecker

This chapter investigates two phenomena where values plausibly interact within artworks. One is the case of purported aesthetic value ‘inversions’ within artworks. The other is the case of purported ethical-artistic value inversions within artworks. I hypothesize that one gets inversion in the valuable properties of artworks, when the properties in question are aesthetic properties. I will look for principles for evaluating artworks that best accommodate that fact of inversion. I will argue that there is a good candidate for such a principle, but it is neither a pro tanto nor a prima facie principle as they are ordinarily conceived. I will finally argue that some proponents of ethical-artistic inversion do indeed treat it as a species of aesthetic inversion.

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-150
Author(s):  
Laura D’Olimpio

There is a debate within philosophy of literature as to whether narrative artworks should be judged morally, for their ethical value, meaning and impact. On one side you have the aesthetes, defenders of aestheticism, who deny the ethical value of an artwork can be taken into consideration when judging the work’s overall aesthetic value. Richard Posner backs artists such as Oscar Wilde who famously wrote, ‘there is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written. That is all’. On the other side of the debate are proponents of ethical criticism such as Martha Nussbaum, Wayne Booth, Noël Carroll and Mary Devereaux. This article examines the educational implications of each position and ultimately defends the importance of moral education alongside aesthetic education. Given artworks are powerful vehicles for moral sentiments and meaning, it is important that viewers are taught to engage critically with art’s ethical features as well as aesthetic features. In this way, educational concerns pose a challenge to the position of aestheticism.


1976 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 101-116
Author(s):  
Paul Woodruff

Plato represents Socrates as believing in the unity of the virtues, quarreling with those who, like Protagoras or Meno, wish to treat the virtues as distinct objects of inquiry (Protagoras 329c2ff., Meno 71e1ff.). On the other hand, there is good reason to deny that Plato's Socrates believed in the numerical identity of the virtues (cf. Meno 79a3-5). What Socrates did believe, I shall argue, is that the various virtues are one in essence. I shall show what this means and how it clears up prima facie inconsistencies among Plato's early dialogues.If I am right, Socrates’ theory has startling consequences. Since essence is exactly what Socrates wants a definition to state, it follows that all virtues will have one and the same definition. And if this is so, no wonder the quest for separate definitions of virtues fails in every case! For example in the Laches the generals are baffled by Courage because Courage has no private essence and cannot be marked off from the other virtues by stating its essence. Its essence is Virtue entire. That is a radical view, but there are good reasons for attributing it to Socrates.


1876 ◽  
Vol 22 (98) ◽  
pp. 196-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Claye Shaw

There is a general idea expressed in text-books, and more or less freely asserted in practice, but which I shall prove to be a fallacy, that a high-arched palate is so frequently met with in idiocy and imbecility that it may be taken as a sign of their existence. Indeed, when a case of this kind is brought forward the patient is made to open his mouth, under the conviction that a high palate will be found as certainly as a superficial alteration of the tongue in gastric disturbance. We shall see that the connection is an accidental one; and there is, in reality, no relationship between the development of the intellect and the height and width of the palate. If we consider that the bones of the cranium are developed in a different manner from those of the face, and that ossification at the base is complete long before that of the bones forming the palate, it is clear that there can be no primâ facie reason for thinking that because a person has an imperfect brain he should therefore have an imperfect palate; yet such an interdependence is held. It is quite true that a constitutional taint, such as rickets or syphilis, which affects the ossification of the bones generally and the cranial sutures, would probably affect the palatine bones, and hence it is that many idiots and imbeciles are found to have high or imperfect palates: but on the other hand some modifying taint may dwarf the height of the body, may affect the shape of the head to such an extent as to make an idiot of the microcephalic type, and yet leave the palate untouched, perfect in all conditions of width, height, number, quality, and regularity of teeth.


1943 ◽  
Vol 37 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 101-111
Author(s):  
F. A. Todd

Blockhead or or Baldhead?(i) Petron. Sat. 39. 12: ‘in Aquario (nascuntur) copones et cucurbitae’.(ii) Apul.Met. I. 15: ‘nos cucurbitae caput non habemus ut pro te moriamur’.Cucurbita in its literal use is the name of many varieties of the numerous family of Cucurbitaceae, as one may learn, e.g. from Plin. Nat. Hist. xix. It is also the name of the cupping instrument called by Juvenal, xiv. 58, uentosa cucurbita, for which see Mayor's note ad loc. For other metaphorical uses of the name, Forcellini and the Thes. Ling. Lat. cite only the two passages quoted above; of these two, Lewis and Short cite only the former. Lexicographers and editors,1 comparing the one passage with the other, concur in the view that the cucurbita is the symbol of stupidity, and that a stupid man may be called a cucurbita, as in Petronius, or be said cucurbitae caput habere, as in Apuleius. At first sight their interpretation of the Apuleian phrase is plausible, for it makes tolerable sense in the context and appears to be supported by such modern expressions as ‘pumpkin-head’ and Kürbiskopf and κεχλι κολοκνθνιον, all of which liken the head of a stupid man to a pumpkin or other gourd which, though bearing some resemblance to a human head, encloses not a brain but an insensate mass of pulp and seeds. But ‘to have a pumpkin-head’ and ‘to be a pumpkin’ are prima facie very different, for the latter equates the man himself with the cucurbita, whereas it is only qua substitute for a head that the cucurbita can typify stupidity; and when it is further observed that in the Petronian passage cucurbitae so interpreted accords ill with the context, it becomes clear that some other explanation must be sought.


2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-121
Author(s):  
Adam Nedeljkovic

The aim of this paper is an attempt at analyses and reconciliation of some prima facie confronted theories of reliability in the context of formal theories of coherence. Formal coherentists attempted to show that there is an epistemologically interesting connection between coherence of an information set and reliability of information sources. Amongst these authors there are divisions and differences concerning the nature of coherence, as well as the nature of reliability. On the one side, we have before us probabilistic coherentists who support a statistical understanding of reliability. On the other side we have supporters of explanatory coherence who see reliability as a dispostition. There are two goals that we shall attempt to achieve in this paper: to present and explain some ideas of reliability, without going into fine detailes and depths of theories in which they were formulated and to show that those ideas about reliability are not that irreconcilable as they might appear, but that they together can form something that we shall call ?reliability profile of an information source?, ?the most basic version?, or shorter: RPISbasic.


2019 ◽  
pp. 41-57
Author(s):  
Robert Stecker

This chapter argues that artistic value is a distinct kind of value from aesthetic value. Artistic value is a function of, and derived from, a plurality of more basic values, including, but not confined to, aesthetic value. Artworks are also valued as artworks for their cognitive value, ethical value, art-historical value, interpretation-centered value, and in other ways as well. To understand the artistic value of particular works requires understanding what the artist who makes the work is intending to do in it—what functions it is intended to fulfill or what it is intended to achieve. In order to defend this view, the chapter will show that artistic value is not reducible to aesthetic value.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
MICHELLE PANCHUK

AbstractThere has been little discussion of the compatibility of Theistic Conceptual Realism (TCR) with the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS). On the one hand, if a plurality of universals is necessary to explain the character of particular things, there is reason to think this commits the proponent of TCR to the existence of a plurality of divine concepts. So the proponent of the DDS has a prima facie reason to reject TCR (and vice versa). On the other hand, many mediaeval philosophers accept both the existence of divine ideas and the DDS. In this article I draw on mediaeval and contemporary accounts of properties and divine simplicity to argue that the two theories are not logically incompatible.


Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (516) ◽  
pp. 1127-1156 ◽  
Author(s):  
C Thi Nguyen

Abstract There seems to be a deep tension between two aspects of aesthetic appreciation. On the one hand, we care about getting things right. Our attempts at aesthetic judgments aim at correctness. On the other hand, we demand autonomy. We want appreciators to arrive at their aesthetic judgments through their own cognitive efforts, rather than through deferring to experts. These two demands seem to be in tension; after all, if we want to get the right judgments, we should defer to the judgments of experts. How can we resolve this tension? The best explanation, I suggest, is that aesthetic appreciation is something like a game. When we play a game, we try to win. But often, winning isn’t the point; playing is. Aesthetic appreciation involves the same flipped motivational structure: we aim at the goal of correctness, but having correct judgments isn’t the point. The point is the engaged process of interpreting, investigating, and exploring the aesthetic object. When one defers to aesthetic testimony, then, one makes the same mistake as when one looks up the answer to a puzzle, rather than solving it for oneself. The shortcut defeats the whole point. This suggests a new account of aesthetic value: the engagement account. The primary value of the activity of aesthetic appreciation lies in the process of trying to generate correct judgments, and not in having correct judgments.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1048 ◽  
pp. 290-293
Author(s):  
Xiakeer Saitaer

Uyghur carpet is the traditional Uyghur handicraft, it is the fusion of spinning, dyeing, knitting and painting with both practical and artistic value. Its origination dates back to more than 2000 years ago and it has been evolving gradually ever since along with the economic development. In recent years, carpet samples with thousands of years history have been discovered in the ruins of ancient tomb in Niya, Shanpula, Yuli, Zhagunluke, Talimu and Peacock River. Scholarships are amazed at the carpets’ unique patterns, delicate quality and fine colors. These carpets are weaved with patterns of human figure, animal and god bird. These patterns are surrounded by designs of beautiful flower and scenery. Some patterns contain auspicious words. The weaving technique, pattern designs and color scheme not only reflect how ancient Uyghur people think about the world, their appreciation of beauty and value of life, but also demonstrate their nature to pursue, and create aesthetic value and their enjoyment of beauty.


1883 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 156-157
Author(s):  
P. G.

Among the objects brought from Tarentum by the Rev. G. J. Chester are certain disks of clay of some interest, though not of artistic value. They are circular and flat or cheese-like in form, with a diameter of 3½ to 3¾ inches, and a thickness of about ¾ of an inch. The inscriptions are impressed in the clay by means of a stamp, and run thus:The order in date is that followed in the list. No. 1 is oldest, and the shape of the м seems to indicate that it may date from the fourth century B.C.; the other three are probably not earlier than the third century. Later they can scarcely be, for after that time the obol gave way to the Roman denarius and sestertius as a measure of value at Tarentum.


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