The Deaths of Combatants

Author(s):  
Michael L Gross

Although there are few restrictions on killing combatants, the contemporary law of war bans weapons that cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering. Because military necessity and humanitarian norms often conflict, no clear regulations have emerged. Instead, states sometimes ban weapons because they cause horrific wounds. But this determination is subjective and has led the Red Cross to seek objective medical guidelines on unnecessary suffering. A close look shows how it is often difficult to apply these guidelines to new non-lethal technologies, which include electromagnetic, pharmacological, and neurological weapons. These weapons do not cause obvious injury and suffering and may even reduce combatant and civilian injuries. Nevertheless, they can cause intense transient pain or impinge upon human dignity when they undermine cognitive capabilities. Weighing the costs of new technologies against their benefits remains an abiding challenge for humanitarian law.

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID LUBAN

AbstractMilitary and humanitarian lawyers approach the laws of war in different ways. For military lawyers, the starting point is military necessity, and the reigning assumption is that legal regulation of war must accommodate military necessity. For humanitarian lawyers, the starting point is human dignity and human rights. The result is two interpretive communities that systematically disagree not only over the meaning of particular law-of-war norms, but also over the sources and methods of law that could be used to resolve the disagreements. That raises the question whether military lawyers’ advice should acknowledge any validity to the contrary views of the ‘humanitarian’ community. The article offers a systematic analysis of the concept of military necessity, showing that civilian interests must figure in assessing military necessity itself. Even on its own terms, the military version of the law of war should seek to accommodate the civilian perspectives featured in the humanitarian version.


2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Buchan

Under international humanitarian law it is prohibited to make the object of attack a person who has surrendered. This article explores the circumstances in which the act of surrender is effective under international humanitarian law and examines, in particular, how surrender can be achieved in practical terms during land warfare in the context of international and non-international armed conflict. First, the article situates surrender within its broader historical and theoretical setting, tracing its legal development as a rule of conventional and customary international humanitarian law and arguing that its crystallisation as a law of war derives from the lack of military necessity to directly target persons who have placed themselves outside the theatre of armed conflict, and that such conduct is unacceptable from a humanitarian perspective. Second, after a careful examination of state practice, the article proposes a three-stage test for determining whether persons have surrendered under international humanitarian law: (1) Have persons attempting to surrender engaged in a positive act which clearly reveals that they no longer intend to participate in hostilities? (2) Is it reasonable in the circumstances prevailing at the time for the opposing force to discern the offer of surrender? and (3) Have surrendered persons unconditionally submitted to the authority of their captor?


1976 ◽  
Vol 16 (185) ◽  
pp. 387-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yolande Diallo

Mrs Diallo went recently to Africa at the request of the ICRC for which she drew up a report, which it gives us pleasure to publish, in view of the interest of the Red Cross in demonstrating that the profound idea which inspired it, the idea of respect for human dignity and of unselfish help for those who suffer, is an inseparable part of man's heritage.


Author(s):  
L. G. Green

In 1974 there took place in Geneva the first session of a diplomatic conference called by Switzerland at the instance of the International Committee of the Red Cross to update the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, particularly with a view to the more careful definition and exposition of what might be described as the fundamental humanitarian principles of law with regard to armed conflict. While it would be an unduly narrow assumption that humanitarian law is only relevant to an armed conflict, it must not be forgotten that breaches thereof are more likely to occur at such a time, for the man in the field has normally been trained to overthrow and if possible kill enemy personnel, even to the extent that occasionally his basic training may be in conflict with the requirements of the law of war. Generally speaking, the ordinary noncommissioned officer is unlikely to stress overmuch the restriction on the permitted means and methods of warfare to be found in the Regulations attached to Hague Convention IV of 1907. Moreover, the ideological campaigns which accompany any major war, with comments by politicians, commanders, and media alike, implying that the enemy has resorted to conduct that might only be expected from those who have placed themselves outside the protection of law or morality accompanied by insulting nicknames that suggest the enemy is not even human, all contribute to the ordinary soldier's idea that destruction of the enemy is the aim and the end regardless of the means employed to achieve it. Examples of this type of situation may be seen in both world wars, as well as in relation to the campaigns in Korea and Vietnam. However, international law has always recognized that there is a law of war and that breaches thereof may result in punishment. The simplest means of imposing such punishment, without at the same time appearing to abandon all sense of legal propriety, is by way of the trial of war criminals.


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (318) ◽  
pp. 309-310

The International Committee of the Red Cross is privileged to address this conference which has the task of strengthening one of the earliest prohibitions of international humanitarian law: the proscription against the use of poison as a means of warfare. This norm has its basis not only in the 1899 Hague Declaration (2) and 1907 Hague Convention (IV) but also in the rules of warfare of diverse moral and cultural systems. Ancient Greeks and Romans customarily observed a prohibition on the use of poison and poison weapons. By 500 BC the Manu Law of War in India had banned the use of such arms. A millennium later regulations on the conduct of war drawn from the Koran by the Saracens forbade poisoning.


Author(s):  
Schmitt Michael N

This chapter explores the principles and rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) that govern the conduct of hostilities by states and other participants during an armed conflict. The term ‘conduct of hostilities’ refers to the application of force in the course of such conflicts. In particular, it encompasses the various methods (tactics) and the means (weapons) that are used during the hostilities. Those aspects of IHL that address the conduct of hostilities can best be understood by reference to a normative typology consisting of foundational principles, general principles, and rules. There are two foundational principles underlying the IHL applicable to the conduct of hostilities: military necessity and humanity. Whereas foundational principles broadly inform IHL, general IHL principles are the sources of individual rules. Rules are the instruments by which states, the sole generators of IHL, agree to limit their freedom of action, and that of other participants, during an armed conflict. The chapter then looks at certain new technologies warfare and highlights the key legal issues they raise with respect to the conduct of hostilities.


1998 ◽  
Vol 38 (324) ◽  
pp. 403-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdul G. Koroma

The decision of the International Review of the Red Cross to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is both understandable and commendable, given the Review's mission to promote and strive for observance of international humanitarian law during armed conflicts and the increasing convergence of that law with human rights law — as evidenced by the gradual substitution of the term “international humanitarian law” for the term “the law of war”.


The conduct of warfare is constantly shaped by forces beyond the battlefield. These forces create complexities in the battlespace for military operations. The ever-changing nature of how and where wars are fought creates challenges for the application of the unchanging body of international law that regulates armed conflicts. The term “complex” is often used to describe modern warfare, but what makes modern warfare complex? Is it the increasingly urbanized battlefield where wars are fought, which is cluttered with civilians and civilian objects? Is it the rise of State-like organized armed groups that leverage the governance vacuum created by failed or failing States? Is it the introduction of new technologies to military operations like autonomous weapons, cyber capabilities, and unmanned aerial systems? Or is it the application of multiple legal regimes to a single conflict? Collectively, these questions formed the basis for the Complex Battlespaces Workshop in which legal scholars and experts from the field of practice came together to discuss these complexities. During the workshop, there was a general consensus that the existing law was sufficient to regulate modern warfare. The challenge, however, arises in application of the law to new technologies, military operations in urban environments, and other issues related to applying international human rights law and international humanitarian law to non-international armed conflicts. This inaugural volume of the Lieber Book Series seeks to address many of the complexities that arise during the application of international law to modern warfare.


The ICRC Library is home to unique collections retracing the parallel development of humanitarian action and law during the past 150+ years. With the core of these collections now digitized, this reference library on international humanitarian law (IHL) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a resource available to all, anytime, anywhere.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Thibaut Moulin

The emergence of new technologies might challenge our assumptions about biomedical research: medical progress may not only cure but enhance human capacities. In particular, the emergence of brain-machine interfaces will admittedly allow disabled people to move or communicate again, but also has various military applications, such as remote control of drones and avatars. Although there is no express legal framework pertaining to the experimental phase of human enhancement techniques, they are actually constrained by international law. According to international humanitarian law, civilians and prisoners of war may be subjected to experiments only when required by their state of health or for medical treatment. According to international human rights law, experimentations are permissible when they meet two conditions: (i) free consent, and (ii) proportionality (that is, the adequacy of risk and benefit). In light of these conditions, this article assesses the situations in which experimentation involving brain-computer interfaces would be lawful. It also gives specific attention to those experimentations carried out on members of the armed forces. In fact, owing to the military hierarchy and the unique nature of its mission (to protect national security at the risk of their own lives), it is necessary to determine how the military may comply with this legal framework.


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