Experts and Peer Disagreement

Mapping Intimacies ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198798705.003.0012 ◽

2018 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Jennifer Lackey

Keyword(s):

Peer Disagreement ◽

Alternative Approach ◽

Epistemic Peers ◽

Central Argument

It is often argued that widespread disagreement among epistemic peers in a domain threatens expertise in that domain. This chapter sketches two different conceptions of expertise: the expert-as-authority and the expert-as-advisor models. While it is standard for philosophers to understand expertise as authoritative, such an approach renders the problem posed by widespread peer disagreement intractable. This chapter argues, however, that there are independent reasons to reject both this model of expertise and the central argument offered on its behalf. The chapter then develops an alternative approach—one that understands expertise in terms of advice—that not only avoids the problems afflicting the expert-as-authority model, but also has the resources for a much more satisfying response to the problem of widespread peer disagreement.

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The Free-Standing Company: a “zombie” theory of international business history?

Journal of Management History ◽

10.1108/jmh-09-2017-0043 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 24 (2) ◽

pp. 156-173 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Simon Mollan

Keyword(s):

International Business ◽

Business History ◽

Historical Evidence ◽

Free Standing ◽

Theoretical Understanding ◽

Content Type ◽

International Firms ◽

Alternative Approach ◽

Central Argument ◽

New Framework

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to decompose the historical and conceptual basis of the Free-Standing Company (FSC) in international business history. This is used to critique the FSC concept. The paper then provides a new framework to explain the lifecycle of these firms in a theoretically sensitive way. Design/methodology/approach The paper is conceptual. The argument is developed through a critical reading of the existing literature. Findings The central argument presented is that the FSC concept is ahistorical and cannot fully explain the firms it considers over time. An alternative approach is proposed. Research limitations/implications The paper does not present new (archival) historical evidence. Originality/value The central contribution/ambition of the paper is to advance the theoretical understanding of international firms of considerable historical importance. The ambition of the paper is to help renew research into this important historical organizational form that speaks directly to the ability of historical research to help advance international business theory.

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Desacuerdo entre pares epistémicos en el debate naturaleza-cultura

Principia an international journal of epistemology ◽

10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n3p485 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 22 (3) ◽

pp. 485-506

Author(s):

Nahuel Pallitto

Keyword(s):

Life Sciences ◽

Peer Disagreement ◽

Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽

Epistemic Practices ◽

Epistemic Peer ◽

Epistemic Peers

Scientific disagreements constitute valuable resources for reflecting on epistemic peer disagreements. In this essay I engage in the debate whether epistemic peers who disagree should be conciliatory or steadfast by examining how scientists actually react in the so called nature-nurture debate. The main conclusion of the analysis is that, when taking into consideration concrete epistemic practices with peers responding to different epistemic perspectives, scientists have good reasons to be steadfast. At the same time, the theoretical conceptualizations of the epistemology of peer disagreement illuminates certain aspects of the nature-nurture debate, such as its long persistence. Therefore, this article contributes both to the debate over the epistemology of disagreement and to the understanding of a never-ending controversy in the life sciences.

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Knowledge and belief

10.1093/oso/9780198792154.003.0008 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Sarah Moss

Keyword(s):

Statistical Inference ◽

Theory Of Knowledge ◽

Peer Disagreement ◽

Perceptual Knowledge ◽

Knowledge Norm ◽

Epistemic Peer ◽

Wide Range ◽

Probabilistic Knowledge ◽

Epistemic Peers ◽

Imprecise Credences

This chapter uses probabilistic knowledge to defend compelling positions in contemporary epistemological debates. The chapter starts by developing a knowledge norm for probabilistic belief and applying this norm to debates about what you should believe when you find out that you disagree with an epistemic peer. By contrast with existing views of peer disagreement, the knowledge norm defended in this chapter can yield the intuitive verdict that disagreeing epistemic peers should adopt imprecise credences, thereby suspending judgment about probabilistic contents that they disagree about. Probabilistic knowledge is also used in this chapter to give a theory of knowledge by statistical inference, as well as to defend dogmatism about perceptual knowledge from a wide range of recent objections.

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A Vindication of the Equal-Weight View

Episteme ◽

10.3366/e1742360009000744 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 6 (3) ◽

pp. 324-335 ◽

Cited By ~ 26

Author(s):

Tomas Bogardus

Keyword(s):

The Other ◽

Equal Weight ◽

Peer Disagreement ◽

Equal Weight View ◽

Direct Acquaintance ◽

Epistemic Peers

ABSTRACTSome philosophers believe that when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other's assessment the same weight as her own. I first make the antecedent of this Equal-Weight View more precise, and then I motivate the View by describing cases in which it gives the intuitively correct verdict. Next I introduce some apparent counterexamples–cases of apparent peer disagreement in which, intuitively, one should not give equal weight to the other party's assessment. To defuse these apparent counterexamples, an advocate of the View might try to explain how they are not genuine cases of peer disagreement. I examine David Christensen's and Adam Elga's explanations and find them wanting. I then offer a novel explanation, which turns on a distinction between knowledge from reports and knowledge from direct acquaintance. Finally, I extend my explanation to provide a handy and satisfying response to the charge of self-defeat.

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What is new in “a new history of management”?

Journal of Management History ◽

10.1108/jmh-07-2018-0033 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 25 (1) ◽

pp. 114-124 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Bernardo Batiz-Lazo

Keyword(s):

Business Organizations ◽

Organization Studies ◽

Content Type ◽

General Management ◽

Alternative Approach ◽

History Of ◽

Central Argument ◽

General Studies ◽

Business And Management ◽

Systematic Thinking

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to evaluate the contributions of the so-called “Historic Turn” in Organization Studies through the attempt by Cummingset al.(2016) to offer a new and alternative approach to teaching and researching the history of management ideas.A New History of Managementis intended to be a provocation rather than a practical plan, and by their own admission, Cummingset al.(2016) prefer controversy to detailed analysis.Design/methodology/approachThis paper offers a comment and reinterpretation of a single contribution to highlight deficiencies which are symptomatic of the post-modernist research agenda around the “Historic Turn” in Organization Studies. The argument develops through a critical reading of Cummingset al.(2016) to determine whether theirs is a thoughtful and serious piece of work.FindingsCummingset al.(2016) invite us to revise and re-evaluate the genesis of management ideas available across textbooks. This by questioning some of the beliefs regarding the origins of management thought within textbooks aimed at both general management and the history of management thought. The premise of Cummings and colleagues is a timely and welcomed suggestion. So is their attempt to broaden the debate to alternative epistemological positions. They can potentially help to improve the emergence of conceptual and theoretical understandings of the history of managers’, business and management thought. Although far from being exhaustive, the paper points to the large number of inconsistencies and poor historiography in Cummingset al.(2016). This is in line with other contributions to the so-called “Historic Turn” in Organization Studies. The central argument presented by this paper is the myopic and technically poor approach of the “Historic Turn”. It is the case that Cummingset al.(2016) fail in their attempt to offer an alternative to established textbooks or explain the development of different approaches to construct systematic studies that, over time, consider the evolution of management, managers and those who have conceptualized their performance.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper does not present new (archival) historical evidence.Originality/valueThe central contribution/ambition of this paper is to incentivize an advance of the current understanding of the origins and evolution of systematic thinking on management, managers and business organizations. The ambition of this paper is in line with Cummingset al.(2016) aim to incentivize research into how textbooks address the origins of management and management thought. Textbooks in both general management and the history of management thought, and the story told in them are important tools that speak directly to the ability of historical research to help advance the different disciplines that form general studies in business and management.

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Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible

Philosophia ◽

10.1007/s11406-021-00326-6 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

John Eriksson ◽

Marco Tiozzo

Keyword(s):

Moral Disagreement ◽

Moral Judgments ◽

Peer Disagreement ◽

Epistemic Peers

AbstractRichard Rowland has recently argued that considerations based on moral disagreement between epistemic peers give us reason to think that cognitivism about moral judgments, i.e., the thesis that moral judgments are beliefs, is false. The novelty of Rowland’s argument is to tweak the problem descriptively, i.e., not focusing on what one ought to do, but on what disputants actually do in the light of peer disagreement. The basic idea is that moral peer disagreement is intelligible. However, if moral judgments were beliefs, and beliefs track perceived evidence, then moral peer disagreement would not be intelligible. Hence, moral judgments are not beliefs. The argument is both novel and interesting, but this paper argues that it fails to establish the conclusion. Beliefs are plausibly analyzed as constituted by dispositions to respond to what is perceived as evidence, but dispositions can always be interfered with. Provided a background explanation of why the disposition is not manifested, peer intransigence is quite intelligible.

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Equality in the theory of international society: Kelsen, Rawls and the English School

Review of International Studies ◽

10.1017/s026021051000149x ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 37 (5) ◽

pp. 2585-2602 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

RONNIE HJORTH

Keyword(s):

International Society ◽

English School ◽

Alternative Approach ◽

Central Argument ◽

Point Of Departure

AbstractThis article examines the idea of equality in the theory of international society. Contrary to the widespread contemporary notion of equality as a corollary principle to sovereignty, the central argument of the article is that equality and sovereignty can and ought to be disconnected, and that the concept of equality, when uncoupled from sovereignty, is a better point of departure when theorising international society than is, for example, non-intervention or sovereignty. An alternative approach to deal with equality of states and other entities within international society is sketched out.

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