Rights’ Elusive Relation to Interests

Author(s):  
Rowan Cruft

Chapter 2 examines the relation between rights, interests, and desires, focusing on Raz’s and Kramer’s differing Interest Theories and Wenar’s recent Kind-Desire Theory. It argues that none of the theories respect our ability to create rights wherever we wish through law or promising, independently of the interests and desires of the right-holder. It argues nonetheless that Raz’s theory succeeds as a sufficient condition on right-holding, while Kramer’s and Wenar’s distinct theories come very close as necessary conditions. The chapter argues that it is easy to overlook the limitations of the theories because every right creates a circular ‘status desire’ or ‘status interest’ in its own fulfilment, borne by the right-holder in virtue of her status as holding a right.

Author(s):  
Arthur Ripstein

This chapter articulates the Kantian approach to private law. It begins by explaining the aims and ambitions of Kantian legal philosophy more generally and, in particular, introducing the Kantian idea that a particular form of thought is appropriate to a particular domain of inquiry or conduct. The chapter situates the Kantian view within a broad natural law tradition. For the part of that tradition that Immanuel Kant develops, the moral structure of natural law is animated by a conception of personal interaction that is so familiar as to be almost invisible. Despite its centrality to both morality and law, in the absence of legal institutions, this natural law is inadequate to its own principles. It requires legal institutions to render it fully determinate in its application consistent with everyone’s independence. It also requires public institutions of adjudication. The chapter further looks at Kant’s “division” of private rights, distinguishing first between the innate right that everyone has simply in virtue of being human and acquired rights that require an affirmative act to establish them. It then goes through the Kantian division of the titles of private right, situating them in relation to the distinction between persons and things. Finally, the chapter articulates the Kantian account of what might be called the naïve theory of remedies—that is, that the remedy is an imperfect continuation of the right that was violated.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1540-1551
Author(s):  
Jung Wook Lim ◽  
Dong Yeol Oh

Abstract Let ({\mathrm{\Gamma}},\le ) be a strictly ordered monoid, and let {{\mathrm{\Gamma}}}^{\ast }\left={\mathrm{\Gamma}}\backslash \{0\} . Let D\subseteq E be an extension of commutative rings with identity, and let I be a nonzero proper ideal of D. Set \begin{array}{l}D+[\kern-2pt[ {E}^{{{\mathrm{\Gamma}}}^{\ast },\le }]\kern-2pt] := \left\{f\in [\kern-2pt[ {E}^{{\mathrm{\Gamma}},\le }]\kern-2pt] \hspace{0.15em}|\hspace{0.2em}f(0)\in D\right\}\hspace{.5em}\text{and}\\ \hspace{0.2em}D+[\kern-2pt[ {I}^{{\Gamma }^{\ast },\le }]\kern-2pt] := \left\{f\in [\kern-2pt[ {D}^{{\mathrm{\Gamma}},\le }]\kern-2pt] \hspace{0.15em}|\hspace{0.2em}f(\alpha )\in I,\hspace{.5em}\text{for}\hspace{.25em}\text{all}\hspace{.5em}\alpha \in {{\mathrm{\Gamma}}}^{\ast }\right\}.\end{array} In this paper, we give necessary conditions for the rings D+[\kern-2pt[ {E}^{{{\mathrm{\Gamma}}}^{\ast },\le }]\kern-2pt] to be Noetherian when ({\mathrm{\Gamma}},\le ) is positively ordered, and sufficient conditions for the rings D+[\kern-2pt[ {E}^{{{\mathrm{\Gamma}}}^{\ast },\le }]\kern-2pt] to be Noetherian when ({\mathrm{\Gamma}},\le ) is positively totally ordered. Moreover, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for the ring D+[\kern-2pt[ {I}^{{\Gamma }^{\ast },\le }]\kern-2pt] to be Noetherian when ({\mathrm{\Gamma}},\le ) is positively totally ordered. As corollaries, we give equivalent conditions for the rings D+({X}_{1},\ldots ,{X}_{n})E{[}{X}_{1},\ldots ,{X}_{n}] and D+({X}_{1},\ldots ,{X}_{n})I{[}{X}_{1},\ldots ,{X}_{n}] to be Noetherian.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 166-187
Author(s):  
Elad Carmel

The connection that Hobbes makes between reason, method, and science renders reason a faculty that is not only natural but also acquired and even somewhat exclusive. This idea might pose a serious problem to Hobbes’s political theory, as it relies heavily on the successful use of reason. This problem is demonstrated in Hobbes’s account of the laws of nature, for which some equality in human reason is clearly needed, but Hobbes is not explicit about the relationship between that and the more advanced form of reason that eventually leads to science. This article suggests that Hobbes’s account of reason is developmental. The seed of natural reason is common to everyone, and is sufficient for the establishment of the commonwealth. Thereafter, peace and leisure provide the necessary conditions for developing the rational skill, that is, fulfilling the human potential for rationality. Consequently, under the right circumstances, knowledge and science are expected to progress dramatically for the benefit of society, an open-ended vision which Hobbes nevertheless leaves implicit. Following Hobbes’s account of reason and philosophy closely can therefore show that he might have had great hopes for humankind, and that in this sense he was a key member of an English Enlightenment.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 227
Author(s):  
Mohammad Imam Utoyo ◽  
Basuki Widodo ◽  
Toto Nusantara ◽  
Suhariningsih Suhariningsih

This script was aimed to determine the necessary conditions for boundedness of Riesz potential in the classical Morrey space. If these results are combined with previous research results will be obtained the necessary and sufficient condition for boundedness of Riesz potential. This necessary condition is obtained through the use of characteristic function as one member of the classical Morrey space.


2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 342-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subhash Kochar ◽  
Maochao Xu

A parallel system with heterogeneous exponential component lifetimes is shown to be more skewed (according to the convex transform order) than the system with independent and identically distributed exponential components. As a consequence, equivalent conditions for comparing the variabilities of the largest order statistics from heterogeneous and homogeneous exponential samples in the sense of the dispersive order and the right-spread order are established. A sufficient condition is also given for the proportional hazard rate model.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-33
Author(s):  
Võ Đình Linh

 Tóm tắt— Trong tài liệu [3], khi trình bày về phương pháp xây dựng lược đồ chữ ký số dựa trên các lược đồ định danh chính tắc nhờ phép biến đổi Fiat-Shamir, tác giả đã chỉ ra “điều kiện đủ” để nhận được một lược đồ chữ ký số an toàn dưới tấn công sử dụng thông điệp được lựa chọn thích nghi là lược đồ định danh chính tắc phải an toàn dưới tấn công bị động. Tuy nhiên, tác giả của [3] chưa chỉ ra “điều kiện cần” đối với các lược đồ định danh chính tắc nhằm đảm bảo tính an toàn cho lược đồ chữ ký số được xây dựng. Do đó, trong bài báo này, chúng tôi hoàn thiện kết quả của [3] bằng việc chỉ ra điều kiện đủ đó cũng chính là điều kiện cần.Abstract— In [3], the author shows that, in order to the digital signature scheme Π' resulting from the Fiat-Shamir transform applied to a canonical identification scheme Π is existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attack then a “sufficient” condition is that the scheme Π has to be secure against a passive attack. However, the author of [3] has not shown the “necessary” conditions for the canonical identification schemes to ensure security of the digital signature scheme Π'. In this paper, we complete this result by showing that sufficient condition is also necessary. 


Author(s):  
Jan Christoph Bublitz

Whether there are intrinsic differences between different means to intervene into brains and minds is a key question of neuroethics, which any future legal regulation of mind-interventions has to face. This chapter affirms such differences by a twofold argument:. First, it present differences between direct (biological, physiological) and indirect (psychological) interventions that are not based on crude mind–brain dualisms or dubious properties such as naturalness of interventions. Second, it shows why these differences (should) matter for the law. In a nutshell, this chapter suggests that indirect interventions should be understood as stimuli that persons perceive through their external senses whereas direct interventions reach brains and minds on different, nonperceptual routes. Interventions primarily differ in virtue of their causal pathways. Because of them, persons have different kinds and amounts of control over interventions; direct interventions regularly bypass resistance and control of recipients. Direct interventions also differ from indirect ones because they misappropriate mechanisms of the brain. These differences bear normative relevance in light of the right to mental self-determination, which should be the guiding normative principle with respect to mind-interventions. As a consequence, the law should adopt by and large a normative—not ontological—dualism between interventions into other minds: nonconsensual direct interventions into other minds should be prohibited by law, with few exceptions. By contrast, indirect interventions should be prima facie permissible, primarily those that qualify as exercises of free speech. The chapter also addresses a range of recent objections, especially by Levy (in the previous chapter).


2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (02) ◽  
pp. 342-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subhash Kochar ◽  
Maochao Xu

A parallel system with heterogeneous exponential component lifetimes is shown to be more skewed (according to the convex transform order) than the system with independent and identically distributed exponential components. As a consequence, equivalent conditions for comparing the variabilities of the largest order statistics from heterogeneous and homogeneous exponential samples in the sense of the dispersive order and the right-spread order are established. A sufficient condition is also given for the proportional hazard rate model.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Wang ◽  
Zhidong Teng ◽  
Fengqin Zhang

The dynamic behaviors in a chemostat model with delayed nutrient recycling and periodically pulsed input are studied. By introducing new analysis technique, the sufficient and necessary conditions on the permanence and extinction of the microorganisms are obtained. Furthermore, by using the Liapunov function method, the sufficient condition on the global attractivity of the model is established. Finally, an example is given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the results in this paper.


2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Berger ◽  
David Willer ◽  
Morris Zelditch

Some sociologists argue that sociological theory does not grow and the reason why it does not grow is that the discipline lacks a core of highly developed, almost universally accepted, paradigms; even worse, because it is reflexive, its criteria of problem and theory choice are so noncognitive that there are no paradigms, hence no progress, in its future. We do not question that sociology lacks a core of almost universally accepted paradigms, nor that highly developed paradigms may be a sufficient condition of theory growth, but we question both that universal acceptance of them is necessary and that sociology has nothing like them. We argue that theoretical research programs—sets of strategies, sets of interrelated theories embodying these strategies, and empirical models interpreting these theories—are sufficient for theoretical growth. An examination of three theoretical research programs in this article shows that they perform some of the same functions for theory growth as, in Kuhn, are performed by paradigms. Sociology may lack a universally accepted core, but there are theoretical research programs in sociology, and therefore already there is theory growth if it is looked for in the right place. Nor is there any warrant for the view that because its criteria of problem and theory choice are inescapably noncognitive, there are no paradigms, hence no progress, in sociology's future. If that were true, not only would sociology lack paradigms, but also theoretical research programs. We conclude from our study that sociology need not wait on the emergence of a universally accepted core. It is sufficient for the growth of theory that it develops further its existing theoretical research programs and that it encourages the creation of new programs.


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