Introduction

Author(s):  
Joseph Levine

In this paper I chart the evolution of my thinking on the metaphysical status of consciousness from the position defended in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness to the present. Originally I argued that materialism is very likely true, but we still couldn’t understand how it could be true, whereas now I believe, on the basis of inference to the best explanation, that it is likely false. However, I still maintain that there is no direct argument from conceivability considerations to the falsehood of materialism. In the rest of the paper I give a brief overview of the papers included in the volume.

Author(s):  
Barry Stroud

This chapter challenges the notion that the colours we believe to belong to the objects we see are ‘secondary’ qualities of those objects. Such a notion is endorsed by John McDowell, who has explained why he thinks the author is wrong to resist it. McDowell recognizes that the author’s focus on the conditions of successfully unmasking the metaphysical status of the colours of things is a way of trying to make sense of whatever notion of reality is involved in it. However, the author argues that the notion of reality he is concerned with is ‘independent reality’, not simply the general notion of reality. He also contends that an exclusively dispositional conception of an object’s being a certain colour cannot account for the perceptions we have of the colours of things.


2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 285-303
Author(s):  
Chon Tejedor
Keyword(s):  

Analysis ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
I. M. Schnall ◽  
D. Widerker

Phronesis ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 371-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Eunyoung Ju

AbstractScholars have long recognised the interest of the Stoics' thought on geometrical limits, both as a specific topic in their physics and within the context of the school's ontological taxonomy. Unfortunately, insufficient textual evidence remains for us to reconstruct their discussion fully. The sources we do have on Stoic geometrical themes are highly polemical, tending to reveal a disagreement as to whether limit is to be understood as a mere concept, as a body or as an incorporeal. In my view, this disagreement held among the historical Stoics, rather than simply reflecting a doxographical divergence in transmission. This apparently Stoic disagreement has generated extensive debate, in which there is still no consensus as to a standard Stoic doctrine of limit. The evidence is thin, and little of it refers in detail to specific texts, especially from the school's founders. But in its overall features the evidence suggests that Posidonius and Cleomedes differed from their Stoic precursors on this topic. There are also grounds for believing that some degree of disagreement obtained between the early Stoics over the metaphysical status of shape. Assuming the Stoics did so disagree, the principal question in the scholarship on Stoic ontology is whether there were actually positions that might be called "standard" within Stoicism on the topic of limit. In attempting to answer this question, my discussion initially sets out to illuminate certain features of early Stoic thinking about limit, and then takes stock of the views offered by late Stoics, notably Posidonius and Cleomedes. Attention to Stoic arguments suggests that the school's founders developed two accounts of shape: on the one hand, as a thought-construct, and, on the other, as a body. In an attempt to resolve the crux bequeathed to them, the school's successors suggested that limits are incorporeal. While the authorship of this last notion cannot be securely identified on account of the absence of direct evidence, it may be traced back to Posidonius, and it went on to have subsequent influence on Stoic thinking, namely in Cleomedes' astronomy.


Res Publica ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-214
Author(s):  
Tim Heysse

Historians and theoreticians of nationalism and nationalist movements are perplexed by the fact that so much of what nationalists believe is evidently not the case. One example of this concerns the ontological or metaphysical status of the nation: whether nations as a form of political community are in the very nature of things or whether they are rather a recent way of imagining the political community.I question the meaning terms such as 'natural', 'imagined' and 'objective'/'subjective' have when we are talking about the nation as the foundation of political legitimacy. Ido this by explaining what meaning those terms have in the philosophical reconstruction of interpretation and communication by the American philosopher Donald Davidson.


Author(s):  
Edward A David

Abstract In recent years, a variety of corporate litigants, from houses of worship to for-profit enterprises, have brought religious liberty suits to the US Supreme Court. Interestingly, the metaphysical status of such litigants has been subject to intense debate by judges and commentators alike. Are these litigants corporate moral persons or mere aggregates of individuals? How, if at all, does their metaphysical status affect our assignment of corporate rights to religious freedom? While many have entertained such questions, others reject them as morally distracting. This article challenges that latter position. Drawing upon the natural law tradition, I argue that group ontology can be used in the assignment of corporate rights in a morally illuminating way. I point out the tradition’s distinctive ontology, which views groups primarily as social actions, subject to moral evaluation. I then discuss how this conception moves attention away from polarizing rights-based discourse towards measured consideration of what is morally right. Finally, I show how this ontology helps practical reasoning to discover a variety of (non-rights-based) reasons and means to protect religious freedoms as well as other moral stakes. Far from causing moral distraction, a natural law group ontology facilitates careful moral deliberation.


1991 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-22
Author(s):  
Austin Lewis ◽  

1978 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. M. Loynes

1. Summary and introductionIn (5) a weak convergence result for U-statistics was obtained as a special case of a reverse martingale theorem; in (7) Miller and Sen obtained another such result for U-statistics by a direct argument. As they stand these results are not very closely connected, since one is concerned with U-statistics Uk for k ≥ n, while the other deals with Uk for k ≤ n, but if one instead thinks of k as unrestricted and transforms the random functions Xn which enter into one of these results into new functions Yn by setting Yn(t) = tXn(t−1) one finds that the Yn are (aside from variations in interpolated values) just the functions with which the other result is concerned. As the limiting Wiener process W is well-known to have the property that tW(t−1) is another Wiener process it is not too surprising that both results should hold, and part of the purpose of this paper is to provide a general framework within which the relationship between these results will become clear. A second purpose is to illustrate the simplification that the martingale property brings to weak convergence studies; this is shown both in the U-statistic example and in a new proof of the convergence of the empirical process.


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