Managing Uncertainty in Forensic and Expert Evidence Cases

2019 ◽  
pp. 115-140
Author(s):  
Carolyn Hoyle ◽  
Mai Sato

This chapter examines issues arising from cases that turn on forensic and expert evidence, focusing on how the Criminal Cases Review Commission investigates such applications and makes its decisions. Drawing on a sample of sixty-one cases involving forty-two applicants, the chapter shows how the Commission makes decisions in cases that ‘turn on’ forensic science and expert testimony. It also considers the influence of developments in the ‘surround’ of the Commission and how the surround affects the Commission's decision field — the broad setting within which decision-making at the Commission takes place. Finally, it analyses the role of decision frames in the Commission's decision-making on forensic and expert evidence cases, noting that such frames are characterised by uncertainty and even anxiety. Concerns about the interpretation and presentation of forensic evidence at trial are discussed, along with the legal and narrative frames of decision-making in forensic and expert evidence cases.

Author(s):  
K. Culbreth

The introduction of scanning electron microscopy and energy dispersive x-ray analysis to forensic science has provided additional methods by which investigative evidence can be analyzed. The importance of evidence from the scene of a crime or from the personal belongings of a victim and suspect has resulted in the development and evaluation of SEM/x-ray analysis applications to various types of forensic evidence. The intent of this paper is to describe some of these applications and to relate their importance to the investigation of criminal cases.The depth of field and high resolution of the SEM are an asset to the evaluation of evidence with respect to surface phenomena and physical matches (1). Fig. 1 shows a Phillips screw which has been reconstructed after the head and shank were separated during a hit-and-run accident.


Daedalus ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 147 (4) ◽  
pp. 164-180
Author(s):  
Valerie P. Hans ◽  
Michael J. Saks

The role of the expert witness in trials is a paradox. Judges and jurors need help with matters beyond their understanding, and judges are expected to act as gatekeepers to ensure that jurors are not fooled by misleading expert testimony. Yet, as gatekeepers, judges might not effectively distinguish sound from unsound expert testimony. As factfinders, judges and jurors both might have difficulty comprehending expert evidence, intelligently resolving conflicts between experts, and applying the scientific and technological evidence they hear to the larger dispute before them. This essay explores those problems and a variety of possible solutions, ranging from more effective ways parties might present technical information at trial, to educational interventions supervised by the court, to making juries more effective in performing their task, to more controversial measures, such as replacing conventional juries with special juries and replacing generalist judges with expert judges.


2019 ◽  
pp. 255-282
Author(s):  
Carolyn Hoyle ◽  
Mai Sato

This chapter examines the Criminal Cases Review Commission's decision-making process through the lens of efficiency and thoroughness. It first considers the ‘sense-making’ process of gathering and interpreting information within the Commission and how the Commission prioritises cases before discussing the Commission's formal ‘knowledge-building’ based on expert evidence and complainant credibility, along with its cultural knowledge. It then analyses the Commission's field that sets the boundaries of the scope of organisational enquiry, the decision frames that help individual decision-makers to operationalise the concepts of thoroughness and efficiency, and the key performance indicators used to measure the Commission's success. It also explores the amount of ‘empirical’ investigation beyond ‘desktop’ reviews carried out by case review managers (CRMs) and the use of section 17 powers to obtain information from external bodies and experts. Finally, it explains how the Commission secures compliance without resorting to legal coercion.


2019 ◽  
pp. 68-84
Author(s):  
Carolyn Hoyle ◽  
Mai Sato

This chapter examines the nature of applications for wrongful convictions that the Criminal Cases Review Commission receives and the kinds of issues raised by applicants. It highlights the potential flaws of applications presented to the Commission, such as those relating to investigations conducted by police and prosecutors. It also reviews the extant literature on the sources of wrongful conviction to explain the range of possible misconduct and legal, scientific, or human error that might lead to an applicant being wrongfully convicted, or to believing themselves to be so. A number of sex cases and ‘expert evidence’ cases are discussed to illustrate the fallibility of witnesses, vulnerable suspects, the fallibility of science and expert testimony, due process failures, and the pervasive influence of prejudice and fear. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the changing nature of wrongful convictions over the past decade or two.


2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 133-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald J. Allen

The different contexts of forensic science and juridical decision making are explored to identify the nature of juridical proof, the role of formalized probability theory in it, and how factual inquiry proceeds in the differing domains.


2019 ◽  
pp. 308-338
Author(s):  
Carolyn Hoyle ◽  
Mai Sato

This concluding chapter summarises the book's key findings and examines the main cultural and structural influences on the Criminal Cases Review Commission's decision-making. It begins with a discussion of three significant changes to the Commission's ‘surround’: reductions in legal aid for defendants and appellants; growing evidence of non-disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence by police and prosecution; and the declining reliability of forensic science evidence. The chapter then considers the critics' claim that the Commission's referral rate is too low and how this raises concerns about access to justice, along with developments in the surround in relation to the ‘field’ and the ‘frame’. It also analyses variability in the Commission's response to cases and its relationship with various ‘stakeholders’. Finally, it looks at the notion that the Commission is too ‘deferential’ to the Court of Appeal when it comes to making decisions about which cases meet the ‘real possibility test’.


2021 ◽  
pp. 251-266
Author(s):  
Franco Taroni ◽  
Silvia Bozza ◽  
Alex Biedermann

Uncertainty is an inevitable complication encountered by members of the judiciary who face inference and decision-making as core aspects of their daily activities. Inference, in this context, is mainly inductive and relates to the use of incomplete information, to reason about propositions of interest. Applied to scientific evidence, this means, for example, to reason about whether or not a person of interest is the source of a recovered evidential material and factfinders are required to make decisions about ultimate issues, for example, regarding a defendant’s guilt. The role of forensic scientists, whose duty is to help assess the probative value of scientific findings, is to offer to mandate authorities’ conclusions that are scientifically sound and logically defensible. This chapter lays out the fundamentals of inference and decision-making under uncertainty with regard to forensic evidence. The authors explicate explain the subjectivist version of Bayesianism and analyze the usefulness of the likelihood ratio in for measuring the degree to which the evidence discriminates between competing propositions in a trial. They also underscore emphasize the importance of decision analysis as a framework that forces helps decision-makers to formalize preference structures.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristy Martire ◽  
Danielle Navarro ◽  
Gary Edmond

Title: Exploring Juror Evaluations of Expert Opinions Using the Expert Persuasion Expectancy (ExPEx) Framework PurposeFactfinders in trials struggle to differentiate witnesses who offer genuinely expert opinions from those who do not. The Expert Persuasion Expectancy (ExPEx) framework proposes eight attributes logically relevant to this assessment: foundation, field, specialty, ability, opinion, support, consistency and trustworthiness. We present two experiments examining the effects of these attributes on the persuasiveness of a forensic gait analysis opinion. MethodsJury-eligible participants rated the credibility, value and weight of an expert report that was either generally strong (Exp. 1; N = 437) or generally weak (Exp. 2; N = 435). The quality of ExPEx attributes varied between participants. Allocation to condition (none, foundation, field, specialty, ability, opinion, support, consistency, trustworthiness) determined which attribute in the report would be weak (cf. strong; Exp. 1), or strong (cf. weak; Exp. 2). ResultsIn Experiment 1, the persuasiveness of a strong report was significantly undermined by weak versions of ability, consistency and trustworthiness. In Experiment 2. a weak report was significantly improved by strong versions of ability and consistency. Unplanned analyses of subjective ratings also identified effects of foundation, field, specialty and opinion.ConclusionsWe found that evidence that ability (i.e., personal proficiency), consistency (i.e., endorsement by other experts), and trustworthiness (i.e., objectivity) attributes influence opinion persuasiveness in logically appropriate ways. Ensuring that factfinders have information about these attributes may improve their assessments of expert opinion evidence. KEYWORDS: Expert opinion; Persuasion; Expert Testimony; Jury decision-making; Expert evidence


2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 701-707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Loane Skene

It is commonly said that patients (or their representatives) have no right to demand that treatment must be continued when medical carers believe it is “futile” to continue it. There are certainly many judicial statements to this effect, some of which are quoted in this paper. However, there are various ways that courts can intervene, even if they do not order directly that treatment must be provided or continued. First, patients or their representatives may argue the process of decision making was unfair or that they were unfairly discriminated against when treatment has been refused. To date, these arguments have met with limited success so far as enabling patients to have treatment provided or continued against medical advice. More recently, however, some patients have challenged the lawfulness of a proposed treatment regime by advancing human rights arguments, based in turn on a broader aspect of patients’ “best interests” than best medical interests.


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